J. Milligan

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol after being found asleep at the wheel at an intersection.

Upon arrest, the officer delayed reading the right to counsel instruction for seven minutes while securing the vehicle and retrieving notes.

The court found this delay violated the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights, noting a systemic misunderstanding of the immediacy requirement by the police service.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breath test results under s. 24(2) due to the seriousness and repetitive nature of the breach, resulting in the dismissal of the charge.

The court also found a s. 8 breach regarding video monitoring of the cell toilet, but dismissed the s. 9 arbitrary detention claim.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second‑degree murder of his common‑law partner following a lengthy trial.

The sentencing issue was the appropriate period of parole ineligibility under s. 745.4 of the Criminal Code.

The court considered the offender’s character, the nature and circumstances of the offence, the history of domestic violence, concealment of the victim’s body, lack of remorse, and the jury’s recommendations.

While the jury recommended significantly higher periods of ineligibility, the court applied established jurisprudential ranges for domestic second‑degree murder.

The court imposed life imprisonment with 16 years’ parole ineligibility, along with DNA and weapons prohibition orders.

In a second-degree murder prosecution, the accused brought pre‑trial applications seeking admission of several diary entries written by the deceased and toxicology results from a prior hospital admission.

The defence argued the diary entries demonstrated the deceased’s alleged propensity to associate with abusive men and supported a possible unknown third‑party suspect defence, or alternatively mitigated the impact of a prior letter describing abuse by the accused.

The court applied the governing test for third‑party suspect evidence requiring a sufficient connection between the proposed suspect and the crime.

Finding the proposed inferences speculative and unsupported by evidence linking any third party to the offence, the court held the diary entries lacked relevance and probative value.

The court also excluded the toxicology results, concluding their minimal probative value regarding alleged risk‑taking behaviour was substantially outweighed by the risk of jury speculation and distraction.

The accused sought leave to bring four additional pre-trial evidentiary applications after the deadline set by the Criminal Proceedings Rules of the Superior Court of Justice (Ontario).

The applications concerned admission of hearsay statements by the deceased under the principled exception, exclusion of blood evidence found in the accused’s vehicle, admission of toxicology records from a prior hospital admission of the deceased, and exclusion of neighbour testimony regarding noises from the accused’s apartment.

Applying Rule 34.03, the court weighed the interests of justice, including the apparent merits of the applications, prejudice to the Crown’s trial preparation, and the orderly conduct of a lengthy jury trial.

Leave was refused for the hearsay and blood evidence applications, the neighbour evidence application was dismissed for having no reasonable prospect of success, and leave was granted for the toxicology application but with argument deferred to trial.

In a murder prosecution, the Crown sought a pre-trial ruling admitting evidence that the accused telephoned the deceased’s mother after the body was discovered and asked what the body had been wearing.

The Crown argued the questioning constituted post-offence conduct supporting an inference of consciousness of guilt, particularly in light of expert evidence suggesting the deceased may have been stripped prior to entering the water.

The defence contended the probative value was weak and that the evidence was prejudicial demeanour evidence capable of supporting innocent explanations.

The court held the evidence was relevant circumstantial evidence and its probative value was not outweighed by prejudice.

Any risks associated with competing inferences could be addressed through proper jury instructions.

The accused was charged with second degree murder in the death of his common-law partner.

In pre-trial rulings, the court determined the admissibility of various pieces of evidence.

The court dismissed the accused's application to exclude evidence seized from his apartment, finding no breach of section 8 of the Charter.

The court ruled on the voluntariness of several statements made by the accused to police, admitting some and excluding others due to lack of proper cautions and tainting.

A statement made to the accused's probation officer was admitted.

The court also admitted certain evidence of prior discreditable conduct, including the deceased's writings and statements to witnesses, to show animus and motive, while excluding others.

Finally, the court admitted some post-offence conduct but excluded passive evasive conduct due to its prejudicial effect.