Court File and Parties
DATE: October 20, 2022 Information No.: 4411-998-21-5757-00
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
HIS MAJESTY THE KING v. THOMAS DYER
Proceedings
BEFORE THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE C. PARRY on October 20, 2022 at KITCHENER, Ontario
Appearances
Counsel for the Crown: B. Schnell/A. Gallow Counsel for Thomas Dyer: N. Wansbutter
Reasons for Sentence
All right. I want to thank everyone for their helpful submissions and for the case law provided. This, of course, is in the case of what was then Regina v. Thomas Dyer. I imagine the style of cause remains the same given who the Monarch was at the time of the commission of the offence. I do not intend to repeat the facts in their entirety. They have been helpfully entered as agreed statement of facts and made an exhibit on this sentencing.
So I will begin as follows: Mr. Dyer attended at a campaign stop on August 15th, 2021, intent on voicing his discontent with the practises and policies of the democratically-elected Prime Minister of Canada, who was campaigning for re-election at the time.
As an individual living in a free and democratic society, he possessed the constitutional right to express his political views and to express his displeasure with any government official, and he was entitled to exercise his right to freedom of assembly for the purposes of doing so. He was entitled to express that right, regardless of whether that government official was a municipal councillor, a mayor, a member of provincial parliament, a member of parliament, or the Prime Minister of Canada. However, he did not possess the right to threaten the life of this politician or any other politician aspiring to achieve political office.
When he threatened the life of Mr. Trudeau, he exceeded, by leaps and bounds, the boundaries of his constitutionally-protected rights of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. Worse, he posed a risk to the right enjoyed by Mr. Trudeau to express his political ideas, and the rights of others to assemble to hear those ideas. And, ironically, he threatened the rights of like-minded individuals - that is, those who shared his political views - to peaceably express those political views because his conduct risked the entire campaign event being shut down. In that way, he risked obstructing a fundamental component of our electoral system, namely, a campaign event in which political ideas and aspirations are communicated to the voting public and in which the voting public communicates with those aspiring to political office.
And, so, while he had the right to express his political views, he did not have the right to interfere with the life, liberty, or security of the person of any of the individuals present at that campaign event, Mr. Trudeau included. As the aphorism goes, “Each person’s right to swing their fist must end at the tip of another person’s nose.” If that aphorism is ignored, we risk descending into anarchy, and out of anarchy comes authoritarianism.
This was a serious crime. It would have been serious if committed at a campaign stop for an aspiring politician who has yet to achieve political office. It is substantially more serious because it was committed against the highest ranking elected official in our country. Our effective head of state, albeit not our titular head of state.
In saying so, I must stress that the seriousness of this offence is wholly independent of the political affiliation of the victim of the offence. It would not matter, and does not matter, the political party to which the victim belongs. No matter what the political affiliation of the victim, Mr. Dyer’s conduct was, by definition, violent and anti-democratic.
The seriousness of this offence lies in the fact that he risked obstructing an essential component of our electoral system, that he threatened the life of a fellow human being, and that this human was effectively our head of state.
In my observation, violent and/or unlawful public protests have been on the rise in this country recently and especially since the onset of the pandemic. In my view, this court bears the obligation to express, in unambiguous terms, that violence and otherwise unlawful protest will not be tolerated. These behaviours will not be tolerated because they pose a threat to the integrity of our democratic constitutional order. The court, therefore, must denounce such unlawful conduct and deter others from emulating such conduct.
It is ironic in the extreme that Mr. Dyer conducted his unlawful protest because of his perception that Mr. Trudeau’s actions and policies, and that of his government, were undemocratic. Mr. Dyer’s conduct constituted a direct and literal threat to a democratically elected figure. And, more generally, a threat to democracy itself.
If such violent conduct were to spread and continue, it would pose a threat to our democratic order. This type of conduct aids and abets the rise of authoritarianism; it does not enhance democracy.
Mr. Wansbutter on behalf of Mr. Dyer points out that the campaign stop proceeded in spite of Mr. Dyer’s conduct and so any risk posed by his conduct did not materialize. In essence, Mr. Wansbutter, therefore, points out the absence of an aggravating factor. I accept the merit of his submission. In other words, I accept that it could have been worse. However, our society suffers harm, and the democratic order suffers harm, by the mere existence of such a violent and anti-democratic speech, and the risks it creates.
As noted to counsel, I am reminded of the wave in a sporting event. It takes one person to start a wave, and each time a person stands and raises their arms, there exists the risk that others will follow and a wave will ensue. With that in mind, I am mindful that Mr. Dyer stood amongst people who I infer he believed were of like political mind when expressing his discontent in the violent way he did so, much like a fan sitting in the stands knows they’re amongst other fans when they stand up and raise their arms.
Having said all of that, I recognize that the determination of a fit sentence does not only require an assessment of the seriousness of the offence, but also an assessment of the circumstances of the offender, so as to develop an understanding of the degree to which the offender should be held morally accountable.
I have received two presentence reports, one main one and a supplemental one, and I’ve reviewed that material. I received the other material provided by the defence, which provides essentially more of an elaboration of what’s already contained in the presentence reports. It points, in many respects, to many aspects of Mr. Dyer that are prosocial and show some achievement in this life. It also points, of course, to the existence of criminal record, which is an aggravating factor, in particular because it involves a series of crimes of violence, beginning in 2005 and ending in 2009.
During that four year time period, he was convicted of assault, uttering threats, another assault, a breach of undertaking, a third assault, a mischief, an assault with intent to resist arrest, a fail to comply with disposition, criminal harassment, another assault, a forcible confinement, yet another assault, an uttering threats, another criminal harassment, a fail to comply probation, and yet another criminal harassment. So that was a prolific period of violence over a four-year period, which stands as a factor that might increase or aggravate what would otherwise be a fit sentence.
However, the defence points out that in 2005, Mr. Dyer was involved in a serious motor vehicle accident, where he was thrown through the windshield of a car, and it resulted in a traumatic brain injury. It required several years to investigate that brain injury and come to a complete understanding of its implications. And it would appear that, as a result of that motor vehicle accident, Mr. Dyer’s personality and behaviours changed. The material provided establishes that he had trouble thereafter with emotional regulation and impulse control, and that his otherwise aggravating criminal record should be examined in that light since it follows soon after the traumatic accident and continues during the period of time in which the impacts of that accident were intermittently investigated before its full import was appreciated.
Mr. Wansbutter, on behalf of his client, also points out that following 2009, there was a hiatus in criminal activity and he submits that having received sufficient counselling and treatment, Mr. Dyer was able to regulate his emotions and control his impulses and live a productive and law-abiding life, and it’s in that context that he raised that he and his spouse had a family that grew to include what is now eight children.
I think it is a meritorious submission to point out the gap in the record and to point out the relationship between the record and the traumatic brain injury.
The defence notes that when COVID hit, and the corresponding shutdowns occurred, that Mr. Dyer experienced considerable financial hardship, as did many people, and I accept that that no doubt placed a considerable stress upon him as the main provider for his family, and, in turn, placed a considerable stress upon his family. And I can appreciate that it’s under those circumstances that he formed his rather vehement objections to the various government policies enacted in response to the COVID pandemic.
I do not – I stress – do not purport to provide an opinion on those policies or on Mr. Dyer’s objections to those policies. I recognize that reasonable people in this country can disagree about such policies, and I do not intend to weigh in upon them, but I accept that it is Mr. Dyer’s sense of perceived injustice as a result of those policies, is what caused him to become so emotionally agitated, and I accept that it is that emotional agitation that built in him until he finally felt inspired to commit the offence for which he’s now being sentenced. And in that respect, I accept that he lost his ability, that he had achieved since his initial traumatic brain injury, to control his impulses and to think through his actions before committing them.
Mr. Wansbutter, on behalf of his client, points out that in the past 14 months, things have stabilized. He continues to work, continues to support his family. He has realized the error of his methods of political dissent, and he has engaged in counselling aimed at controlling his anger and provided greater impulse control. I accept that he’s engaged in that counselling out of a sincere desire to live a prosocial life and to avoid further conflict with the law, and I accept that he’s stabilized and I accept that his risk moving forward has, as a result, been greatly mitigated.
Having regard to those factors, the defence seeks a non-custodial sentence. The defence urges me to consider the principle of restraint as codified in s. 718 of the Criminal Code; asks me, amongst other things, to consider the imposition of a probation order, which would contain community service hours as a means of providing reparation to the community for the harm done, and also as a means to further ensure Mr. Dyer’s rehabilitation and providing him and the rest of the community some sense of deterrence.
The Crown, similarly, seeks a $2,000 fine and probation. Mr. Wansbutter concedes the reasonableness of the Crown’s position, including the fine, but the parties have made clear to me that this is not a joint submission. Indeed, Mr. Wansbutter’s position has changed from the date on which the plea was entered to today’s date.
The Crown has provided a book of authorities for similar cases in which similar conduct was sentenced. I don’t intend to refer to each case individually, but to observe, as we did in submissions, that, generally speaking, the sentences range from discharges at the low end to jail at the high end, the most seriously being in the range of about eight months, as I recall it.
However, generally speaking, where custody was imposed, it was in the intermittent range, more often than not in the 30-day range and higher.
Generally speaking, the non-custodial sentences involved instances in which the threat was more remote, and the risk created therefore more remote and generally involved venting of some form, typically on social media or otherwise. Custodial sentences tended to involve more immediate conduct where the perceived risk was correspondingly more great.
In this case before me, I view the threats as being relatively immediate and brazen. Mr. Dyer was at a campaign event while the victim of this offence was speaking at that event. I appreciate that the victim did not hear the threats but others gathered at the campaign event did. And those others, interestingly, included the police who showed some significant restraint in their approach to the situation. But, nevertheless, the victim of the threats was there. And Mr. Dyer’s conduct, as I’ve already mentioned, risked causing the termination of the event and risked the incitement of others to follow his example. As I say, it was serious criminal conduct.
To exceed the position of the Crown, the court must give the parties a chance to make submissions, which I have done, and must give reasons for doing so, which I’m in the process of doing. The test for jumping joint submissions does not apply in this situation because this was not a joint submission, albeit a similarly posited submission. But, nevertheless, I am of the view that the court should not lightly exceed the Crown’s position. I am cognizant that the Crown is here representing the community and speaking on behalf of the community. The Crown has assessed the case law and has assessed its evidence, and arrived at a position, and, in my view, considerable deference ought to be shown at least when the court is considering whether to exceed the Crown’s position.
And so it is with great respect that I express the view that a fine and probation, in my respectful view, is too lenient and does not adequately and sufficiently send the necessary deterrent message to the general public, and does not sufficiently denounce the conduct in question. Such anti-democratic and violent conduct must stop. It is incumbent on the court to make that message clear. People are entitled to non-violent political protest that respects the rights of others to enjoy life, liberty, and security of the person. People are entitled to express their views at the ballot box, but the public must be reminded, in no uncertain terms, that they cannot employ violence or mischief to achieve their political ends. I am therefore of the view that a custodial sentence is necessary to adequately express the principles of denunciation and deterrence. However, I am mindful of the principle of restraint. I am mindful, in that regard, that this is a man who supports nine other people, who has found stability, who has obtained counselling, who has pled guilty and expressed remorse, and who I accept is genuinely remorseful. I am mindful that he has also undertaken a significant amount of counselling to ensure that he continues to achieve stability. I accept that he is not a danger to the community, and I accept that the fundamental principles and purposes of sentencing can be accomplished by the imposition of a conditional sentence. In that sense, I accept that both general deterrence, specific deterrence, and denunciation can be achieved through the imposition of a conditional sentence. And I accept that the public, hearing this decision, will understand that what I’ve imposed is a jail sentence but a jail sentence that I’ve allowed to be served on conditions in the community. And for those who are unfamiliar with the notion of conditional sentences, they, in effect, act as a de facto immediate parole for the imposition of what otherwise would be a jail sentence. The consequences of breach of those conditions on that sentence would result in your re-arrest and your being brought, summarily, before me for determination as to what to do next, and often that determination results in converting what remains of the sentence into a traditional custodial sentence in the same way a parole violator has their parole revoked and they go back to jail.
In arriving at this disposition, I am satisfied, then, that I’m communicating to the general public that if one is to behave violently to achieve political ends, one can expect to go to jail, but in appropriate circumstances, where there are sufficient mitigating circumstances, one might hope to serve that jail sentence conditionally in the community.
And so I’m of the view that a conditional sentence of 60 days in duration will suffice to achieve the fundamental principles and purposes of sentencing. I should say that I considered, very carefully, the submission for a fine and while appreciating that Mr. Dyer makes a decent living, given the number of mouths he has to feed, I’m, frankly, worried about its feasibility. Although it was embraced by Mr. Wansbutter on his client’s behalf, he’s got a lot of people to support and I wondered about whether or not the payment of a fine of that amount in any reasonable amount of time was realistic, but I was nevertheless of the view that it did not send the sufficient message of denunciation and deterrence, and so it became a moot point.
So the terms of the conditional sentence will be as follows: You’ll keep the peace and be of good behaviour. My apologies. Just give me one moment. Appear before the court, sorry, when required to so by the court; report as the court directs to a supervisor and thereafter report when required by the supervisor and in a manner directed by the supervisor. Remain in Ontario unless you have the written permission from the court or supervisor to leave the province; notify the court or supervisor in advance of any change of name or address, and promptly notify the court or supervisor of any change in employment or occupation.
You will report by telephone, or in person to a supervisor within two working days, and after that at all times and places as directed by the supervisor or any person authorized by a supervisor to assist in your supervision. You will cooperate with your supervisor and you must sign any releases necessary to permit the supervisor to monitor your compliance, and you must provide proof of compliance of any condition of this order to your supervisor on request.
You will live at – and can I have your client’s current address?
MR. WANSBUTTER: It’s – it’s [address redacted] Street in Kitchener.
THE COURT: All right. You will live at that address or a place approved of by the supervisor and not change that address without obtaining the consent of the supervisor in advance.
You will be under house arrest for the full duration of the sentence. During that time, you’ll remain in your residence or on the property of your residence, at all times except – I’ll need your help – I’m assuming that you don’t work typically on Sundays?
THOMAS DYER: Yeah. Never on weekends.
THE COURT: All right. So if you were to be out and about to do some shopping or what have you, Sundays would be the preferrable date?
THOMAS DYER: Sure.
THE COURT: Does that work?
THOMAS DYER: Yeah, that’ll work.
THE COURT: All right. So between 12 p.m. and 5 p.m. every Sunday in order to acquire the necessities of life. How old are your kids again? They range.
THOMAS DYER: Six months to seventeen.
THE COURT: My goodness. All right.
THOMAS DYER: Seventeen being my step – my stepdaughter.
THE COURT: Right.
THOMAS DYER: But I raised her.
THE COURT: I’m going to pause on – well, I’ll stick a pin on something I’m just trying to think about. I imagine they need picking up and driving all over the place.
THOMAS DYER: No, they can take the bus.
THE COURT: All right.
THOMAS DYER: They can take the bus.
THE COURT: All right. Well, I’ll move on. Except for any medical emergencies involving you or any member of your immediate family, for example, spouse, child, parent, sibling, or your spouse’s immediate family, again including child, parent, or sibling. Except for going directly to and from, or being at school, employment, court attendances, religious services, and legal or medical or dental appointments. Except for going directly to or from and being at assessment, treatment, or counselling sessions. Going – well, I’ll put this in. I’m not sure how I’m going to deal with that but except for going directly to or from performing community service hours. Except with the prior written approval of the supervisor. The approval is to be carried with you during these times. And except for carrying out any legal obligations regarding compliance with this conditional sentence order. So you might be obliged to do something that I have not thought of on this list of exceptions, and if you are, and the supervisor tells you you are, and you need to leave the house for that purpose, then you can.
You will not possess any weapons as defined by the Criminal Code, for example, a BB gun, pellet gun, firearm, imitation firearm, crossbow, prohibited or restricted weapon or device, ammunition or explosive substance, or anything designed to be used or intended for use to cause death or injury or to threaten or intimidate any person.
You’ll attend and actively participate in all assessment, counselling, and rehabilitative programs as directed by the supervisor, and complete them to the satisfaction of the supervisor.
I’m inclined to leave community service hours to the probation portion of the order because I just don’t know how quickly they’ll be able to set anything up. Does that make sense to counsel?
MR. WANSBUTTER: I think that – that makes sense to me, Your Honour.
MR. GALLOW: I agree.
THE COURT: I don't know if counsel contemplated any other terms that I should consider?
MR. WANSBUTTER: I just want to make sure I didn’t miss anything, Your Honour. Is there a – an exception for work...
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. WANSBUTTER: ...employment? Okay, thank you.
THE COURT: There’s a very long exception that includes a number of things that include work, church, school, et cetera.
MR. WANSBUTTER: Yeah. Thank you.
THE COURT: Meetings with your – bear with me a moment. Interestingly, that exception, as I recall it, does not include meeting with the supervisor but that’s why I have added the other category of exception, other legal obligations. Yeah, school, employment, court attendances, religious services, legal or medical or dental appointments.
MR. WANSBUTTER: Thank you, Your Honour.
MR. GALLOW: There was one term that I didn’t mention but that I’ll just bring up now. It was imposed in the case of Mr. Hayes, which is included in the book of authorities. It was a Saskatchewan case. He was prevented, on a term of probation, from attending any event where the Prime Minister was expected to be present. I certainly agree that lawful protesting is to be...
THE COURT: Yeah, I’m...
MR. GALLOW: ...encouraged...
THE COURT: ...I’m not sure I want to curtail his lawful free speech.
MR. GALLOW: I agree.
THE COURT: And if he’s keeping the peace and being of good behaviour, then he’s more than welcome to express, in my view, his political views. If he’s unlawfully expressing his political views, then he’s not keeping the peace and being of good behaviour and he’ll be breaching the order, and any good politician should welcome a dialogue with those who disagree with them. So I’ll leave it at that.
So, there we go. So those are the terms of the conditional sentence order. We’ve already had the discussion about what happens if you violate it, so you don’t want to do that. But it’s relatively brief, and life is busy so I’m sure it will go by in the blink of an eye. But, nevertheless, as I say, this sentence involves a message sending to not only you but to public at large as to how they ought to conduct any form of protest.
Moving on, then, I agree that a period of probation is appropriate, in large part because it will facilitate the imposition of community service hours as part of the punishment and also to offer you any support that you may feel you need if you’re struggling with your emotional or behavioural regulation.
So the terms of probation will be for 12 months. They will require you to keep the peace and be of good behaviour; appear before the court when you’re required to do so; notify the court or probation officer in advance of any change of name or address and promptly notify the court or probation officer of any change of employment or occupation.
You’ll report to a probation officer by telephone or in person. You’ll do that within two working days of the completion of your conditional sentence order, and after that at all times and places as directed by the probation officer or any person authorized by a probation officer to assist in your supervision.
You’ll cooperate with your probation officer and you must sign any releases necessary to permit the probation officer to monitor your compliance, and you must provide proof of compliance with any condition of this order to your probation officer on request.
You’ll not possess any weapons as defined by the Criminal Code, for example, a BB gun, pellet gun, firearm, imitation firearm, crossbow, prohibited or restricted weapon or device, ammunition or explosive substance, or anything designed to be used or intended for use to cause death or injury or to threaten or intimidate any person.
Again, you’ll attend and actively participate in all assessment, counselling, and rehabilitative programs as directed by the probation officer and complete them to the satisfaction of the probation officer.
And, lastly, you’ll perform – sorry, you said you don’t work weekends?
THOMAS DYER: No.
THE COURT: So if you did two weekends a month where you did five hours community service per weekend, that’s ten hours a month. So, in theory, you should be able to get 100 hours done comfortably...
THOMAS DYER: Yeah.
THE COURT: ...in 12 months. You seem like an industrious man.
THOMAS DYER: I should be.
THE COURT: All right. And I’m hopeful – well, I’ll make it clear – so you’ll perform 100 hours of community service work on a rate and schedule to be directed by the probation officer, that must be completed within 12 months of the start date of this order. I’m going to note – if you go to box 5, Madam Clerk, or other – no, you have to click other – any community service hours performed during the conditional sentence for this offence will count as community services hours on this probation order. So that gives you 14 months to do 100 hours.
I can't think of any other terms of probation unless counsel are advocating them. I considered a no-contact term, but, as I say, provided it’s lawful contact, I’m not concerned. Had there been a victim impact statement, I might’ve thought differently about it but absent a direct request, and recognizing that the complainant is a public figure that must find necessity and engage in political discourse with his constituents, the accused being one of those constituents, I’m not inclined to impose a no-contact order without specific request. That, then, completes the terms of probation. Do you understand those terms?
THOMAS DYER: I do.
THE COURT: You understand that a breach of the probation order is a criminal offence?
THOMAS DYER: It is, yeah.
THE COURT: And that criminal offence is, in theory, punishable by up to a maximum of four years in prison if the Crown proceeds by indictment, or maximum two years less a day in prison, or a maximum $5,000 fine if the Crown proceeds by summary conviction, okay?
THOMAS DYER: Okay.
THE COURT: There will be an order pursuant to s. 110 of the Criminal Code. It’s a standalone weapons prohibition order. It will be, given your criminal record, and....
THOMAS DYER: Sir, I have a lifetime ban.
THE COURT: Oh, maybe you do. Maybe you do. I overlooked that.
MR. GALLOW: Sort of.
MR. WANSBUTTER: I don’t have Mr. Dyer’s record right in front of me but my understanding was...
THE COURT: He’s got a 109 order...
MR. WANSBUTTER: ...that he did – was already bound by a lifetime weapons prohibition.
THE COURT: Yeah, the 109 in – oh – oh, wait a second.
THOMAS DYER: No, the last one should be a lifetime ban.
MR. GALLOW: Two of them.
THE COURT: Right. No, he would’ve gotten a 109 order in – I need to – in Newmarket in 2009 because it would’ve been his second criminal harassment and his third.
MR. GALLOW: Yes, I – I hadn’t seen that, Your Honour. I think....
THE COURT: So it’ll be mandatory life once he has two criminal harassments. So a 110 order today is redundant.
MR. GALLOW: Agreed.
THE COURT: So, as a result, I’ll decline to impose a 110 order to – it’d be ordering what’s already in place, so it doesn’t achieve much.
And, sorry, it was a secondary DNA offence?
MR. GALLOW: It is.
MR. WANSBUTTER: It is. It should be on file but....
THE COURT: And you’re eligible – I appreciate you’re already in the Databank but you’re here, so it’s a short trip to the basement so I’m going to order that you provide a sample of your bodily substances for the purposes of analyzing a portion of your DNA and putting that portion on the National DNA Databank. So you can provide that sample to an officer who’s qualified by statutory regulation to take that sample in accordance with the approved procedures. However, since the police already have your DNA...
THOMAS DYER: It should be on file.
THE COURT: ...then they’re just going to take your prints, because that’s the only procedure they’ll ask you to comply with.
THOMAS DYER: Okay.
THE COURT: All right?
MR. GALLOW: Count 2 is outstanding. I’d ask that it be withdrawn, please.
THE COURT: Count 2 is withdrawn. I think that completes everything, then.
MR. GALLOW: Yes.
THE COURT: Again, I thank you for your help.
MR. GALLOW: Thank you for your decision, Your Honour. As I said in my submissions, it seems there is a – a growth of these types of offences and it was challenging to find commentary on them, so I appreciate yours.
THE COURT: Well, the law is an evolving thing and it has to evolve with circumstances and although I didn’t mention it specially in the reasons, as I said during submissions, I think [R. v. Lacasse] permits the court to put its finger in the air and see which way the wind is blowing in the community and cater the sentence accordingly, which I’ve attempted to do.
CLERK REGISTRAR: Your Honour, excuse me, did I miss time served or is there no time served?
MR. GALLOW: I don’t....
MR. WANSBUTTER: No, I – I don’t believe there ever was any. We weren’t asking....
THE COURT: And I don’t believe there was any that I was made aware of or if there was, I had forgotten it.
MR. GALLOW: Released on an undertaking.
THOMAS DYER: I was released on an undertaking, yeah.
THE COURT: Yeah.
...MATTER IS COMPLETED
Certificate of Transcript
FORM 2 Certificate of Transcript Evidence Act, subsection 5(2)
I, Helena Tsapoitis-Barbesin, certify that this document is a true and accurate transcript of the recording of R. v. Thomas Dyer in the Ontario Court of Justice, held at 85 Frederick Street, Kitchener, Ontario, taken from Recording No. 4411_CrtRm-104_20221020_090047__6_PARRYC.dcr, dated October 20, 2022 which has been certified in Form 1 by Karisma Jeffrey.
November 3, 2022
Date (Authorized Transcriptionist) Helena Tsapoitis-Barbesin ACT ID# 2372561617 416-889-6054 Helena10@hotmail.com Transcriptsontario.ca