Harald Mattson

The defendant, Christian Almendares, was charged with two counts of sexual assault and sexual exploitation.

The trial focused on the credibility and reliability of the complainant and the defendant.

Applying the principles from R. v. W.D., the court found that the defendant's evidence created a reasonable doubt.

The court also expressed concerns about the overall reliability and context of the complainant's evidence.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, and the charges were dismissed.

The applicant, Michael Theberge, charged with drug and weapons offences, brought a pre-trial motion to exclude evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant at his residence.

He argued that the police's use of a "dynamic entry" (battering ram, limited penetration) violated his section 8 Charter rights, contending it was an unwarranted and unreasonable use of force.

The Crown argued the entry method was justified by reasonable grounds concerning officer safety and the potential destruction of evidence.

The court, applying principles from R. v. Cornell and R. v. Pileggi, found that the police had reasonable grounds to depart from the "knock and announce" rule, made an individualized assessment, and did not act based on a blanket policy.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

Teanna May Young pleaded guilty to Fraud Over $5000 for her involvement in a staged car collision as part of a larger fraud investigation.

The Crown sought a 12-month conditional sentence and $10,900 in restitution, while the defence requested a suspended sentence.

The court imposed a 6-month conditional sentence (two months house arrest, two months curfew) followed by a 12-month probation order.

The court rejected the joint submission for a restitution order, finding it would perpetuate the offender's cycle of poverty and offend the totality principle, given her limited financial means and mental health challenges.

The accused, charged with human trafficking and sexual assault, brought an application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code to cross-examine the complainant on her prior work as an escort.

The accused argued the evidence was necessary to support the defence narrative that the complainant worked willingly as an escort and was not groomed by the accused.

The Crown conceded some areas of cross-examination but opposed others.

The court granted the accused's application, finding the evidence was fundamental to the coherence of the defence narrative and did not engage the twin myths.

The court also granted the Crown's unopposed application to adduce evidence of how the complainant knew the accused.

The accused applied to re-open a ruling that admitted evidence derived from a search of her cell phone, arguing that the court failed to address an oral submission constituting a facial attack on the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court dismissed the application, finding that the accused failed to include this ground in her written applications as required by Rule 31 of the Criminal Proceedings Rules and provided no explanation for the omission.

Furthermore, the court held that even if the ground were considered, it would not change the conclusion that the issuing justice could have validly issued the warrant.

The accused, charged with serious offences including human trafficking and sexual assault, brought an application for a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence under s. 24(1) of the Charter.

The application was based on late and misleading disclosure by the police and Crown regarding the identity of a suspect named in the Information to Obtain a search warrant for the accused's cell phone.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the disclosure issues were isolated, had been remedied, and did not meet the high threshold of undermining the integrity of the justice system required for a stay or exclusion of evidence.

The accused, charged with human trafficking and other offences involving a minor complainant, brought an application to exclude evidence derived from a search of her cell phone and from production orders.

The accused argued that the Information to Obtain (ITO) for the search warrant contained misleading information and sought an overly broad date range, violating section 8 of the Charter.

The court found that while the ITO contained some misleading information, its core substance supported the issuance of the warrant.

Regarding the production orders, the court applied the Grant framework to a previously found section 8 breach and concluded that the evidence should not be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, as the police acted in good faith, the breach was minimally intrusive, and society has a high interest in adjudicating the serious charges on their merits.

The applications were dismissed.

The accused, charged with kidnapping and human trafficking, brought a Charter application challenging production orders for their cell phone records.

They argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked reasonable grounds to believe the records would afford evidence of the offences, as there was no evidence they possessed or used cell phones during the alleged offences.

The court agreed, finding the ITO relied on mere suspicion rather than credibly-based probability, resulting in a breach of section 8 of the Charter.

A subsequent hearing will determine if the evidence should be excluded under section 24(2).

The applicant, charged with human trafficking and related offences, brought an application to exclude evidence obtained from a search of her rented vehicle, alleging a breach of her s. 8 Charter rights.

Police initially entered the vehicle without a warrant to retrieve the complainant's property, during which they observed wallets and identification, prompting them to obtain a search warrant.

The court dismissed the application, finding that even if the observations from the initial entry were excised from the Information to Obtain, there were sufficient grounds to issue the warrant.

Furthermore, the court held that even if a s. 8 breach occurred, the evidence would be admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter as the police acted in good faith and its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused, L.R., brought an application under section 24(2) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to exclude a videotaped statement given to police, alleging a breach of her section 10(b) right to counsel and that the statement was involuntary due to oppressive conditions and inducements.

The Crown concurrently sought a finding that the statement was voluntary.

The court found that the Crown proved voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, as L.R.'s will was not overborne by inducements or oppressive conditions, and she maintained her right to silence numerous times.

The court also found no breach of L.R.'s section 10(b) Charter rights, as she was properly informed of her rights, understood them, and was afforded opportunities to consult with duty counsel.

Consequently, L.R.'s application to exclude the statement was dismissed, and the Crown's application for admissibility was granted.

The applicant, L.R., brought a motion for a stay of charges under section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a breach of her right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The central issue was whether the 18-month or 30-month presumptive ceiling from R. v. Jordan applied to a case proceeding by direct indictment in Superior Court without a preliminary inquiry.

The applicant argued for the 18-month ceiling, which would make the 26-month delay presumptively unreasonable.

The court reviewed several Ontario, Manitoba, and Alberta Superior Court and appellate decisions, all of which consistently held that the 30-month ceiling applies when a case is going to trial in Superior Court, regardless of whether a preliminary inquiry was held or if a direct indictment was preferred.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion, affirming that the 30-month ceiling was applicable and that the applicant had not demonstrated unreasonable delay falling short of that ceiling, nor had she taken meaningful steps to expedite proceedings.

The court also declined to grant leave for a further s. 11(b) application, emphasizing that all alternate arguments should be brought in one application.