Brennan Smart

The three accused were charged with conspiracy to traffic cocaine, trafficking cocaine, and possession of proceeds of crime following an RCMP undercover operation.

The Crown's case relied heavily on voice identification evidence from intercepted communications to link the accused Shanker to the conspiracy.

The court found the voice identification evidence unreliable due to cross-racial identification issues, expectation bias, and the poor quality of the recordings.

Without reliable voice identification, the circumstantial evidence of the accused's presence at the warehouse was insufficient to prove their involvement in the drug trafficking scheme beyond a reasonable doubt.

All accused were acquitted of the cocaine-related charges.

Pawar conceded guilt to a separate charge of possessing opium for the purpose of trafficking.

The accused was charged with manslaughter after a neighbourly dispute escalated.

The accused went to the deceased's garage to discuss an altercation that occurred the previous day between their wives.

The deceased became angry, threatened to kill the accused, and reached for what appeared to be a handgun (later determined to be a pellet gun).

In response, the accused punched the deceased once in the head, causing a rare vertebral artery tear that resulted in death.

The court found that the accused acted in lawful self-defence under section 34 of the Criminal Code, as he reasonably believed force was being threatened and his response was proportionate.

The accused was found not guilty.

The offender was convicted of first degree murder and kidnapping with a firearm in relation to a drug debt.

The court imposed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 25 years for the murder.

For the kidnapping, the court agreed with the Crown that the context of enforcing a drug debt required denunciation and deterrence, imposing a concurrent life sentence.

This case concerns the trial of David Hui and Musab Saboon for the first-degree murder and kidnapping of Lee Chiodo.

The victim's body was found shot in the head on Mission Island.

The Crown's case heavily relied on the testimony of Marshall Hardy-Fox, an accomplice whose murder charge was withdrawn after he implicated the accused.

The court applied a Vetrovec warning to Hardy-Fox's evidence, scrutinizing it carefully but ultimately finding it credible due to corroborating independent evidence, including Facebook messages, surveillance videos, and forensic findings.

The court found that the kidnapping "crystallized" with threats and a gun in the car, and that the murder was both constructive (arising from the kidnapping/unlawful confinement) and planned and deliberate.

Both accused were found guilty of kidnapping and first-degree murder.

Kyle Byrne pleaded guilty to impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing the death of Karli Chomick, contrary to s.320.14(3) of the Criminal Code of Canada.

The incident involved a high-speed collision while the offender's blood alcohol concentration was more than twice the legal limit.

The court accepted a joint submission for a sentence of five years imprisonment, an eight-year driving prohibition (totaling 13 years), a 10-year weapon prohibition, and a secondary DNA order.

The sentencing emphasized denunciation and deterrence, considering aggravating factors such as high blameworthiness, the victim's death, high BAC, excessive speed, and the offender's initial call to his mother instead of 9-1-1.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, first-time offender status, and the offender's serious injuries.

The applicant sought an order in the nature of prohibition to prevent a judge of the Ontario Court of Justice from proceeding with his criminal trial remotely via video conference, and an order to quash the ruling that ordered the trial to proceed remotely.

The applicant argued that there was no jurisdiction to order a remote trial or compel a complainant to testify remotely without consent or application.

The Superior Court dismissed both applications, holding that the trial judge had jurisdiction under the Criminal Code to order remote participation for the Crown, expert witness, and complainant.

The court clarified that while an accused's remote participation requires their consent, errors in exercising jurisdiction are reviewable by appeal, not by extraordinary remedies like prohibition or certiorari, unless they amount to a jurisdictional error or breach of natural justice.

The accused was charged with sexual assault arising from an encounter with a complainant he met through a dating application.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to evaluate conflicting testimony and found that while the complainant’s evidence about further sexual conduct was credible, the Crown had not proven those allegations beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, the court concluded that the accused initiated a kiss without consent and without taking reasonable steps to ascertain consent.

The defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent had no air of reality.

The accused was therefore convicted of sexual assault based on the non-consensual kiss.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

The trial judge had excluded the breathalyzer readings under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding a breach of the respondent's s. 10(b) right to counsel, as police failed to provide him with a lawyer's directory when he could not reach his counsel of choice.

The Superior Court of Justice found no error in the trial judge's application of the law or the Grant framework and dismissed the appeal.

The applicant was charged with dangerous driving and impaired driving causing bodily harm following a motor vehicle collision.

Police seized blood samples drawn for medical purposes and sealed them without reasonable grounds to believe the samples would afford evidence of a criminal act.

Seven weeks later, police obtained a warrant and seized the blood, which was subsequently tested and revealed the presence of Xanax.

The applicant moved to exclude the evidence on the basis of an unreasonable seizure contrary to section 8 of the Charter.

The court found that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds at the time of sealing the blood samples and that the sealing constituted an unreasonable seizure and Charter violation.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The Crown appealed the sentence of the respondent, who pleaded guilty to four drinking and driving offences.

The sentencing judge had declined to treat the respondent's 1985 impaired driving conviction as a previous conviction under s. 255(4) of the Criminal Code, and sentenced him to time served.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court allowed the appeal, finding that the 1985 conviction was a previous conviction by virtue of the Interpretation Act, triggering the mandatory minimum sentence of 120 days.

The court varied the sentence to 6 months in custody, 3 years' probation, and a 5-year driving prohibition.

The Crown sought to qualify a police officer as an expert witness to provide opinion evidence regarding factual characteristics indicative of cocaine trafficking.

The defence objected on the basis that the officer was not properly qualified under the fourth Mohan criterion.

The court found that the Crown had not established that the officer understood her primary duty to the court rather than to the Crown.

The application to present opinion evidence was dismissed.

The charge was subsequently resolved by guilty plea to simple possession of cocaine.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

Following a RIDE program stop, the accused provided breath samples indicating a BAC of 100 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused challenged the admissibility of the breath test evidence on the grounds that police breached his Charter right to counsel by failing to inform him of available resources to contact counsel of choice, thereby unconstitutionally channeling him to duty counsel.

The court found a serious Charter breach and excluded the evidence, resulting in an acquittal.

The offender was convicted of sexually touching a 15-year-old boy, a former student and friend of his son, whom he was mentoring.

The offender, a former school vice principal and church youth leader, unbuttoned the victim's pants and touched his penis while telling him this would help him play a video game better.

The offence was opportunistic and occurred during a sleepover.

The court imposed a 10-month jail sentence, emphasizing the breach of trust, the vulnerability of the victim, and the significant psychological harm caused.

The court rejected the Crown's request for one year and the defence request for 14 days, finding the appropriate sentence fell within the established range for sexual interference offences.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for refusing an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand.

The trial judge found a Charter breach of the right to counsel, reasoning that the officer's subjective belief of a potential delay triggered the right, and his actions suspended the usual suspension of counsel rights during a "forthwith" demand.

The appeal court held that the trial judge erred by overemphasizing the officer's subjective belief and incorrectly equating a chance to call a lawyer with a "realistic opportunity to consult counsel." The court reiterated that the right to counsel is suspended during a forthwith ASD demand if there is no realistic opportunity for consultation, regardless of the officer's subjective expectations.

The officer's gratuitous offer of counsel rights does not create a right where none exists.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered.

The applicant sought to exclude a post-arrest statement on the basis of a violation of his section 10(b) Charter right to counsel.

The applicant had retained counsel prior to arrest and repeatedly requested to speak with his lawyer during a police interview.

Despite these clear requests, the investigating officer continued questioning without facilitating access to counsel.

The court found that the applicant had invoked his right to counsel through multiple explicit requests and that the officer's failure to provide reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel constituted a section 10(b) violation.

The statement was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant appealed a conviction for assault with a weapon and possession of a weapon for dangerous purposes.

The appeal concerned whether the trial judge erred in considering court documents related to bail for identification purposes and if this caused a denial of procedural fairness.

The appellate court found that the trial judge erred in using the surety's affidavit for its truth and that the manner in which the bail documents were introduced into the analysis, after the defence had closed its case, violated procedural fairness.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and the case remitted for a new adjudication. interesting_citations_summary: > The decision clarifies the admissibility of court documents for the truth of their contents, applying the two-step test from *R. v. Caesar, 2016 ONCA 599*.

It distinguishes between the inherent reliability of original court documents like a Recognizance and the substantive admissibility of information within them, particularly affidavits.

The court emphasizes that while a Recognizance itself may be admissible, the introduction of such evidence by the trial judge *sua sponte* after the close of the Crown's case and defence election not to call evidence constitutes a denial of procedural fairness, as it deprives the accused of knowing the full case against them.

The case reinforces the principle that an accused is entitled to know the entirety of the Crown's case before responding. final_judgement: > The appeal is allowed, the convictions are set aside, and the case is remitted back to the Ontario Court of Justice for adjudication. winning_degree_applicant: 1 winning_degree_respondent: 5 judge_bias_applicant: 0 judge_bias_respondent: 0 year: 2016 decision_number: 5778 file_number: "SCA 8478" source: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2016/2016onsc5778/2016onsc5778.html" cited_cases: legislation: - title: "Criminal Code of Canada" case_law: - title: "R. v Bailey, 2014 ONSC 5477" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2014/2014onsc5477/2014onsc5477.html" - title: "R. v. Caesar, 2016 ONCA 599" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2016/2016onca599/2016onca599.html" - title: "R. v. C (W.B). (2000), 130 O.A.C. 1" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2000/2000canlii5659/2000canlii5659.html" - title: "R. v. Hunt (1986), 18 O.A.C. 78" - title: "R. v. Toozhy, [2013] O.J. No. 1303 (S.C.)" - title: "R. v. Timms, [1989] O.J. No. 893 (C.A.)" - title: "R v. M.B.P., [1994] 1 S.C.R. 555" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1994/1994canlii125/1994canlii125.html" - title: "R. v Evaglok, [2010] NWTJ No. 90 (C.A.)" - title: "R. v. Roy, 2012 SCC 26" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2012/2012scc26/2012scc26.html" - title: "R. v. MacNeil, 2009 NSCA 46, [2009] N.S.J. No. 203 (C.A.)" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/ns/nsca/doc/2009/2009nsca46/2009nsca46.html" - title: "R. v. Watson, [2004] O.J. No. 4921 (C.A.)" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2004/2004canlii45443/2004canlii45443.html" - title: "R. v. Crawford, [2015] A.J. No. 552 (C.A.)" - title: "R. v. K.T., 2013 ONCA 257" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2013/2013onca257/2013onca257.html" keywords: - Criminal law - Appeal - Procedural fairness - Identification evidence - Bail documents - Recognizance - Affidavit of surety - Admissibility of evidence - Miscarriage of justice - New trial areas_of_law: - Criminal Law - Evidence - Civil Procedure --- # Court File and Parties **COURT FILE NO.:** SCA 8478 **DATE:** 2016-09-27 **ONTARIO** **SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE** **SUMMARY CONVICTION APPEAL COURT** **B E T W E E N:** **HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN** J. Caskie, for the Crown Respondent **- and -** **Rustam Suleimanov** B. Smart, for the Appellant Appellant **HEARD:** August 31, 2016 A.J. Goodman J.: # REASONS FOR JUDGMENT (On appeal from the Honourable Justice Epstein) [ 1 ] This is an appeal against conviction imposed on January 29, 2015 by Epstein J. of the Ontario Court of Justice at Kitchener, Ontario. [ 2 ] The appeal relates to offences of Assault with a Weapon and Possession of a Weapon for Dangerous Purposes, contrary to their respective provisions in the Criminal Code of Canada. [1] [ 3 ] At the conclusion of submissions on August 31, 2016, the Crown was permitted to file supplementary written materials on the issue of the appropriate remedy should the appeal be successful. [ 4 ] Principally, the appellant raises two grounds of appeal.

Was the trial judge entitled to consider court documents related to bail on the issue of identification?

Did the trial judge’s review of these court documents in the circumstances of this case cause a denial of procedural fairness?

If so, what is the appropriate remedy?

The third area of contention related to the appellant’s mode of participation in the incident was not addressed during oral argument. ## The Evidence at Trial: [ 5 ] The ultimate issue in this case was the identity of the two perpetrators.

On May 1, 2013, at approximately 3:06 p.m., Awad Omar was assaulted near the Grand River Transit platform outside the Bay store entrance of Fairview Park Mall, located at 200 Fairway Road South in the City of Kitchener. [ 6 ] An eye-witness at the scene informed police that two men arrived in a motor vehicle with the license plate number BNEN 125.

The vehicle was silver, four-door 2012 Hyundai and the registered owner of the vehicle was identified. [ 7 ] Later the same day, Detective Constable Merrigan (“Merrigan”) attended 452 Shelley Drive and identified the vehicle.

He observed the appellant who resides at this location with his mother in the parking lot.

Merrigan spoke to the registered owner of the vehicle although Merrigan did not speak to the appellant at that point.

At this location, the appellant’s mother advised that he had access to the vehicle during the time of the assault.

The police subsequently seized the vehicle for processing at the police headquarters. [ 8 ] The defence did not admit that the Ministry of Transportation records showing the license plate number and corresponding registered owner’s name, Nurgul Ogombaieva (“Ogombaieva”) as evidence in relation to the accused. [ 9 ] The Crown Attorney relied upon video footage to demonstrate the two perpetrators assaulting the victim outside of The Bay store.

The video reflected that a vehicle pulled into the driving lane near the bus stop and stopped abruptly.

The doors opened and two males got out.

The man who emerged from the vehicle with an expandable baton came from the passenger side of the vehicle, while the driver carried no weapon.

The video depicted one man hit the victim over the head with a baton, while the other man shoved the victim to the ground, kicked his side, and punched his head.

One of the men visible in the video exited the vehicle after the other, and he was carrying a retractable baton.

After the quick assault, both men returned to the vehicle and drove away. [ 10 ] Detective Constable Livingstone reviewed the footage and testified that he identified the appellant as one of the assailants in the video. [ 11 ] During the course of trial, the judge reviewed documents relating to the judicial interim release of the accused, attached to the Information.

The trial judge discovered from the appellant’s Recognizance that he resided at 452-B Shelley Drive in Kitchener with his mother as his surety.

The learned judge also noted that the affiant of the affidavit of surety was Ogombaieva. [ 12 ] During submissions, the trial judge asked counsel whether he could make substantive use of information contained in the Bail Recognizance and the affidavit of the surety.

He invited submissions on this point and adjourned to allow counsel to present further submissions and authorities. [ 13 ] Having regard to the evidence of the police officer, the Ministry of Transportation records filed with the court, and the documents examined by the trial judge, the judge determined that there was sufficient evidence to constitute proof of the identity of the accused as the driver. ## Positions of the Parties: [ 14 ] The appellant submits that the learned trial judge erred in denying procedural fairness.

After the defence elected to call no defence, the trial judge advised that he was cognizant of documents attached to the Information, including the affidavit for Justification for Surety, the Recognizance itself and documents filed in support of the appellant’s release plan.

In doing so, the appellant submits that the trial judge erred in finding that a connection could be established between the appellant and the owner of the vehicle used during the assault.

In embarking upon his own investigation of the documents attached to the Information the judge violated the principle of a “case to meet”. [ 15 ] The appellant submits that not only was there a denial of procedural fairness, rather the trial judge failed to conduct a proper analysis of the bail documents in support of his conclusion. [ 16 ] The Crown concedes based on recent appellate jurisprudence, (that was not available to the trial judge), the relationship between the surety and the appellant, as described in the surety’s affidavit was not admissible.

The Crown submits that the information contained in the Recognizance was substantively admissible as circumstantial evidence against the appellant. [ 17 ] The Crown says that the trial judge was entitled to consider the recognizance and the evidence advanced at trial in arriving at his determination.

Based on all of the evidence before him the trial judge drew the proper conclusions and inferences in support of his finding.

The Crown submits that any analysis conducted by the trial judge with respect to the Recognizance and the weight attributed to it in the overall analysis of the evidence was minimal and would not have affected His Honour’s verdict. [ 18 ] The Crown submits there was no denial of procedural fairness as the trial judge permitted defence counsel to make full submission on the very issues before this appeal court.

The appeal should be dismissed. ## Analysis: ### The examination of court documents: [ 19 ] Historically, the jurisprudence supported the proposition that a Court can take notice of its own documents and processes.

The rule that “the Court has at all times power to look at its own records and to take notice of their contents although they may not be formally brought before the Court” was first expressed by the Court of Exchequer in 1869 and has been consequently cited with approval by the Ontario Court of Appeal.

The justification for this Rule was explained by Campbell J. in *R. v Bailey, 2014 ONSC 5477*, [2014] O.J. No. 4420, (S.C.) at para. 18, where he stated that: At common law, original judicial or court documents… were always admissible as evidence, without notice.

This long-standing rule of law was based on the notion that courts always had the power to examine their own records and take notice of their contents in proceedings before them.

The lack of notice caused no unfairness to any parties to the litigation as, being public documents, original judicial or court documents are always readily available for inspection. [ 20 ] After the appellant’s conviction in this case, the Ontario Court of Appeal released its judgment in the case of *R. v. Caesar, 2016 ONCA 599*, [2016] O.J. No. 4007, which specifically addressed the use a Court can make of the contents of its own documents.

In *Caesar*, the Court of Appeal employed a two-step test to determine whether records of judicial proceedings are admissible for the truth of their contents.

First, the court must determine whether the records meet the criteria for admission without further proof of authenticity; and secondly, if so, whether their contents are substantively admissible either because it was the recorder’s duty to verify their validity or because they are otherwise admissible through the principled exception, or some other exception. [ 21 ] In *Caesar*, the Court applied this test to find that the fact of the co-accused’s guilty plea, noted on the Information, was admissible.

However, in that case, the transcripts could not be tendered for the truth of their content or as evidence of the facts underlying the plea. [ 22 ] While the power of a court to examine its own documents without notice is often relied upon by a party to a litigation attempting to tender a court document as part of its case; in *Caesar*, the Court of Appeal reframed the question with respect to substantive admissibility.

In doing so, the Court of Appeal reviewed some of the relevant jurisprudence including *R. v. Hunt* (1986), 18 O.A.C. 78 and *Bailey*, amongst other cases.

Whether the contents of the documents or records are admissible for the truth of their contents is clearly dependant on the circumstances: para 36.

Court documents are admissible without further proof because of their inherent reliability: para. 36. [ 23 ] If the scope of the duty of the court official making the record is to validate the truth of the contents, prepared by a court official and signed by a jurist, the jurisprudence permits such a court document, - the actual Recognizance - as admissible for all purposes, satisfying the criteria as outlined in para. 38 of *Caesar*, without the need for exemplification.

See also *R. v. C (W.B). (2000)*, 130 O.A.C. 1.

Indeed, the same level of trustworthiness or reliability does not arise for the introduction of transcripts of prior proceedings without a complete analysis as directed by the appellate court. [ 24 ] In this case, during final submissions, the Crown alleged that the registered owner of the motor vehicle was the appellant’s mother.

The trial judge interjected by correctly pointing out that there had been “no admissible evidence viva voce from the witness box nor [sic] filed as exhibits today which would make the connection between the accused and the registered owner as mother and son”. [2] It was at that was at that point, the trial judge then brought up the documents relating to the appellant’s release, stating: …But I am wondering whether or not I can take into account from the documents attached to the information that the [sic] woman with the same name, same address as the registered owner of that vehicle swore an affidavit of surety and is the named surety on the recognizance of bail for the accused, both at the same address. [3] [ 25 ] The appellant argued that, as the Crown had not sought to rely on those documents, the information contained therein was not admissible evidence against the appellant. [ 26 ] The Crown took the position that those documents and their contents were admissible for all purposes.

Irrespective of any consideration of the surety’s affidavit, the Crown submits that as a court document the trial judge could refer to the Recognizance and take notice of its contents, on his own motion at any time.

The Crown says that the name and address of the surety and the term of the Recognizance requiring that the appellant reside at the address of the vehicle’s registered owner were admissible pieces of circumstantial evidence to connect the appellant to the vehicle used in the commission of the assault. [ 27 ] While the Court exercised its well-recognized and longstanding power to review and take notice of its own documents, apart from the affidavit, the concern advanced here is not only for alleged procedural unfairness, rather, it includes the scope of review of the relevant documents in the decision making process. [ 28 ] There is no dispute that the trial judge erred in his use and consideration of the surety’s affidavit, and the Crown concedes that the contents of the affidavit of surety, specifically the statement that the surety is the appellant’s mother and other information related to identification was not admissible for its truth. [ 29 ] Nonetheless, in my view, the Recognizance itself in this case meets the first requirement of the two-step test set in *Caesar*.

As an original court document, it meets the criteria of admission without further proof of authenticity.

The Recognizance also satisfies the second step without further inquiry as it is the original court document.

In creating that document it was the court clerk and the presiding justice of the peace’s duty to ensure the validity and accuracy of the Recognizance and its terms. [ 30 ] I note that in *Caesar*, the Court of Appeal found the fact of the guilty plea admissible, in part because “[t]he existence of the guilty plea is not contentious nor is it open to competing inferences as to its meaning.” Here, the release and its terms are not contentious or open to competing inferences. [ 31 ] The Crown says that an individual with the very distinctive name of Ogombaieva acted as the appellant’s surety.

The trial judge appeared to have relied upon the Recognizance to demonstrate two facts.

First, that an individual with the same name and address as the registered owner of the motor vehicle acted as the appellant’s surety; and second that the address at which the appellant was ordered to reside. [ 32 ] Therefore, the information contained on the Recognizance was, under *Caesar*, admissible for the truth of its contents and properly considered by the trial judge as circumstantial evidence connecting the appellant to an address with the name of the surety and her address.

I cannot find fault with this logic. [ 33 ] In this context, the trial judge stated: …There is no question that in the video and the stills extracted there from, the person bears a striking resemblance to the accused.

But as I have indicated, the definition of the photos and the images on the video are such that it is not clear and I cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt from looking at the videos and the photos alone that the accused is the person who was driving the motor vehicle.

There is however other evidence.

A Ministry of Transportation document was introduced on consent in evidence indicating that the driver’s licence of this accused reflects that his address is 452-B Shelley Drive in Kitchener.

However, as was pointed out by Mr. Smart, the incident occurred on May 1st, 2013 and the MTO extract was printed in April 2014. [4] During the course of the trial, I noted that attached to the information were some documents pertaining to the release of the accused.

He was released on a recognizance to reside at 452-B Shelley Drive, Kitchener.

The surety was his mother and indeed there was an affidavit by his mother as surety that had been prepared and presented by the defence in an effort to obtain the release of the accused.

This affidavit indicated that the affiant, Nurgul Ogombaieau of 452-B Shelley Drive, Kitchener, was the mother of the accused. [5] [ 34 ] Addressing the person named in the charge and the issue of identification of the person before the court as the person who committed the offence, is an element requiring proof at every criminal trial, unless admissions are made by the defence: *R. v Evaglok* [2010] NWTJ No. 90 (C.A.) at p. 6.

This issue is distinct from that of the connection between the person named in the charge and the person appearing before the court.

In *Evaglok*, the court held that the court is entitled to assume that a person appearing in court and answering to a charge is the person charged.

It does not necessarily flow that the person appearing in court and whose name is upon the charge is the person who indeed committed the offence.

The burden of proof rests with the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.

The taking of judicial notice of the court’s process is only a circumstance in which the trier of fact might infer the identity of the accused and is distinct from being conclusive: at para. 27. [ 35 ] In his Reasons for Judgment, Epstein J. continued: Having reviewed the authorities, I am of the view that it is amply clear that I am entitled to have reference to the court process and the documents pertaining thereto attached to this information.

That there is no need that the documents be made evidence in the case and that there is no notice requirement.

I have given careful consideration to whether or not absent the bail documents I would have been satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused in this case.

It is almost impossible for me to determine that because I have lurking in the back of my mind the fact that the mother has this unusual name, was the registered owner of the vehicle and lived at that address.

If I exclude the court documents from consideration, I am left with the video showing certainly some considerable similarities between the driver and the accused.

The fact that within an hour he was at the address of the registered owner, or standing on the porch at least, that the car was there beside the house and that the very next day he was wearing what appeared to be a white t-shirt under something else and the pants that I have described.

I believe I would have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that that was sufficient to establish the identity of the accused as the driver in any event. [6] [ 36 ] From my review of the transcripts, it is readily apparent that the trial judge was alive to the issue of identity.

How much the use of the impugned surety’s affidavit affected the trial judge’s decision making process is difficult to delineate from the other evidence presented at trial.

The language next employed by the learned trial judge is most challenging. [7] I am not certain in that regard, but I believe I would have come to the conclusion.

I can tell you that with the addition of the reference to the bail papers, I am left in no doubt that the accused was the driver of the vehicle. [ 37 ] Although the trial judge considered the release documents in making that decision, he indicated that even without the information contained therein he “believe[s] that [he] would have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that [the evidence] was sufficient to establish the identity of the accused as the driver”. [ 38 ] In his analysis, Epstein J. appeared to have given some weight to the evidence arising from the bail documents, including the surety affidavit in support of his findings; while at the same time, suggesting some uncertainty - “a belief that he would have concluded” - the identity of one of the perpetrators as the appellant.

To what extent is not readily ascertainable from the Reasons. ### Denial of Procedural Fairness: [ 39 ] This aspect of the appeal is most fundamental to the appellant’s position.

As mentioned, the trial judge first raised the question during the Crown attorney’s final submissions: THE COURT: We’re going to have an issue with respect to the mother and I should raise that now I suppose.

You’ll recall that when Detective Constable Merrigan gave evidence with respect to what he’d been told by the registered owner identifying her son as the person who had the car that there was an objection from Mr. Smart.

And I also took note of the specific acknowledgements that admissions made by Mr. Smart which specifically excluded an acknowledgement that he was the son of the registered owner as I understood it.

So at this stage, with respect to the evidence before me, I think there is no admissible evidence viva voce from the witness box nor filed as exhibits today which would make the connection between the accused and the registered owner as mother and son.

Having said that, there is attached to the first information a recognizance and an affidavit of surety.

I specifically did not raise this during the court of the evidence because I didn’t want to in any way interfere with how the evidence might be called or I didn’t want to be in a position where I might tempt the Crown to call evidence it otherwise wasn’t going to call.

I didn’t want to interfere to that extent.

But I am wondering whether or not I can take into account from the documents attached to the information that the woman with the same name, same address as the registered owner of that vehicle swore an affidavit of surety and is the named surety on the recognizance of bail for the accused, both at the same address.

What’s your position about that?

THE COURT: Well, let me just say this.

The reason that I didn’t raise it when it became apparent to me during the evidence was because I wanted to preserve the situation so that it would essentially play out as it is now.

If I had mentioned it during the trial, then it might’ve prejudiced the defence.

MR.

SMART: Fair enough and I appreciate ….

THE COURT: So that’s why I mentioned it at the end.

So my question becomes this, if we deal with this on the basis of a procedural fairness issue, is any perceived unfairness remedied or can it be remedied by me taking some steps for instance to allow the defence to reconsider whether or not it wishes to call evidence? [8] [ 40 ] Undoubtedly, the trial judge was concerned about this issue.

During submissions of counsel, and followed by a discussion of his Reasons for Judgment, Epstein J. stated: Having said that, there is attached to the first information a recognizance and an affidavit of surety.

I specifically did not raise this during the course of the evidence because I didn’t want to in any way interfere with how the evidence might be called or I didn’t want to be in a position where I might tempt the Crown to call evidence it otherwise wasn’t going to call.

I didn’t want to interfere to that extent.

Fearing that the revelation during the trial of the information found by me might affect how the trial proceeded, I opted not to make mention of it until the evidence was in and we were at the submission stage of proceedings.

I invited both counsel to make submissions and adjourned the matter for that purpose. [9] THE COURT: Mr. Smart also takes the position that procedural fairness dictates that it ought not to be relied upon.

And also takes the position that even if it is something that is admissible, it was incumbent upon the Crown to introduce it as evidence as part of the trial which clearly the Crown did not do.

It was precisely for that reason I decided not to make mention of it during the trial because I did not want to affect that course of the prosecution and give the Crown the option to introduce that evidence which might have been missed by the Crown theretofore.

Having reviewed the authorities, I am of the view that it is amply clear that I am entitled to have reference to the court process and the documents pertaining thereto. [10] [ 41 ] I disagree with the Crown’s characterization that this case is not a situation in which Epstein J. engaged in his own investigation to find evidence against the appellant that would not otherwise have been before the Court.

It is clear the trial judge had at least turned his mind to the issue, early on in the case and, as referenced above, stated: “I specifically did not raise this during the course of the evidence because I didn’t want to in any way interfere with how the evidence might be called or I didn’t want to be in a position where I might tempt the Crown to call evidence it otherwise wasn’t going to call”. [ 42 ] The Crown attorney provided the trial judge with the case of *R. v. Toozhy*, [2013] O.J. No. 1303, (S.C.), wherein, Fuerst J. of her own motion, reviewed the signature on the accused’s undertaking and used that signature to support her finding that the accused was the author of a fraudulent loan document.

I am persuaded that the facts and the rationale for Fuerst J.’s use or viewing of the documents for the purpose expressed in *Toozhy* are clearly distinguishable. [ 43 ] In this context, I note the brief reference found in *R. v. Timms*, [1989] O.J. No. 893 (C.A.).

The Court of Appeal held that “the taking of the recognizance is authorized by the Criminal Code and was in form 32.

In our opinion the recognizance is a judicial or court document and was admissible in evidence against the appellant without further proof”.

In that case, the signature on the recognizance was used to validate the signature of the appellant.

The important distinction, however, is that the original Recognizance was tendered into evidence at the opening of trial.

The same situation arose in *Bailey*, where the Crown had tendered the documents into evidence. [ 44 ] I agree with the general proposition advanced by the Crown that while an accused is entitled to be aware of all the evidence that could be used against him at trial, he is not entitled to know how those pieces of evidence will be used and what particular pieces of evidence will ultimately be relied upon.

Again, Crown counsel submits that the appellant was certainly aware of the existence and contents of the Recognizance as he personally entered into it before a justice. [ 45 ] It is true that a Recognizance is a court document that is equally available to both parties for inspection and it is not something that was in the possession or control of the Crown.

However, such a suggestion of knowledge or of its existence only goes so far.

The Crown submits that there was no prejudice, without notice, regardless of who first referred to it.

That it or they were referred to by the Court rather than the Crown caused no unfairness to the appellant. [ 46 ] With respect, I must disagree.

The admissibility of evidence by processes that allow for the ease of such introduction through statute or by the common law is one matter.

The actual tendering of the document into evidence at trial for the truth of its contents is another.

An argument could be made that the Crown’s approach to this question could invite prejudice and may effectively serve to reverse the onus or the burden of proof onto the appellant. [ 47 ] It is trite law that an accused is entitled to know the entirety of the Crown’s case against him or her by the conclusion of the Crown’s case prior to responding, (with very limited exceptions permitted for the Crown to re-open its case. [11]) By analogy, as a matter of fairness and natural justice, the rules permitting the Crown to reopen a case are limited.

As Lamer C.J. held for the majority in *R v. M.B.P.*, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 555 at para. 23, the Crown must not be allowed to reopen its case, absent the narrowest of circumstances, especially once the defence has begun to “meet the case” including having elected to call no evidence.

See also para. 37. [ 48 ] Recall that the Crown attorney did not choose to tender the recognizance documents into evidence during its case in-chief.

Here, the trial judge having considered the issue during the presentation of the Crown’s case and subsequently raising the question with the parties, (bearing in mind his expressed reluctance to alert the Crown to a potential disconnect in the evidence leading to the chain of identification), required that the appellant react or reassess its trial position after having elected to call no defence. [ 49 ] In this matter, the Crown closed its case without calling Ogombaieva as a witness.

The Ministry of Transportation records showing her name as the registered owner of the vehicle involved in the assault was not admitted by the Defence.

Instead, a police officer testified to his knowledge of the identity of the vehicle owner and to whom he believed had access to the vehicle.

That belief is unhelpful to the exercise and the officer’s evidence alone was insufficient to establish the connection between the accused and the vehicle alone. [ 50 ] From a procedural fairness aspect, the trial judge was aware of the bail release documents and information therein and had averred to it in his own mind, albeit without alerting the parties until after the close of the evidence.

I do not understand why the delay in raising the issue was only elevated at the point of final submissions. [ 51 ] After the evidence was presented, and in response to final submissions, the trial judge, in investigating the bail release documents raised the issue.

I agree with the applicant in that the judge’s comments placed him in an untenable position.

Having elected to call no evidence based on the case as presented by the Crown, the judge’s consideration of the document thrust the appellant into a strategic quagmire.

Offering the defence the remedy of an opportunity to call evidence at that late stage of the trial was of diminishing utility.

With respect, the trial judge’s consideration of the issue and the manner in which it was introduced and imported into the analysis here violated the principles of procedural fairness. ## The remedy: [ 52 ] Having found that the learned trial judge denied procedural fairness to the appellant, the question remains as to what is the appropriate remedy? [ 53 ] The appellant submits that the proper remedy in this case ought to be an acquittal.

Any other remedy would have a hollow significance, given that the Crown would benefit from the analysis offered here and in the court below and tender the relevant documents in its case in-chief and in accordance with the principles outlined in *Caesar*. [ 54 ] In a criminal prosecution, it is trite law that the trier of fact must adjudicate the merits of the case based on admissible evidence tendered by the parties. [ 55 ] The question to be posed is whether there is any evidence upon which a properly instructed trier of fact could have convicted.

If there is not, then generally an acquittal is the appropriate remedy: *R. v. Roy, 2012 SCC 26* at paras 53-54, *R. v. MacNeil, 2009 NSCA 46*, [2009] N.S.J. No. 203 (C.A.) at para. 16. [ 56 ] A new trial is the appropriate remedy where the actions of the trial judge rendered the original proceedings unfair: *R. v. Watson*, [2004] O.J. No. 4921 (C.A.), *R. v. Crawford*, [2015] A.J. No. 552 (C.A.), *R. v. K.T., 2013 ONCA 257*. [ 57 ] That said, I agree with Crown counsel in that appellate courts have generally reserved their discretion to enter an acquittal to circumstances where the admissible evidence could not support a conviction, which is not the situation found in the present case. ## Conclusion: [ 58 ] For all of the aforementioned reasons, I find that the learned trial judge denied the applicant’s right to procedural fairness.

As a result, there was a miscarriage of justice warranting appellate intervention that cannot be remedied by applying the curative proviso. [ 59 ] The appeal is allowed, the convictions are set aside and the case is remitted back to the Ontario Court of Justice for adjudication. [ 60 ] The appellant has already served the entirety of his sentence.

In this case, the Crown may want to consider whether it would best serve the interests of justice to subject the appellant to a further trial. --- A.J. Goodman, J. Released: September 27, 2016 --- **COURT FILE NO.:** SCA 8478 **DATE:** 2016-09-27 **ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE SUMMARY CONVICTION APPEAL COURT** **B E T W E E N:** **HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN** Respondent **- and –** **RUSTAM SULEIMANOV** Appellant **REASONS FOR JUDGMENT** (On appeal from the Honourable Justice Epstein) Released: September 27, 2016 [1] The trial judge employed the Kienapple principle with respect to the s. 266 and s. 267(a) counts. [2] Transcript of Proceedings of January 8, 2015 at p. 3. [3] Transcript of Proceedings of January 8, 2015 at p. 4. [4] Reasons for Judgment, Transcript of Proceedings of January 29, 2015 at pp. 70-71. [5] Reasons for Judgment, Transcript of Proceedings of January 29, 2015 at p. 72. [6] Reasons for Judgment, Transcript of Proceedings of January 29, 2015 at pp. 75-76. [7] Reasons for Judgment, Transcript of Proceedings of January 29, 2015 at p. 77. [8] Transcript of Proceedings of January 8, 2015 at pp. 3-4. [9] Reasons for Judgement, Transcript of Proceedings of January 29, 2016 at pp. 72-73. [10] Reasons for Judgment, Transcript of Proceedings of January 29, 2015 at pp. 73 & 75. [11] Although it is clear that such an application here would have the effect of splitting the Crown’s case.

The accused, charged with first degree murder and indignity to human remains, applied for judicial interim release.

The Crown opposed release, citing the gravity of the offence and the accused's alleged involvement in drug and firearms trafficking.

The court considered the proposed release plan, which included strict house arrest, electronic monitoring, and a $600,000 surety provided by the accused's mother.

Finding triable issues in the Crown's case and emphasizing the accused's right to make full answer and defence, the court concluded the accused met the onus under section 515(10) of the Criminal Code and granted release on strict conditions.

The accused pleaded guilty to assaulting his nine-year-old son contrary to section 266 of the Criminal Code.

The assault involved striking the child with an open hand and a leather strap, causing welts and bruising.

The Crown sought custody, emphasizing the seriousness of violence against children and the breach of trust.

The defence sought a conditional discharge, highlighting the accused's genuine remorse, immediate self-reporting, participation in rehabilitative programs, and his status as an Aboriginal offender.

The court imposed a conditional discharge with 12 months probation, finding this to be a rare case warranting an exception to the general principle that violence against children demands incarceration and criminal conviction.

The accused pleaded guilty to attempted murder of his wife on October 28, 2012.

The victim was stabbed multiple times in bed, pursued through the residence, and the accused subsequently set fires throughout the home and disconnected the propane line, endangering first responders.

The victim escaped through a bathroom window onto the roof.

The court imposed a sentence of nine years imprisonment with credit for 22 months of pre-trial custody, resulting in seven years and two months remaining to be served.

The sentencing considered aggravating factors including the brutal nature of the attack, breach of trust, and violation of a no-contact order, balanced against mitigating factors including the accused's advanced age (78 at time of offence), genuine remorse, guilty plea, and otherwise exemplary character.

The appellant appealed convictions for mischief under $5,000 and breach of an undertaking arising from the slashing of vehicle tires.

At trial, the Crown introduced evidence that the appellant had previously threatened the complainant and his family and made comments about the complainant’s vehicle tires.

No voir dire was conducted to determine whether this prior discreditable conduct evidence had probative value outweighing its prejudicial effect.

The appeal court held that such evidence is presumptively inadmissible unless properly assessed through a voir dire.

Because the trial judge relied on this evidence in assessing guilt, the admission of the evidence constituted reversible error.