Brennan Smart

The three accused were charged with conspiracy to traffic cocaine, trafficking cocaine, and possession of proceeds of crime following an RCMP undercover operation.

The Crown's case relied heavily on voice identification evidence from intercepted communications to link the accused Shanker to the conspiracy.

The court found the voice identification evidence unreliable due to cross-racial identification issues, expectation bias, and the poor quality of the recordings.

Without reliable voice identification, the circumstantial evidence of the accused's presence at the warehouse was insufficient to prove their involvement in the drug trafficking scheme beyond a reasonable doubt.

All accused were acquitted of the cocaine-related charges.

Pawar conceded guilt to a separate charge of possessing opium for the purpose of trafficking.

This case concerns the trial of David Hui and Musab Saboon for the first-degree murder and kidnapping of Lee Chiodo.

The victim's body was found shot in the head on Mission Island.

The Crown's case heavily relied on the testimony of Marshall Hardy-Fox, an accomplice whose murder charge was withdrawn after he implicated the accused.

The court applied a Vetrovec warning to Hardy-Fox's evidence, scrutinizing it carefully but ultimately finding it credible due to corroborating independent evidence, including Facebook messages, surveillance videos, and forensic findings.

The court found that the kidnapping "crystallized" with threats and a gun in the car, and that the murder was both constructive (arising from the kidnapping/unlawful confinement) and planned and deliberate.

Both accused were found guilty of kidnapping and first-degree murder.

Kyle Byrne pleaded guilty to impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing the death of Karli Chomick, contrary to s.320.14(3) of the Criminal Code of Canada.

The incident involved a high-speed collision while the offender's blood alcohol concentration was more than twice the legal limit.

The court accepted a joint submission for a sentence of five years imprisonment, an eight-year driving prohibition (totaling 13 years), a 10-year weapon prohibition, and a secondary DNA order.

The sentencing emphasized denunciation and deterrence, considering aggravating factors such as high blameworthiness, the victim's death, high BAC, excessive speed, and the offender's initial call to his mother instead of 9-1-1.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, first-time offender status, and the offender's serious injuries.

The applicant sought an order in the nature of prohibition to prevent a judge of the Ontario Court of Justice from proceeding with his criminal trial remotely via video conference, and an order to quash the ruling that ordered the trial to proceed remotely.

The applicant argued that there was no jurisdiction to order a remote trial or compel a complainant to testify remotely without consent or application.

The Superior Court dismissed both applications, holding that the trial judge had jurisdiction under the Criminal Code to order remote participation for the Crown, expert witness, and complainant.

The court clarified that while an accused's remote participation requires their consent, errors in exercising jurisdiction are reviewable by appeal, not by extraordinary remedies like prohibition or certiorari, unless they amount to a jurisdictional error or breach of natural justice.

The applicant was charged with dangerous driving and impaired driving causing bodily harm following a motor vehicle collision.

Police seized blood samples drawn for medical purposes and sealed them without reasonable grounds to believe the samples would afford evidence of a criminal act.

Seven weeks later, police obtained a warrant and seized the blood, which was subsequently tested and revealed the presence of Xanax.

The applicant moved to exclude the evidence on the basis of an unreasonable seizure contrary to section 8 of the Charter.

The court found that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds at the time of sealing the blood samples and that the sealing constituted an unreasonable seizure and Charter violation.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The Crown sought to qualify a police officer as an expert witness to provide opinion evidence regarding factual characteristics indicative of cocaine trafficking.

The defence objected on the basis that the officer was not properly qualified under the fourth Mohan criterion.

The court found that the Crown had not established that the officer understood her primary duty to the court rather than to the Crown.

The application to present opinion evidence was dismissed.

The charge was subsequently resolved by guilty plea to simple possession of cocaine.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

Following a RIDE program stop, the accused provided breath samples indicating a BAC of 100 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused challenged the admissibility of the breath test evidence on the grounds that police breached his Charter right to counsel by failing to inform him of available resources to contact counsel of choice, thereby unconstitutionally channeling him to duty counsel.

The court found a serious Charter breach and excluded the evidence, resulting in an acquittal.

The offender was convicted of sexually touching a 15-year-old boy, a former student and friend of his son, whom he was mentoring.

The offender, a former school vice principal and church youth leader, unbuttoned the victim's pants and touched his penis while telling him this would help him play a video game better.

The offence was opportunistic and occurred during a sleepover.

The court imposed a 10-month jail sentence, emphasizing the breach of trust, the vulnerability of the victim, and the significant psychological harm caused.

The court rejected the Crown's request for one year and the defence request for 14 days, finding the appropriate sentence fell within the established range for sexual interference offences.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for refusing an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand.

The trial judge found a Charter breach of the right to counsel, reasoning that the officer's subjective belief of a potential delay triggered the right, and his actions suspended the usual suspension of counsel rights during a "forthwith" demand.

The appeal court held that the trial judge erred by overemphasizing the officer's subjective belief and incorrectly equating a chance to call a lawyer with a "realistic opportunity to consult counsel." The court reiterated that the right to counsel is suspended during a forthwith ASD demand if there is no realistic opportunity for consultation, regardless of the officer's subjective expectations.

The officer's gratuitous offer of counsel rights does not create a right where none exists.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered.

The applicant sought to exclude a post-arrest statement on the basis of a violation of his section 10(b) Charter right to counsel.

The applicant had retained counsel prior to arrest and repeatedly requested to speak with his lawyer during a police interview.

Despite these clear requests, the investigating officer continued questioning without facilitating access to counsel.

The court found that the applicant had invoked his right to counsel through multiple explicit requests and that the officer's failure to provide reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel constituted a section 10(b) violation.

The statement was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused, charged with first degree murder and indignity to human remains, applied for judicial interim release.

The Crown opposed release, citing the gravity of the offence and the accused's alleged involvement in drug and firearms trafficking.

The court considered the proposed release plan, which included strict house arrest, electronic monitoring, and a $600,000 surety provided by the accused's mother.

Finding triable issues in the Crown's case and emphasizing the accused's right to make full answer and defence, the court concluded the accused met the onus under section 515(10) of the Criminal Code and granted release on strict conditions.

The accused pleaded guilty to assaulting his nine-year-old son contrary to section 266 of the Criminal Code.

The assault involved striking the child with an open hand and a leather strap, causing welts and bruising.

The Crown sought custody, emphasizing the seriousness of violence against children and the breach of trust.

The defence sought a conditional discharge, highlighting the accused's genuine remorse, immediate self-reporting, participation in rehabilitative programs, and his status as an Aboriginal offender.

The court imposed a conditional discharge with 12 months probation, finding this to be a rare case warranting an exception to the general principle that violence against children demands incarceration and criminal conviction.

The accused pleaded guilty to attempted murder of his wife on October 28, 2012.

The victim was stabbed multiple times in bed, pursued through the residence, and the accused subsequently set fires throughout the home and disconnected the propane line, endangering first responders.

The victim escaped through a bathroom window onto the roof.

The court imposed a sentence of nine years imprisonment with credit for 22 months of pre-trial custody, resulting in seven years and two months remaining to be served.

The sentencing considered aggravating factors including the brutal nature of the attack, breach of trust, and violation of a no-contact order, balanced against mitigating factors including the accused's advanced age (78 at time of offence), genuine remorse, guilty plea, and otherwise exemplary character.

The appellant appealed convictions for mischief under $5,000 and breach of an undertaking arising from the slashing of vehicle tires.

At trial, the Crown introduced evidence that the appellant had previously threatened the complainant and his family and made comments about the complainant’s vehicle tires.

No voir dire was conducted to determine whether this prior discreditable conduct evidence had probative value outweighing its prejudicial effect.

The appeal court held that such evidence is presumptively inadmissible unless properly assessed through a voir dire.

Because the trial judge relied on this evidence in assessing guilt, the admission of the evidence constituted reversible error.