Justice Scott Latimer

The accused was charged with impaired driving and dangerous driving causing death following a motor vehicle collision.

This pre-trial motion addressed the admissibility of evidence obtained during the police investigation.

The court found multiple Charter violations including unlawful detention without rights advisement, compelled statements in violation of section 7 rights, unlawful arrest and breath demand, unlawful vehicle seizure without reasonable grounds, and unlawful seizure of blood samples and airbag data.

The court determined that the investigation was fundamentally flawed from its inception, with police taking investigative shortcuts that resulted in evidence being unlawfully obtained.

The court found that evidence obtained in violation of the Charter could not be relied upon to lawfully seize other evidence, rendering subsequent warranted seizures unlawful as well.

The applicant challenged the legality of the process by which he was charged with impaired driving.

The Crown had reviewed the initial "Over 80" charge during case management and recommended that an impaired driving charge also be laid.

The applicant argued that the Crown's direction to police violated police independence and principles of fundamental justice under section 7 of the Charter.

The applicant also argued that the officer who swore the new information lacked subjective grounds and that the Justice of the Peace failed to establish a prima facie case before issuing process.

The court found that the Crown's email constituted a recommendation rather than a direction, and that police independence was not violated.

However, the court found that insufficient grounds were presented to the Justice of the Peace to establish a prima facie case of impaired driving, constituting a Charter violation.

The court declined to quash the information as a remedy, finding the liberty intrusion to be minimal.

A 25-year-old offender with a history of addiction and post-traumatic stress disorder from childhood sexual abuse pleaded guilty to multiple charges including breaches of probation, assault on a police officer, and sexual assault.

The sentencing judge imposed 30 days jail time (time served) without additional probation, rejecting the Crown's request for a two-year probation order.

The decision critically examines the criminalization of probation breaches for vulnerable individuals and the concept of "system-generated offences" drawing on the Supreme Court's recent decision in R. v. Zora regarding disproportionate impacts on marginalized populations.

The defendant sought to raise a Charter section 8 application challenging the lawfulness of a breath demand at the close of the Crown's case in an impaired driving trial.

The defendant argued that the officer's use of the word "breathalyzer" in describing the demand rendered it invalid.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the defendant had failed to provide advance notice of the Charter application despite having twelve months to do so, and that raising the issue at the close of the Crown's case would impede the trial process and render it unfair to the witness.

The applicant was charged with dangerous driving and impaired driving causing bodily harm following a motor vehicle collision.

Police seized blood samples drawn for medical purposes and sealed them without reasonable grounds to believe the samples would afford evidence of a criminal act.

Seven weeks later, police obtained a warrant and seized the blood, which was subsequently tested and revealed the presence of Xanax.

The applicant moved to exclude the evidence on the basis of an unreasonable seizure contrary to section 8 of the Charter.

The court found that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds at the time of sealing the blood samples and that the sealing constituted an unreasonable seizure and Charter violation.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused pleaded guilty to conspiracy to traffic fentanyl and methamphetamine over a two-week period in October 2017.

The court found the accused was the directing mind and principal actor in a large drug trafficking conspiracy in Waterloo Region.

The accused possessed approximately three kilograms of fentanyl, cocaine, and methamphetamine for distribution.

The court imposed a sentence of fifteen years imprisonment on the fentanyl conspiracy count, with a concurrent five-year sentence on the methamphetamine count, after crediting three years time served.

The court emphasized the severity of fentanyl trafficking and its devastating impact on the community.

The Attorney General of Ontario sought an order appointing counsel for a seventeen-year-old sexual assault complainant to represent her interests during a section 278.93 Code application hearing concerning evidence of her sexual history.

The complainant wished to exercise her standing and right to legal representation at the evidentiary hearing.

The court considered whether a statutory court possessed the jurisdiction to make such an appointment order.

The Crown sought to qualify a police officer as an expert witness to provide opinion evidence regarding factual characteristics indicative of cocaine trafficking.

The defence objected on the basis that the officer was not properly qualified under the fourth Mohan criterion.

The court found that the Crown had not established that the officer understood her primary duty to the court rather than to the Crown.

The application to present opinion evidence was dismissed.

The charge was subsequently resolved by guilty plea to simple possession of cocaine.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg/100mL under the former section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The charge was laid before December 18, 2018, when new impaired driving legislation (Bill C-46) came into force, replacing the old provisions with Part VIII.1.

At the close of the Crown's case, the accused applied for a directed verdict, arguing that the presumption of identity—previously available under the repealed section 258(1)(c)—no longer applied to transitional cases.

The court held that the presumption of identity continues to apply to prosecutions under the former section 253(1)(b) offence, and dismissed the application for a directed verdict.

The accused was charged with public nudity under section 174 of the Criminal Code for standing on the steps of a courthouse wearing only a multi-coloured athletic supporter and sneakers as part of a protest regarding a prior police seizure of his medical marijuana.

The Crown proceeded on the theory that the accused was "so clad as to offend against public order." The court found that while the accused intentionally dressed provocatively and positioned himself visibly on the courthouse steps, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was "so clad as to offend against public order." The evidence demonstrated no actual disturbance of the public peace or public order—only some bewildered looks and jokes from passersby.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with trafficking carfentanil following the death of a young man from an overdose.

Police obtained the deceased's phone from his father and, without a warrant, examined text messages between the deceased and the accused.

The court found that the accused had standing to challenge the seizure of his sent text messages under section 8 of the Charter, as he retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in those communications post-transmission.

The warrantless search violated section 8.

However, the court admitted the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, balancing the seriousness of the violation (minor, given the law at the time), the significant impact on the accused's privacy interests, and society's strong interest in adjudicating a serious drug trafficking charge in the context of a community opioid crisis.

The applicant sought to exclude a post-arrest statement on the basis of a violation of his section 10(b) Charter right to counsel.

The applicant had retained counsel prior to arrest and repeatedly requested to speak with his lawyer during a police interview.

Despite these clear requests, the investigating officer continued questioning without facilitating access to counsel.

The court found that the applicant had invoked his right to counsel through multiple explicit requests and that the officer's failure to provide reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel constituted a section 10(b) violation.

The statement was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The defendant was convicted of making and possessing written child pornography following a trial.

The defendant engaged in an online dialogue involving "daddy-daughter roleplay and ageplay" with references to actual children, including sharing photographs of his stepdaughters and describing sexual activity with them.

The defendant applied under section 12 of the Charter arguing that the mandatory minimum sentences of six months for making and three months for possessing child pornography constituted cruel and unusual punishment.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding that the mandatory minimums were not grossly disproportionate to the offences and circumstances.

The court imposed a sentence of seven months jail for making child pornography and three months concurrent for possession.

The accused, a full-time facility attendant at a municipal arena, was charged with three counts of sexual exploitation, one count of invitation to sexual touching, and one count of unlawful confinement involving four teenage part-time employees.

The Crown alleged the accused abused his supervisory position by isolating the complainants and inviting them to expose their genitals, offering various pretexts such as sizing for condoms or providing sexual advice.

The trial judge found the accused guilty of invitation to sexual touching with respect to one complainant but acquitted him on the sexual exploitation counts, finding that the Crown failed to establish the essential element of a position of trust or authority in a workplace context where the accused had no managerial authority over the complainants.

The unlawful confinement charge was withdrawn by directed verdict.

The offender pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography, making it available to others, and breaching bail conditions by being in proximity to children.

The offender accessed child pornography online, created a profile on a Russian website facilitating such material, distributed files to an undercover officer on two occasions, and maintained a Dropbox account containing child abuse images.

Forensic examination revealed 3,555 images and 2,155 videos meeting the Criminal Code definition of child pornography, with material classified at the fourth level of the Oliver scale involving penetrative sexual activity between adults and children.

The offender also breached bail by attending a retirement party where children were present.

The court imposed an 18-month custodial sentence, balancing the serious nature of the offences and aggravating factors against the offender's guilty plea, remorse, insight, rehabilitative efforts, and the impact on his elderly wife.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and refusing to provide a breath sample following a motor vehicle collision on December 14, 2015.

The Crown alleged the accused was impaired by alcohol when operating his vehicle and subsequently refused to provide breath samples at the hospital.

The accused was acquitted of impaired operation but convicted of refusing to provide a breath sample.

The court found insufficient evidence of impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, but determined the accused intentionally failed to provide a sample despite suffering from a fractured sternum.

The accused was charged with driving a motor vehicle with blood alcohol concentration exceeding eighty milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

She brought a Charter application seeking to exclude breath samples obtained at a police station, alleging a violation of section 10(b) of the Charter regarding her right to counsel.

The accused argued that although she was read her rights from a pre-printed card at the roadside, the information was delivered too quickly while she was emotionally distressed and overwhelmed with other information, and that she was not effectively informed of her right to contact a lawyer of her choice.

The court found that the police adequately informed the accused of her section 10(b) rights and that she failed to take any positive action to invoke or exercise her right to counsel.

The application was dismissed and the accused was found guilty.