Nicholas Wansbutter

David H. Whetham was sentenced for eight criminal charges, including possession of fentanyl, methamphetamine, cocaine, and hydromorphone for the purpose of trafficking, as well as multiple firearms offences (possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, possession while prohibited, careless storage) and possession of identity documents.

The offences occurred while the accused was subject to a prior weapon prohibition order.

A Charter breach (sections 8 and 9) was found regarding the search warrant that led to the seizure of evidence, but the evidence was admitted under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the accused's related criminal record and the dangerous combination of drugs and firearms, and mitigating factors including a challenging childhood, substance abuse issues, and the Charter breach.

The Crown sought a 10-year sentence, while the defence proposed 6 years (net 5).

The court imposed a total sentence of 8 years imprisonment, with 67 months remaining after accounting for 29 months of pre-sentence custody credit, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, particularly for fentanyl trafficking.

Concurrent sentences were imposed for the other charges, along with life and 10-year weapon prohibition orders, secondary DNA orders, and a forfeiture order.

The accused brought an application to exclude evidence under sections 8, 9, and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing that a search warrant for his residence and his subsequent arrest lacked reasonable grounds.

The court found that the accused's Charter rights under sections 8 and 9 were violated due to insufficient grounds in the heavily redacted Information to Obtain and lack of reasonable grounds for arrest.

However, applying the R. v. Grant analysis, the court determined that while the impact on the accused's privacy was significant, the seriousness of the police conduct was weak, and society's interest in an adjudication on the merits for serious charges (including possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and trafficking fentanyl) outweighed the Charter breaches.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

Subsequently, the court found the accused guilty on all eight charges, concluding that the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had knowledge and control over the seized items, particularly given the distinctive safe key found on his person.

Thomas Dyer was sentenced for uttering threats against the Prime Minister at a campaign event.

The court emphasized the seriousness of threatening a high-ranking elected official and the anti-democratic nature of such conduct, highlighting the need for denunciation and deterrence.

While acknowledging the accused's traumatic brain injury, subsequent rehabilitation, and family responsibilities as mitigating factors, the court found the Crown's proposed fine and probation too lenient.

A 60-day conditional sentence was imposed, along with 12 months of probation including 100 hours of community service, and a DNA order.

The court declined a new weapons prohibition due to an existing lifetime ban.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of sexual interference, sexual assault, sexual assault with a weapon, unlawful confinement, and incest arising from allegations that he repeatedly sexually abused his daughter over several years.

The defence challenged the credibility and reliability of the complainant’s evidence, emphasizing inconsistencies and incremental disclosure during police interviews and testimony.

The court accepted the complainant’s explanations for delayed and selective disclosure, noting the dynamics of trauma, familial relationships, and the difficulty of reporting incest.

After carefully scrutinizing credibility and reliability, the court found the complainant’s testimony compelling and consistent with lived experience.

The Crown proved the essential elements of the offences beyond a reasonable doubt and the accused was convicted on ten counts.

The accused brought pre-trial applications alleging breaches of their rights under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter, seeking the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2).

The charges stemmed from a traffic stop where police discovered methamphetamine, hydromorphone, and weapons.

The court found that the police officer used the traffic stop as a pretext to investigate suspicions of drug activity and probation breaches, without legitimate highway safety concerns.

This constituted an arbitrary detention under s. 9 of the Charter, which tainted the subsequent plain view seizure and searches incident to arrest, violating s. 8.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute due to the seriousness of the police misconduct.

The evidence was excluded.

The accused brought a pre-trial application alleging a breach of his section 8 Charter rights and seeking the exclusion of evidence under section 24(2).

The accused challenged the facial validity of a search warrant issued under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, arguing the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked sufficient reliable evidence.

The court reviewed the ITO, which relied on information from a confidential informant corroborated by police surveillance.

The court found that the ITO contained sufficient credible and reliable evidence to permit the authorizing justice to find reasonable grounds to issue the warrant.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with impaired operation by drug and taking a motor vehicle without consent, brought a Rowbotham application seeking state-funded counsel.

The court applied the three-part test for a Rowbotham order.

While the applicant had been refused Legal Aid, the court found he failed to establish impecuniosity, as he had the ability to work and earn funds before trial.

Furthermore, the court held that the applicant's right to a fair trial would not be materially compromised without counsel, given the straightforward nature of the case, his cognitive abilities, and the trial judge's duty to assist an unrepresented accused.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown brought a voir dire application to determine the voluntariness of videotaped statements made by the accused during a formal police interview.

The accused had been arrested after fleeing police and was apprehended with the assistance of a police dog, resulting in significant bite injuries.

Prior to the interview, the accused experienced severe pain, sleep deprivation, and a lack of food.

The court found no police trickery or improper threats or promises.

However, considering the cumulative effect of the accused's pain, sleep deprivation, medication, and lack of food, the court had a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused's statements were voluntary.

The statements were ruled inadmissible.

The Crown brought a pretrial application to determine the voluntariness of videotaped statements made by the accused during a police interview.

The accused argued the statements were involuntary due to subtle promises, oppressive circumstances, and a breach of his right to silence under section 7 of the Charter.

The court applied the Oickle framework and found no improper threats, promises, or oppression, and that the accused had an operating mind.

The court concluded the statements were voluntary and admissible.

The accused was charged with possession of methamphetamine after police, acting on a tip from a confidential informant, arrested him while he was walking his dog.

A search incident to arrest at the police station revealed 7.6 grams of methamphetamine hidden inside the dog's harness.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging arbitrary detention and unreasonable search and seizure under sections 8 and 9.

The court found the police had reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest based on the compelling, credible, and corroborated informant tip.

The subsequent search of the dog's harness was deemed a valid search incident to lawful arrest.

The Charter application was dismissed, and the accused was found guilty of possession.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second‑degree murder of his common‑law partner following a lengthy trial.

The sentencing issue was the appropriate period of parole ineligibility under s. 745.4 of the Criminal Code.

The court considered the offender’s character, the nature and circumstances of the offence, the history of domestic violence, concealment of the victim’s body, lack of remorse, and the jury’s recommendations.

While the jury recommended significantly higher periods of ineligibility, the court applied established jurisprudential ranges for domestic second‑degree murder.

The court imposed life imprisonment with 16 years’ parole ineligibility, along with DNA and weapons prohibition orders.

Following a judge‑alone criminal trial involving extensive wiretap and surveillance evidence, the accused faced multiple charges relating to firearm trafficking, drug trafficking conspiracy, possession of firearms, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The central issue was whether the accused was the individual known as “Kia” in intercepted communications coordinating cocaine trafficking and the transfer of a handgun.

The court excluded voice‑identification evidence derived from statements obtained in breach of the accused’s Charter s.10(b) right to counsel, but held that overwhelming circumstantial evidence independently established identity.

The court found that the accused participated in conspiracies to traffic cocaine and a firearm and constructively possessed the firearm for the purpose of transfer.

However, the Crown failed to prove possession of a separate Ruger handgun or related proceeds of crime found in the residence.

In a criminal trial involving charges of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and firearms and related firearm and proceeds offences, the accused brought a motion seeking to excise portions of intercepted wiretap communications before they were presented to the jury.

The court assessed the admissibility of various excerpts under the common law balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect.

While many portions were found highly probative of the alleged conspiracies—particularly discussions identifying a firearm, the motive for acquiring it, and relationships between alleged co‑conspirators—other segments containing inflammatory threats, gang‑related references, reckless conduct, or irrelevant personal remarks were ordered removed.

The court emphasized the importance of limiting prejudice while preserving context necessary for the Crown’s theory of conspiracy and firearms trafficking.

Numerous specified line ranges across several intercepts were ordered excised, while the remainder of the recordings were admitted.

During a criminal trial involving allegations of conspiracy to traffic cocaine and firearms, the Crown sought to introduce evidence of other discreditable conduct.

The court considered whether count‑to‑count reasoning and comparator wiretap intercepts relating to unrelated drug transactions were admissible.

Applying the principles governing propensity and bad character evidence, the court held that certain evidence relating to drug trafficking could be used as contextual circumstantial evidence for possession of proceeds of crime and firearms, but not to infer guilt on unrelated firearm trafficking counts.

The court further ruled that comparator wiretap intercepts involving alleged drug dealings with third parties were inadmissible because their probative value was low and their prejudicial effect extremely high.

In a second-degree murder prosecution, the accused brought pre‑trial applications seeking admission of several diary entries written by the deceased and toxicology results from a prior hospital admission.

The defence argued the diary entries demonstrated the deceased’s alleged propensity to associate with abusive men and supported a possible unknown third‑party suspect defence, or alternatively mitigated the impact of a prior letter describing abuse by the accused.

The court applied the governing test for third‑party suspect evidence requiring a sufficient connection between the proposed suspect and the crime.

Finding the proposed inferences speculative and unsupported by evidence linking any third party to the offence, the court held the diary entries lacked relevance and probative value.

The court also excluded the toxicology results, concluding their minimal probative value regarding alleged risk‑taking behaviour was substantially outweighed by the risk of jury speculation and distraction.

The accused brought a pre‑trial motion seeking exclusion of post‑offence conduct evidence from two witnesses on the basis that its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.

The proposed evidence concerned actions taken by the accused after police began investigating the disappearance of his partner, including conduct relating to the movement and concealment of his vehicle and interactions with a police officer executing a warrant to seize the vehicle.

The court held that testimony from a mechanic describing the accused’s efforts to park and store the vehicle was probative of a possible attempt to conceal incriminating evidence and was therefore admissible.

However, the court found that evidence from a police officer describing the accused’s demeanour and interactions during the vehicle seizure had minimal probative value and a significant risk of prejudicial interpretation as consciousness of guilt.

The officer’s evidence about the accused’s conduct was excluded, although evidence regarding the execution of the warrant remained admissible.

The accused sought leave to bring four additional pre-trial evidentiary applications after the deadline set by the Criminal Proceedings Rules of the Superior Court of Justice (Ontario).

The applications concerned admission of hearsay statements by the deceased under the principled exception, exclusion of blood evidence found in the accused’s vehicle, admission of toxicology records from a prior hospital admission of the deceased, and exclusion of neighbour testimony regarding noises from the accused’s apartment.

Applying Rule 34.03, the court weighed the interests of justice, including the apparent merits of the applications, prejudice to the Crown’s trial preparation, and the orderly conduct of a lengthy jury trial.

Leave was refused for the hearsay and blood evidence applications, the neighbour evidence application was dismissed for having no reasonable prospect of success, and leave was granted for the toxicology application but with argument deferred to trial.

In a murder prosecution, the Crown sought a pre-trial ruling admitting evidence that the accused telephoned the deceased’s mother after the body was discovered and asked what the body had been wearing.

The Crown argued the questioning constituted post-offence conduct supporting an inference of consciousness of guilt, particularly in light of expert evidence suggesting the deceased may have been stripped prior to entering the water.

The defence contended the probative value was weak and that the evidence was prejudicial demeanour evidence capable of supporting innocent explanations.

The court held the evidence was relevant circumstantial evidence and its probative value was not outweighed by prejudice.

Any risks associated with competing inferences could be addressed through proper jury instructions.

The accused was charged with second degree murder in the death of his common-law partner.

In pre-trial rulings, the court determined the admissibility of various pieces of evidence.

The court dismissed the accused's application to exclude evidence seized from his apartment, finding no breach of section 8 of the Charter.

The court ruled on the voluntariness of several statements made by the accused to police, admitting some and excluding others due to lack of proper cautions and tainting.

A statement made to the accused's probation officer was admitted.

The court also admitted certain evidence of prior discreditable conduct, including the deceased's writings and statements to witnesses, to show animus and motive, while excluding others.

Finally, the court admitted some post-offence conduct but excluded passive evasive conduct due to its prejudicial effect.