Benjamin Schnell

The decision addresses a pretrial motion regarding the admissibility of bad character evidence about the complainant in a sexual assault prosecution.

The Applicant sought to introduce evidence from Brittany Crozier regarding the complainant’s alleged drug use and trafficking while incarcerated, arguing it was relevant to credibility and reliability.

The court found the evidence to be collateral, of low probative value, and likely to distract and confuse the jury, and excluded it.

The ruling reviews the collateral fact rule and its exceptions, and applies the balancing of probative value versus prejudicial effect.

This decision addresses two pretrial motions: the Crown’s application to admit prior consistent statements of the complainant, and the admissibility of statements from both the complainant and Mr. Burnette as res gestae and, for Mr. Burnette, as after-the-fact conduct.

The court reviews the legal framework for prior consistent statements, the narrative exception, and the admissibility of after-the-fact conduct, ultimately allowing certain narrative evidence and after-the-fact conduct to be admitted, but excluding the audio recording of a prior consistent statement as evidence.

This decision addresses whether compelled statements made by a correctional officer during a disciplinary investigation can be used in a subsequent criminal trial.

The court held that the statements, made under statutory compulsion and in an adversarial context, are excluded from use for any purpose in the criminal proceedings, including for cross-examination on credibility.

The ruling applies the Supreme Court’s guidance in R. v. White and R. v. Nedelcu, emphasizing the protection against self-incrimination under section 7 of the Charter.

The decision addresses whether intercepted telephone communications of a complainant, disclosed to the accused in a sexual assault prosecution, constitute "records" under section 278.1 of the Criminal Code and, if so, whether they are admissible under section 278.92.

The court finds that the intercepted calls are "records" and that limited cross-examination on certain topics (money, parole, and civil action) is permitted, as the probative value is not substantially outweighed by prejudice.

The ruling clarifies the application of the s. 278 regime to institutional records and the balancing of privacy and fair trial rights.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting breathalyzer results despite alleged Charter breaches and in failing to find a s. 10(b) breach regarding his need for an interpreter.

The summary conviction appeal court found no ss. 8, 9, or 10(b) Charter breaches and held the evidence was admissible.

However, the appeal court found the trial judge erred by taking judicial notice that the appellant's blood alcohol concentration proved impairment without giving the parties notice.

Consequently, the impaired driving conviction was quashed, but the conditional stay on the 'over-80' charge was lifted, a conviction was entered, and the same sentence of a $1,500 fine and a one-year driving prohibition was imposed.

This ruling addresses an application by the accused, Donald McCarthy, under s. 276 of the Criminal Code to admit evidence of the complainant's prior sexual activity in a sexual assault trial.

The proposed evidence included a prior consensual sexual encounter and discussions about a threesome, which the accused argued were relevant to the complainant's credibility due to alleged inconsistencies in her statements.

The court found no material inconsistency, noting the complainant's initial police statement was limited by specific police instructions.

The court determined the proposed evidence lacked significant probative value and was substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice, particularly considering the complainant's Indigenous identity and the private nature of the "Threesome Evidence." The application was dismissed.

This is a sentencing decision for Hesham Aly, who was found guilty by a jury of fraudulent personation with intent to cause disadvantage, contrary to s. 403(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

Aly, a former social worker, impersonated two former colleagues and disclosed confidential client information from social service agencies to various organizations and media outlets, motivated by revenge after his termination and a human rights complaint.

The court found numerous aggravating factors, including the planned and deliberate nature of the acts, malice, sophistication, significant impact on victims and organizations, breach of trust, and betrayal of professional standards.

Aly absconded before sentencing.

The court sentenced Aly to 4 years imprisonment, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence due to the egregious breach of trust and harm caused to vulnerable persons and community institutions.

Sentencing following a jury conviction for sexual assault involving an incapacitated complainant.

The sentencing judge conducted independent fact-finding on aggravating circumstances, applying the jury-verdict framework and the W.D. credibility analysis, and found beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant never consented, lacked capacity when intercourse began, and that the offender knew of that incapacity.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court held that penetrative sexual assault of an incapacitated adult with significant victim impact and added throat contact attracted a penitentiary term.

A 42-month custodial sentence was imposed with ancillary non-communication, DNA, and firearms orders, while the SOIRA issue was deferred.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

He raised six grounds of appeal, including challenges to the admission of hearsay evidence regarding the breathalyzer's calibration, the application of the repealed presumption of identity, the reasonableness of the delay in taking breath samples, the officer's grounds for arrest, and the Crown's failure to disclose the analyst's certificate.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed all grounds, finding no errors in the trial judge's application of the law or assessment of the evidence.

Thomas Dyer was sentenced for uttering threats against the Prime Minister at a campaign event.

The court emphasized the seriousness of threatening a high-ranking elected official and the anti-democratic nature of such conduct, highlighting the need for denunciation and deterrence.

While acknowledging the accused's traumatic brain injury, subsequent rehabilitation, and family responsibilities as mitigating factors, the court found the Crown's proposed fine and probation too lenient.

A 60-day conditional sentence was imposed, along with 12 months of probation including 100 hours of community service, and a DNA order.

The court declined a new weapons prohibition due to an existing lifetime ban.

The defendant, charged with fraudulent personation following data breaches at his former employer, brought an application alleging a breach of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The court calculated the total delay from the date the information was sworn and deducted periods of defence delay, including time spent pursuing resolution discussions and delays in obtaining instructions.

The net delay was found to be 28 months and 6 days, which is below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for superior courts.

The defendant failed to establish that the delay was unreasonable, and the application was dismissed.

The court also noted in obiter that the COVID-19 pandemic would constitute exceptional circumstances justifying delay.

The corporate defendant, operating a bar, pleaded guilty to regulatory offences under the Liquor Licence Act for permitting drunkenness and selling liquor to an intoxicated person.

A patron was over-served at the establishment and subsequently caused a fatal motor vehicle collision.

The court applied sentencing principles for corporate regulatory offences, emphasizing deterrence and prevention.

Weighing the severe aggravating consequence of death against mitigating factors including early guilty pleas, lack of prior record, and staff training, the court imposed a total fine of $40,000 plus a $10,000 victim surcharge.

The applicant, charged with fraudulent personation, brought a pre-trial application seeking to exclude evidence seized from his residence pursuant to a search warrant, alleging a breach of his s. 8 Charter rights.

The applicant argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) was facially invalid because it failed to sufficiently connect him to the IP address used in the offences or establish that a search of his new residence would afford evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding the ITO contained a sufficient circumstantial basis linking the applicant to the IP address and establishing reasonable grounds to believe electronic devices would be found at his residence.

The warrant was validly issued, and no Charter breach occurred.

The accused, Ranveer Singh, was charged with sexual assault.

The complainant's evidence regarding lack of consent and the precise nature of the touching raised credibility and reliability concerns due to inconsistencies between her stated feelings/motives and actions, and contradictory factual accounts.

The accused claimed the complainant consented through her conduct, which he perceived as sexual advances.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove the absence of consent beyond a reasonable doubt, and also failed to disprove the accused's honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused brought a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of his detention.

In an addendum to a previous ruling, the court reconsidered its conclusion regarding arbitrary detention under section 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that although the officer was a trespasser at the point of detention, rendering the detention unlawful and thus arbitrary, the evidence would not be excluded under section 24(2) as admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The trial proceeded.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging that a police officer violated his section 8 rights (freedom from unreasonable search and seizure) by attending at his front door and entering his home foyer without a warrant, and his section 9 rights (freedom from arbitrary detention) by demanding his driver's licence, vehicle registration, and insurance while inside the home.

The court found that the officer's attendance at the door for the purpose of gathering evidence exceeded the implied invitation doctrine, and that the officer's entry into the foyer was unlawful.

However, the court admitted the evidence obtained during the breach under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that exclusion would not be necessary to preserve the repute of the administration of justice.

The accused pleaded guilty to three firearms offences: possession of restricted firearms (contrary to s. 95), careless storage of a firearm (contrary to s. 86), and occupant of a motor vehicle with knowledge of a firearm (contrary to s. 94).

The accused inherited his father's firearms collection following his parents' deaths and unlawfully possessed handguns for approximately eight months.

The accused accidentally shot himself with one of the handguns, leading to police discovery of the weapons.

The court imposed a 12-month conditional sentence with electronic monitoring and home confinement for the first six months, finding that while firearms offences are serious, the accused's lack of criminal record, remorse, prosocial character, and the context of his parents' recent deaths warranted a conditional sentence rather than incarceration.