Katherine Enns

The accused, charged with manslaughter and aggravated assault, sought to exclude two statements made to police on January 3, 2020, and May 4, 2020.

He alleged the statements were involuntary and obtained in violation of his rights under sections 9 and 10(b) of the Charter.

Following a blended voir dire, the court found that the police treated the accused respectfully, no threats or inducements were made, and the accused's Charter rights were not breached during either detention.

Both statements were ruled voluntary and admissible at trial.

The accused, charged with manslaughter and other offences, brought a pretrial application for a stay of proceedings, alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from the date of the charges to the anticipated completion of the trial was 30 months and 28 days.

The court deducted 4.5 months of defence delay caused by counsel's scheduling inflexibility, bringing the net delay below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The court found the defence failed to demonstrate meaningful and sustained steps to expedite the proceeding, and dismissed the application.

The accused, charged with manslaughter and other offences, sought leave to cross-examine the affiant and sub-affiants of an Information to Obtain (ITO) a general warrant.

The accused argued that the authorizing judge was deprived of relevant information regarding the police's operational plan, including the intention to obtain a statement and the use of the Emergency Response Unit.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that cross-examination was not necessary because the arguments regarding the omissions and the use of a youth record could be made based on the evidence already before the court.

The offender was found guilty by a jury of two counts of sexual assault against two different complainants.

The assaults involved touching and digital penetration while the victims were sleeping in the offender's apartment.

The Crown sought a sentence of two years less a day, while the defence sought seven months.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the breach of trust and the profound impact on the victims.

The offender was sentenced to 15 months' incarceration followed by two years of probation, along with ancillary orders including a DNA order, weapons prohibition, and SOIRA registration.

Benjamin Kowba was found guilty by a jury of two counts of sexual assault.

This endorsement constitutes the first segment of a bifurcated sentencing hearing, tasked with determining the factual basis of the jury's ambiguous verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused digitally penetrated complainant K.K. without consent, and kissed S.G.'s arm and touched her breast while she was sleeping.

However, the court found that the Crown did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused undid the button and zipper on S.G.'s shorts.

The decision outlines the principles for factual findings following a jury verdict, particularly when the verdict's factual implications are ambiguous.

The accused, charged with human trafficking and sexual assault, brought an application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code to cross-examine the complainant on her prior work as an escort.

The accused argued the evidence was necessary to support the defence narrative that the complainant worked willingly as an escort and was not groomed by the accused.

The Crown conceded some areas of cross-examination but opposed others.

The court granted the accused's application, finding the evidence was fundamental to the coherence of the defence narrative and did not engage the twin myths.

The court also granted the Crown's unopposed application to adduce evidence of how the complainant knew the accused.

The accused applied to re-open a ruling that admitted evidence derived from a search of her cell phone, arguing that the court failed to address an oral submission constituting a facial attack on the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court dismissed the application, finding that the accused failed to include this ground in her written applications as required by Rule 31 of the Criminal Proceedings Rules and provided no explanation for the omission.

Furthermore, the court held that even if the ground were considered, it would not change the conclusion that the issuing justice could have validly issued the warrant.

The accused, charged with human trafficking and other offences involving a minor complainant, brought an application to exclude evidence derived from a search of her cell phone and from production orders.

The accused argued that the Information to Obtain (ITO) for the search warrant contained misleading information and sought an overly broad date range, violating section 8 of the Charter.

The court found that while the ITO contained some misleading information, its core substance supported the issuance of the warrant.

Regarding the production orders, the court applied the Grant framework to a previously found section 8 breach and concluded that the evidence should not be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, as the police acted in good faith, the breach was minimally intrusive, and society has a high interest in adjudicating the serious charges on their merits.

The applications were dismissed.

The applicant sought access to manually manipulate her seized cell phone, arguing that the forensic extractions provided by the Crown might be incomplete.

The Crown had provided digital and forensic copies of the extraction but refused manual access without strict conditions, arguing that access is governed by s. 605 of the Criminal Code.

The court dismissed the application, finding that even if an independent right to access existed outside s. 605, the applicant failed to show an air of reality or provide evidence beyond mere speculation that the forensic extractions were deficient.

The accused, charged with kidnapping and human trafficking, brought a Charter application challenging production orders for their cell phone records.

They argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked reasonable grounds to believe the records would afford evidence of the offences, as there was no evidence they possessed or used cell phones during the alleged offences.

The court agreed, finding the ITO relied on mere suspicion rather than credibly-based probability, resulting in a breach of section 8 of the Charter.

A subsequent hearing will determine if the evidence should be excluded under section 24(2).

The accused, L.R., brought an application under section 24(2) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to exclude a videotaped statement given to police, alleging a breach of her section 10(b) right to counsel and that the statement was involuntary due to oppressive conditions and inducements.

The Crown concurrently sought a finding that the statement was voluntary.

The court found that the Crown proved voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, as L.R.'s will was not overborne by inducements or oppressive conditions, and she maintained her right to silence numerous times.

The court also found no breach of L.R.'s section 10(b) Charter rights, as she was properly informed of her rights, understood them, and was afforded opportunities to consult with duty counsel.

Consequently, L.R.'s application to exclude the statement was dismissed, and the Crown's application for admissibility was granted.

The applicant, charged with human trafficking and related offences, brought an application to exclude evidence obtained from a search of her rented vehicle, alleging a breach of her s. 8 Charter rights.

Police initially entered the vehicle without a warrant to retrieve the complainant's property, during which they observed wallets and identification, prompting them to obtain a search warrant.

The court dismissed the application, finding that even if the observations from the initial entry were excised from the Information to Obtain, there were sufficient grounds to issue the warrant.

Furthermore, the court held that even if a s. 8 breach occurred, the evidence would be admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter as the police acted in good faith and its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was charged with public nudity under section 174 of the Criminal Code for standing on the steps of a courthouse wearing only a multi-coloured athletic supporter and sneakers as part of a protest regarding a prior police seizure of his medical marijuana.

The Crown proceeded on the theory that the accused was "so clad as to offend against public order." The court found that while the accused intentionally dressed provocatively and positioned himself visibly on the courthouse steps, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was "so clad as to offend against public order." The evidence demonstrated no actual disturbance of the public peace or public order—only some bewildered looks and jokes from passersby.

The accused was acquitted.