Aaron Glenn McMaster

The decision addresses an application by Edwin Capehart to exclude evidence on the basis of alleged violations of his Charter rights, specifically regarding a warrantless download of cellphone data and the validity of two search warrants.

The court finds a breach of s. 8 of the Charter due to police delay in seeking a warrant after a warrantless download, but ultimately admits the evidence after a Grant analysis.

The court finds Capehart guilty on most counts, including firearms and drug offences, and not guilty on two counts.

The appellant, William Simpson, appealed his convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault.

He argued that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny, misapplied the guidance in R. v. W.(D.), and erred by relying on speculation and impermissible stereotypes.

The appellant also sought to admit fresh evidence from a clinical psychiatrist regarding his mental acuity at the time of trial.

The court dismissed the fresh evidence application, finding it lacked cogency, due diligence, and credibility.

On the merits of the appeal, the court found no error in the trial judge's W.(D.) analysis, no s.276 or Seaboyer error, and no erroneous reliance on common-sense assumptions.

The court affirmed that the trial judge's credibility assessment was rooted in the evidence and entitled to deference.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused pleaded guilty to trafficking fentanyl, a Schedule I substance, after a friend died from consuming the drug he sold.

The Crown sought a six-year custodial sentence, emphasizing the victim's death and the dangerous nature of fentanyl.

The defence sought a conditional sentence of two years less a day, highlighting the accused's status as an addict trafficker, his significant rehabilitative efforts, early guilty plea, and compliance with strict bail conditions.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by three years probation, including house arrest, a DNA order, and a 10-year weapons prohibition.

The decision distinguished between commercial traffickers and addict traffickers, emphasizing rehabilitation and the principle of proportionality.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for assault and assault with a weapon, seeking to withdraw his guilty pleas on the basis that they were involuntary, uninformed, and the result of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to establish that his pleas were invalid or that he suffered prejudice.

The court rejected the appellant's credibility, noting he admitted to lying to the court during his plea allocution to achieve his goals.

The Crown applied for an adult sentence for a young person, M.B., who was found guilty of numerous serious offences, including a targeted shooting and subsequent firearm and drug offences.

The court considered the two-part test under section 72 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act: whether the Crown rebutted the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness and whether a youth sentence would be insufficient for accountability.

The court found that M.B.'s actions, while serious, did not demonstrate adult maturity or sophistication, citing his background as a refugee, cognitive challenges, susceptibility to negative peer influence, and amateurish conduct during the offences.

The court also noted M.B.'s significant progress and rehabilitation while in custody.

Consequently, the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness, and the application for an adult sentence was dismissed, with the court concluding that a maximum youth sentence could adequately hold M.B. accountable.

A young person was tried on charges arising from two separate incidents: a mass shooting at a Subway restaurant in Waterloo on April 19, 2019, where approximately 35 shots were fired into a crowded establishment, and a series of offences committed on May 16, 2019, including dangerous driving, fleeing police, and possession of a loaded firearm with serial number removed.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, particularly video surveillance footage, cell phone records, GPS data, and physical evidence recovered from the scene.

The court found the accused guilty on all counts based on overwhelming circumstantial evidence establishing identity as one of the shooters and connecting him to the May 16 incident through a clear chain of evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving, dangerous operation, and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended toxicology evidence by rejecting his claim that he only consumed over-the-counter pain medication, failing to recognize that codeine (and its metabolites hydrocodone and morphine) can be found in such medication.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error, as there was no evidence the specific medication ingested contained codeine, and the trial judge was not required to take judicial notice of that possibility.

The accused, charged with attempted murder and discharging a firearm, applied for a pre-trial ruling to admit his prior consistent statements made to police during and after his arrest.

He argued the statements were spontaneous and probative of his state of mind at the time of the offence under the Edgar exception.

The Crown opposed, arguing the statements lacked spontaneity because the accused had already spoken to friends and a crisis negotiator before being confronted by police.

The court agreed with the Crown, finding the statements were not genuine reactions to the accusation but expressions of hope regarding the case's outcome.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 milligrams.

He argued the trial judge erred in findings of fact and credibility, and that his rights under ss. 8 and 10(b) of the Charter were breached.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's global assessment of credibility, which concluded the appellant had fabricated evidence.

The court also upheld the finding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to make an ASD demand based on the odour of alcohol.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter based on alleged violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The applicant was stopped for a traffic violation, subjected to an approved screening device test, arrested for driving over 80, and provided breath samples.

The court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct the breath demand based on a faint odour of alcohol from the vehicle, the applicant's admission of earlier drinking, and confirmation of the odour from the applicant's mouth.

The court further found that the officer complied with the informational component of section 10(b) by reading the pre-printed rights, and that the applicant did not exercise his right to counsel until requesting duty counsel at the police station, at which point the police properly implemented that request.

The Charter application was dismissed.

The accused, a full-time facility attendant at a municipal arena, was charged with three counts of sexual exploitation, one count of invitation to sexual touching, and one count of unlawful confinement involving four teenage part-time employees.

The Crown alleged the accused abused his supervisory position by isolating the complainants and inviting them to expose their genitals, offering various pretexts such as sizing for condoms or providing sexual advice.

The trial judge found the accused guilty of invitation to sexual touching with respect to one complainant but acquitted him on the sexual exploitation counts, finding that the Crown failed to establish the essential element of a position of trust or authority in a workplace context where the accused had no managerial authority over the complainants.

The unlawful confinement charge was withdrawn by directed verdict.

The Crown brought an application to admit statements made by the accused to a police officer following breath testing as voluntary.

The court conducted a voluntariness analysis under the confessions rule established in R. v. Oickle.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove the statements were voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.

Key factors included the accused's youth and first arrest, questioning on a detain sheet prior to legal advice, a compelled breath demand with questioning during the procedure, and the absence of a secondary caution.

The court held that the circumstances created a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused understood his right to silence when questioned by the officer.

The applicant brought a section 11(b) application seeking a stay of proceedings based on an alleged unreasonable delay to trial in a robbery charge.

The charge was laid on March 13, 2016, with trial scheduled to end on March 9, 2018.

The court applied the presumptive ceiling framework established in R. v. Jordan, which sets an 18-month ceiling for trials in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The key issue was whether delay resulting from the removal of original counsel in December 2016 constituted defence delay.

The court found that the removal of counsel and the resulting adjournment of trial dates constituted defence delay attributable to the defence.

Calculating net delay at approximately 13 months, the court found this fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling and dismissed the application.

The applicants brought applications to exclude financial records obtained pursuant to a production order issued on April 8, 2016, and executed on the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce.

The applicants alleged the seizure violated their section 8 Charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

The court found that while a section 8 violation was established regarding the improper inclusion of account particulars within the information to obtain, the violation did not warrant exclusion of evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The application to exclude the financial records was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample contrary to section 254(5) of the Criminal Code following a roadside sobriety check.

The defendant claimed he used the word "prefer" rather than "refuse" and believed he had the right to decline the roadside test based on legal advice received in the United States.

The court found the defendant guilty, determining that he unequivocally refused to comply with a lawful demand and that his conduct constituted a refusal regardless of the specific words used.

The court rejected the defendant's credibility and accepted the officer's evidence as reliable and truthful.

The applicant was charged with driving with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

He brought a motion to exclude breath samples obtained during police investigation on the basis that they were unreasonably seized in violation of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown failed to establish that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to believe the applicant had committed the offence, as the breath sample was administered only thirteen minutes after the applicant stated he had consumed alcohol.

The officer was aware of the "mouth alcohol" issue and the requirement to wait fifteen to twenty minutes before testing, but proceeded with the test anyway.

The court found this constituted a serious Charter violation and excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample for an approved screening device (ASD) test.

The Crown alleged the refusal occurred without reasonable excuse under section 254(2)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violation of his right to retain and instruct counsel.

The officer advised the accused of his right to counsel due to an anticipated delay in the ASD's arrival, but failed to provide complete information about the right and interrupted the accused's attempt to contact counsel by requesting an insurance slip.

The court found the officer breached the accused's section 10(b) Charter rights by failing to fully inform him of his right to counsel and by failing to hold off from eliciting further evidence while the accused was attempting to exercise that right.

The charge was dismissed.