K. Katzsch

The offender was convicted by a jury of second‑degree murder of his common‑law partner following a lengthy trial.

The sentencing issue was the appropriate period of parole ineligibility under s. 745.4 of the Criminal Code.

The court considered the offender’s character, the nature and circumstances of the offence, the history of domestic violence, concealment of the victim’s body, lack of remorse, and the jury’s recommendations.

While the jury recommended significantly higher periods of ineligibility, the court applied established jurisprudential ranges for domestic second‑degree murder.

The court imposed life imprisonment with 16 years’ parole ineligibility, along with DNA and weapons prohibition orders.

In a second-degree murder prosecution, the accused brought pre‑trial applications seeking admission of several diary entries written by the deceased and toxicology results from a prior hospital admission.

The defence argued the diary entries demonstrated the deceased’s alleged propensity to associate with abusive men and supported a possible unknown third‑party suspect defence, or alternatively mitigated the impact of a prior letter describing abuse by the accused.

The court applied the governing test for third‑party suspect evidence requiring a sufficient connection between the proposed suspect and the crime.

Finding the proposed inferences speculative and unsupported by evidence linking any third party to the offence, the court held the diary entries lacked relevance and probative value.

The court also excluded the toxicology results, concluding their minimal probative value regarding alleged risk‑taking behaviour was substantially outweighed by the risk of jury speculation and distraction.

The accused brought a pre‑trial motion seeking exclusion of post‑offence conduct evidence from two witnesses on the basis that its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.

The proposed evidence concerned actions taken by the accused after police began investigating the disappearance of his partner, including conduct relating to the movement and concealment of his vehicle and interactions with a police officer executing a warrant to seize the vehicle.

The court held that testimony from a mechanic describing the accused’s efforts to park and store the vehicle was probative of a possible attempt to conceal incriminating evidence and was therefore admissible.

However, the court found that evidence from a police officer describing the accused’s demeanour and interactions during the vehicle seizure had minimal probative value and a significant risk of prejudicial interpretation as consciousness of guilt.

The officer’s evidence about the accused’s conduct was excluded, although evidence regarding the execution of the warrant remained admissible.

The accused sought leave to bring four additional pre-trial evidentiary applications after the deadline set by the Criminal Proceedings Rules of the Superior Court of Justice (Ontario).

The applications concerned admission of hearsay statements by the deceased under the principled exception, exclusion of blood evidence found in the accused’s vehicle, admission of toxicology records from a prior hospital admission of the deceased, and exclusion of neighbour testimony regarding noises from the accused’s apartment.

Applying Rule 34.03, the court weighed the interests of justice, including the apparent merits of the applications, prejudice to the Crown’s trial preparation, and the orderly conduct of a lengthy jury trial.

Leave was refused for the hearsay and blood evidence applications, the neighbour evidence application was dismissed for having no reasonable prospect of success, and leave was granted for the toxicology application but with argument deferred to trial.

In a murder prosecution, the Crown sought a pre-trial ruling admitting evidence that the accused telephoned the deceased’s mother after the body was discovered and asked what the body had been wearing.

The Crown argued the questioning constituted post-offence conduct supporting an inference of consciousness of guilt, particularly in light of expert evidence suggesting the deceased may have been stripped prior to entering the water.

The defence contended the probative value was weak and that the evidence was prejudicial demeanour evidence capable of supporting innocent explanations.

The court held the evidence was relevant circumstantial evidence and its probative value was not outweighed by prejudice.

Any risks associated with competing inferences could be addressed through proper jury instructions.

The accused was charged with second degree murder in the death of his common-law partner.

In pre-trial rulings, the court determined the admissibility of various pieces of evidence.

The court dismissed the accused's application to exclude evidence seized from his apartment, finding no breach of section 8 of the Charter.

The court ruled on the voluntariness of several statements made by the accused to police, admitting some and excluding others due to lack of proper cautions and tainting.

A statement made to the accused's probation officer was admitted.

The court also admitted certain evidence of prior discreditable conduct, including the deceased's writings and statements to witnesses, to show animus and motive, while excluding others.

Finally, the court admitted some post-offence conduct but excluded passive evasive conduct due to its prejudicial effect.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown sought to admit breath sample results obtained following a roadside screening device demand.

The court found that although the officer unnecessarily provided rights to counsel at a time when none were legally required, this did not constitute a Charter breach.

The "forthwith" requirement under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code was satisfied, as there was no reasonable opportunity for the accused to consult with counsel before providing the sample.

The application was dismissed and the evidence was admitted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving while disqualified.

He argued that the Crown could not rely on a provincial license suspension to prove disqualification because he had not been informed of the penal consequences of driving while disqualified, as required by section 260(1) of the Criminal Code for court-ordered prohibitions.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, holding that the notice requirements in section 260(1) apply only to court-ordered prohibitions under section 259(5)(a) and do not apply when the Crown proves disqualification via a provincial suspension under section 259(5)(b).