Simon Jewitt McNaughton

This decision addresses the sentencing of Kaitlyn Braun, who committed multiple offences involving deception of doulas by falsely claiming pregnancy and sexual assault, resulting in emotional and financial harm to victims.

After an initial conditional sentence order (CSO) was breached by new offences, the court considered a joint submission to terminate the CSO and impose a consecutive global three-year jail sentence.

The court carefully applied the public interest test for joint submissions, balancing the offender’s diagnosed mental health issues, the gravity and nature of the offences, and the impact on victims.

The decision highlights the court’s discretion in handling breaches of CSOs and the importance of structured treatment programs like Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (DBT) in sentencing.

This decision addresses the timing and legality of police detention and breath sample demands in an impaired driving case involving Erin Wanner.

The court found that Ms. Wanner was not detained until the police demanded a breath sample using an approved screening device (ASD).

The Crown failed to prove that the screening demand was made immediately upon forming reasonable suspicion, resulting in breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

Despite these breaches, the breath sample evidence was admitted under section 24(2) because excluding it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The court was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Wanner was the driver who crashed into a light pole with three children as passengers and found her guilty.

This decision addresses the application of s. 530 of the Criminal Code regarding an accused's right to a trial in the official language of their choice.

The court held that the Crown met its burden to show that Kevin Nguyen could not have his trial in French due to insufficient proficiency to follow proceedings or instruct counsel in French.

The ruling emphasizes that the right to a French trial requires actual ability to participate meaningfully in that language, not merely a preference or cultural identity.

The decision also clarifies that administrative convenience is irrelevant and that the right to a fair trial may be compromised if the accused cannot follow the proceedings in the chosen language.

The court sentenced Daniel Keefe to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility for 10 years after a jury found him guilty of second degree murder.

The decision reviews the facts of the offence, the impact on the victim’s family, the legal parameters for sentencing, and the positions of Crown and defence.

The court accepted a joint submission for the minimum period of parole ineligibility, citing the offender’s youth, lack of criminal record, and absence of aggravating factors.

Ancillary orders were also imposed, including a lifetime weapons prohibition, DNA order, and non-communication orders.

The decision concerns a defence motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of second degree murder.

The accused, Daniel Keefe, argued that the evidence could not support a finding of second degree murder and that only manslaughter should be left to the jury.

The court reviewed the evidence, including witness testimony, the 911 call, and expert pathology evidence, and applied the legal test for a directed verdict.

The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence on which a properly instructed jury could convict of second degree murder, and dismissed the motion.

This direction addresses the admissibility and use of a third video clip in a criminal trial involving Daniel Keefe.

The court considers the relevance and potential prejudice of the video, which depicts an attack by Aiden Cunningham on a third party, and provides guidance on how the jury should be instructed if the attacker is not identified in evidence.

The decision addresses whether the statement made by Daniel Keefe to police was voluntary and whether his section 10(b) Charter rights were breached.

The court found that, although Keefe was advised of his rights and consulted counsel, the circumstances of his detention—including his youth, inexperience, anxiety, lack of medication, and not being told about the recording or use of his statement—meant the Crown did not prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.

The statement was excluded.

The offender, Shantel Mahadai, was convicted by a jury of robbery as an aider, specifically as the getaway driver.

The court found that she was a willing participant in the planned robbery from the beginning, rejecting her testimony as implausible.

The Crown sought a 3-year custodial sentence, while the Defence sought a 12-month conditional sentence.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, finding that a conditional sentence was inconsistent with sentencing principles given the planned nature of the offence, the offender's lack of remorse, and her privileged background.

Despite mitigating factors such as her age, absence of a prior criminal record (except for a conditional discharge for fraud), and compliance with bail conditions, the court imposed a sentence of 2 years, 4 months, and 17 days in a federal penitentiary, after applying Duncan and Downes credits for harsh pre-sentence custody and strict bail conditions.

Ancillary orders included a 10-year weapons prohibition, DNA sample, and communication prohibition with co-accused.

The Crown appealed a conditional discharge sentence imposed on the respondent for distributing intimate images of his former partner, arguing the sentence was unfit, akin to a disguised conditional sentence, and failed to adequately address denunciation and deterrence.

The Superior Court of Justice, sitting as a summary conviction appeal court, dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge did not err in principle or law, and the sentence was not demonstrably unfit, emphasizing the deference owed to sentencing judges and the individualized nature of sentencing.

The Crown appealed a conditional discharge sentence imposed on the respondent for distributing intimate images and breach of a release order.

The Crown argued the sentencing judge erred by imposing a probation order akin to a conditional sentence, failing to adequately address denunciation and deterrence, and concluding the discharge was not contrary to public interest.

The appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge did not err in principle or impose an unfit sentence, emphasizing the individualized nature of sentencing and the deference owed to the sentencing judge's discretion.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought an application to admit three videos and the victim's criminal record to support a self-defence claim.

The defence argued this evidence would demonstrate the victim's violent disposition and the reasonableness of the accused's apprehension of violence.

The Crown conceded the admissibility of two videos but opposed the third and the criminal record.

The court granted the application, finding the evidence highly probative of the victim's propensity for violence and the risk of harm perceived by the accused, concluding that its probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

This decision concerns a fresh bail application by Daniel Keefe, charged with second-degree murder, following an initial denial.

The Crown conceded a material change in circumstances due to the passage of time.

The court assessed the bail plan against the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention under the Criminal Code.

The proposed sureties (Keefe's mother and aunt) were found to lack sufficient awareness of their undertaking's gravity, and their proposed plan was deemed unrealistic and inconsistent with information about Keefe's mental health.

The court found a substantial likelihood that Keefe could interfere with the administration of justice and that his release would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, given the serious charge and the strength of the Crown's case.

The application for bail was dismissed, and Keefe was ordered to remain in detention.

The respondent, Barry Lee Charpentier, was charged with fraud over $5,000.

The Crown alleged a scheme where Charpentier, as Vice-President of Construction for E & E Seegmiller Limited, colluded with a sub-contractor (Chym Engineering Limited) to inflate invoices, with half of the excess funds being paid to a company owned by Charpentier's former spouse.

Charpentier denied fraud, claiming the payments were compensation agreed upon with Tim Seegmiller due to unfulfilled employment contract terms and his involvement in Seegmiller's alleged bid-rigging and other unethical activities.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove the identity of the victim (E & E Seegmiller Limited as a legal entity), deprivation, and mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt, largely due to the absence of crucial corporate documents and the testimony of Tim Seegmiller.

Consequently, Charpentier was found not guilty.

The applicant sought the return of his motor vehicle that was seized and detained pursuant to section 490 of the Criminal Code.

The vehicle was seized following charges of dangerous driving, criminal harassment, and common assault.

The Crown indicated its intention to seek forfeiture of the vehicle as offence-related property if conviction was obtained.

The applicant argued that detention was unnecessary for investigation or trial purposes and that hardship would result from continued detention, as he required the vehicle for employment outside the jurisdiction.

The court found it had jurisdiction to entertain the application but dismissed it, finding the vehicle was required for the anticipated forfeiture hearing as an "other proceeding" under section 490(1) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant was charged with dangerous driving and impaired driving causing bodily harm following a motor vehicle collision.

Police seized blood samples drawn for medical purposes and sealed them without reasonable grounds to believe the samples would afford evidence of a criminal act.

Seven weeks later, police obtained a warrant and seized the blood, which was subsequently tested and revealed the presence of Xanax.

The applicant moved to exclude the evidence on the basis of an unreasonable seizure contrary to section 8 of the Charter.

The court found that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds at the time of sealing the blood samples and that the sealing constituted an unreasonable seizure and Charter violation.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on charges of impaired operation of a motor vehicle and failing to comply with a breathalyzer demand.

The trial judge had directed a verdict of acquittal on the refusal charge at the close of the Crown's case and acquitted on the impaired driving charge after the respondent testified.

The appeal challenged the directed verdict, arguing an error in law, and the sufficiency of the trial judge's reasons for acquittal on impaired driving, alleging palpable and overriding error.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of evidence for the impaired driving charge, and that the trial judge was correct in granting the directed verdict for the refusal charge due to insufficient evidence to identify the demanding officer and the timing of the refusal.

Alternatively, if there was an error in the directed verdict, it did not impact the overall verdict and did not justify a retrial.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, possession of marijuana, and failing to provide a breath sample.

The Crown brought a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of the arrest.

The court found that the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused for impaired driving based on observations of slurred speech, glassy red-rimmed eyes, odour of alcohol, and the circumstances of a vehicle collision.

The Charter application was dismissed.

At trial, the accused was acquitted of failing to provide a breath sample because the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the failure was intentional.

The court found sufficient doubt regarding the accused's mens rea, particularly given his offers to provide alternative forms of testing.

The accused was convicted of possession of marijuana and acquitted of impaired driving.

The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in law by impermissibly using the complainant's text messages for the truth of their contents and to corroborate her testimony, and by failing to consider plausible innocent explanations for the appellant's text messages.

The appellate court found these were errors of law, concluding that without the impermissible evidence, there was insufficient proof of absence of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and an acquittal entered.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving causing bodily harm after a single-vehicle accident where his car struck a house, injuring his passenger.

The Crown presented evidence of the defendant's blood alcohol concentration (BAC) and the circumstances of the accident, including his attempt to hide beer bottles.

The defence argued a Charter s. 10(b) breach regarding privacy during legal consultation at the hospital and offered an alternative explanation for the accident involving the passenger grabbing the steering wheel due to a cat on the road.

The court dismissed the Charter argument, finding police took reasonable steps for privacy in an emergency setting.

The court also rejected the defence's explanation for the accident, finding the passenger's testimony unreliable and accepting her prior inconsistent statement to a witness as substantive evidence.

The court concluded that the defendant's ability to operate the vehicle was impaired by alcohol, which was a significant contributing cause of the accident and the passenger's injuries, and found the defendant guilty.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The Crown called two witnesses: the arresting officer and the qualified breath technician.

The defence called no evidence.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt based on the totality of the evidence, including minimal and equivocal observations of driving conduct and inconsistent observations between officers regarding physical signs of impairment.

The court also found that the Crown failed to establish that breath samples were taken as soon as practicable due to an unexplained delay occasioned by a call to duty counsel that was neither clearly requested nor made with proper notice to the accused.

Both charges were dismissed.