Andrew Gary Bond

The defendant pleaded guilty to six charges including theft under $5000, operation of a motor vehicle while blood alcohol content exceeded 80 mg per 100 ml of blood, impaired operation of a motor vehicle (twice), failure to provide a breath sample, and failure to comply with a recognizance.

The Crown sought to treat the driving offences as third offences based on prior convictions from 1985 and 2008, triggering a mandatory minimum penalty of 120 days.

The defence argued that the 1985 conviction under section 234 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970 should not be treated as a prior offence for purposes of section 255(4) of the current Criminal Code.

The court found that the 1985 conviction did not constitute a prior offence within the meaning of section 255(4), as the legislative amendment involved substantive changes beyond mere renumbering.

The driving offences were therefore treated as second offences with a mandatory minimum of 30 days imprisonment.

The Crown charged two defendants with possession of prohibited weapons, controlled substances, and firearms offences.

Following a Charter voir dire and trial, the co-accused was acquitted on all counts.

The defendant Ball pleaded guilty to possession of brass knuckles and controlled substances but maintained not guilty pleas to firearms charges involving a Smith and Wesson .357 Magnum handgun.

The central issue was whether the handgun was a functioning firearm as defined in the Criminal Code or a disabled/inoperable item.

The Crown relied on photographs, text messages, and expert evidence.

The defendant testified the handgun had been rendered inoperable and he was attempting to defraud acquaintances by misrepresenting it as a real firearm.

The court found the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the item was a functioning firearm and dismissed the firearms charges.

The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction from the Ontario Court of Justice, arguing the trial judge misapprehended key evidence and applied a different level of scrutiny to defence evidence than to the complainant’s testimony.

The alleged errors concerned the timing of graffiti written by the complainant in the accused’s apartment and inconsistencies in the complainant’s account of when she arrived in the city and how long she remained at the residence.

The appeal court held that the trial judge was aware of the inconsistencies and reasonably resolved them within the credibility assessment.

It further held that the reasons did not demonstrate that different standards of scrutiny were applied to the defence witnesses and the complainant.

The conviction was therefore supported by the evidence and disclosed no miscarriage of justice.