Elizabeth Hird

The appellant, Lerrell Stennett, appealed his convictions for dangerous operation and impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm, and an ancillary victim surcharge order.

The accident involved the appellant losing control of his vehicle on a wet highway, resulting in multiple collisions and serious injuries to himself and passengers.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty based on circumstantial evidence of excessive speed for the conditions and a projected blood alcohol concentration indicating impairment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from conviction, finding no misapprehension of evidence, no improper inference from consequences, and no circular reasoning.

The court allowed the appeal from sentence only to set aside the victim surcharges, as the regime was later ruled unconstitutional.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving, dangerous operation, and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended toxicology evidence by rejecting his claim that he only consumed over-the-counter pain medication, failing to recognize that codeine (and its metabolites hydrocodone and morphine) can be found in such medication.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error, as there was no evidence the specific medication ingested contained codeine, and the trial judge was not required to take judicial notice of that possibility.

The accused was charged with Impaired Operation or Care or Control of a Motor Vehicle and Over 80 following a single motor vehicle collision on November 25, 2017.

The Crown relied on breath test evidence and a forensic toxicology report.

The court found that the Crown failed to establish the time of operation or care or control of the motor vehicle, rendering the toxicology report's projected blood alcohol concentration calculations inapplicable.

Additionally, considering the totality of the evidence, the court found reasonable doubt as to whether the accused's ability to operate the vehicle was impaired by alcohol, as the observed indicia of impairment were reasonably capable of being explained by the effects of the accident and injuries sustained.

The accused was acquitted on both charges.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood arising from a motor vehicle collision.

The accused raised multiple Charter arguments challenging the lawfulness of the police investigation, including claims of delayed rights to counsel, improper ASD demand timing, and late disclosure of an expert toxicology report.

The court rejected all Charter arguments and found the accused guilty based on breath sample analysis showing a BAC of 260 mg per 100 ml of blood at the time of the collision.

The defendant, Kunal Bulland, was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm.

The court found that the defendant's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol at the time of the collision, based on expert toxicological evidence, physical indicia of impairment, and his driving conduct.

The court also determined that this impairment was a significant contributing cause of the victim's severe injuries.

Consequently, the defendant was found guilty of the charge.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

Following a RIDE program stop, the accused provided breath samples indicating a BAC of 100 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused challenged the admissibility of the breath test evidence on the grounds that police breached his Charter right to counsel by failing to inform him of available resources to contact counsel of choice, thereby unconstitutionally channeling him to duty counsel.

The court found a serious Charter breach and excluded the evidence, resulting in an acquittal.

The accused was charged with sexual assault after having intercourse with his roommate's girlfriend while she was passed out on a couch.

The accused raised the defence of automatism, arguing he was in a state of extreme intoxication from consuming alcohol, marijuana, and GHB.

The court found the complainant was incapable of consenting and did not consent.

The court rejected the accused's evidence that he consumed GHB, finding he was not extremely intoxicated and therefore not in a state of automatism.

The accused was found guilty.

Walter Creglia appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient and that his Charter rights were violated due to a lack of reasonable grounds for arrest.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge's reasons for both dismissing the Charter motion and convicting on impaired driving were convoluted, difficult to understand, and failed to demonstrate a clear path to conviction by linking the evidence, law, and conclusions.

The court also noted the trial judge's irrelevant discussion of "care and control." Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered, as meaningful appellate review was not possible, and the curative proviso was deemed inapplicable.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle, care or control with blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, and wilfully failing to provide a suitable breath sample.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The accused pleaded not guilty.

At trial, the Crown conceded it had not proven the over 80 offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found the accused guilty of impaired care or control and wilfully failing to provide a suitable breath sample, applying the three-part test from R. v. Boudreault regarding care or control, and finding the accused's claimed asthma did not explain his inability to provide samples.