Alyssa Bain

David H. Whetham was sentenced for eight criminal charges, including possession of fentanyl, methamphetamine, cocaine, and hydromorphone for the purpose of trafficking, as well as multiple firearms offences (possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, possession while prohibited, careless storage) and possession of identity documents.

The offences occurred while the accused was subject to a prior weapon prohibition order.

A Charter breach (sections 8 and 9) was found regarding the search warrant that led to the seizure of evidence, but the evidence was admitted under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the accused's related criminal record and the dangerous combination of drugs and firearms, and mitigating factors including a challenging childhood, substance abuse issues, and the Charter breach.

The Crown sought a 10-year sentence, while the defence proposed 6 years (net 5).

The court imposed a total sentence of 8 years imprisonment, with 67 months remaining after accounting for 29 months of pre-sentence custody credit, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, particularly for fentanyl trafficking.

Concurrent sentences were imposed for the other charges, along with life and 10-year weapon prohibition orders, secondary DNA orders, and a forfeiture order.

Peter Bouctsis, a youth, was convicted of second-degree murder.

The Crown sought an adult sentence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, arguing that the presumption of diminished moral culpability was rebutted and a youth sentence would be insufficient for accountability, rehabilitation, and public safety.

The court found that the offender demonstrated adult-level maturity and sophistication in planning the crime and continued criminal conduct while in custody.

The court granted the Crown's application, imposing a life sentence with parole eligibility after seven years, emphasizing the need for long-term monitoring for public protection.

The accused, charged with manslaughter and aggravated assault, sought to exclude two statements made to police on January 3, 2020, and May 4, 2020.

He alleged the statements were involuntary and obtained in violation of his rights under sections 9 and 10(b) of the Charter.

Following a blended voir dire, the court found that the police treated the accused respectfully, no threats or inducements were made, and the accused's Charter rights were not breached during either detention.

Both statements were ruled voluntary and admissible at trial.

The accused, charged with manslaughter and other offences, brought a pretrial application for a stay of proceedings, alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from the date of the charges to the anticipated completion of the trial was 30 months and 28 days.

The court deducted 4.5 months of defence delay caused by counsel's scheduling inflexibility, bringing the net delay below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The court found the defence failed to demonstrate meaningful and sustained steps to expedite the proceeding, and dismissed the application.

The accused, charged with manslaughter and other offences, sought leave to cross-examine the affiant and sub-affiants of an Information to Obtain (ITO) a general warrant.

The accused argued that the authorizing judge was deprived of relevant information regarding the police's operational plan, including the intention to obtain a statement and the use of the Emergency Response Unit.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that cross-examination was not necessary because the arguments regarding the omissions and the use of a youth record could be made based on the evidence already before the court.

The accused, a young person, was tried for second-degree murder following a drug rip-off where he shot the victim twice, including once in the head.

The sole issue at trial was whether the accused had the requisite specific intent for murder under s. 229(a) of the Criminal Code, or whether he should be convicted of manslaughter.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to the accused's out-of-court exculpatory statements and found them implausible.

Applying the common sense inference that a sane and sober person intends the natural and probable consequences of their actions, the court concluded the accused intended to cause bodily harm that he knew was likely to cause death and was reckless whether death ensued.

The accused was found guilty of second-degree murder.

The accused applied to re-open a ruling that admitted evidence derived from a search of her cell phone, arguing that the court failed to address an oral submission constituting a facial attack on the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court dismissed the application, finding that the accused failed to include this ground in her written applications as required by Rule 31 of the Criminal Proceedings Rules and provided no explanation for the omission.

Furthermore, the court held that even if the ground were considered, it would not change the conclusion that the issuing justice could have validly issued the warrant.

The accused, charged with human trafficking and other offences involving a minor complainant, brought an application to exclude evidence derived from a search of her cell phone and from production orders.

The accused argued that the Information to Obtain (ITO) for the search warrant contained misleading information and sought an overly broad date range, violating section 8 of the Charter.

The court found that while the ITO contained some misleading information, its core substance supported the issuance of the warrant.

Regarding the production orders, the court applied the Grant framework to a previously found section 8 breach and concluded that the evidence should not be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, as the police acted in good faith, the breach was minimally intrusive, and society has a high interest in adjudicating the serious charges on their merits.

The applications were dismissed.

The accused was charged with trafficking carfentanil following the death of a young man from an overdose.

Police obtained the deceased's phone from his father and, without a warrant, examined text messages between the deceased and the accused.

The court found that the accused had standing to challenge the seizure of his sent text messages under section 8 of the Charter, as he retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in those communications post-transmission.

The warrantless search violated section 8.

However, the court admitted the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, balancing the seriousness of the violation (minor, given the law at the time), the significant impact on the accused's privacy interests, and society's strong interest in adjudicating a serious drug trafficking charge in the context of a community opioid crisis.

The applicant, charged with possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, sought disclosure of the identities of two confidential informants and their production for cross-examination, or a stay of proceedings.

The defence theory was that the drugs found in the applicant's bedroom belonged to his brother, a known drug trafficker, and were planted to deflect suspicion.

The court applied the "innocence at stake" exception to informer privilege, requiring the applicant to demonstrate that the information sought was not available from any other source and that he was otherwise unable to raise a reasonable doubt.

The application was dismissed as the applicant failed to meet the threshold test, as there were other potential sources of evidence to support the defence theory.