Jonathan Thompson

The appellant, Kensky Dautruche, appealed two convictions for possession of cocaine and crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The appeal challenged the validity of a vehicle search incident to arrest for flight from police under s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the trial judge's inference regarding the appellant's possession of cocaine found outside the vehicle.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the search was a valid search incident to arrest, as the officer had a reasonable subjective belief that the search might uncover evidence explaining the flight.

The court also determined that even if a Charter breach occurred, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2).

Furthermore, the Court affirmed the trial judge's inference of possession of the second bag of cocaine, finding it to be the only rational inference from the circumstantial evidence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal sentence was denied.

The accused brought several pre-trial applications, including to quash the indictment, change venue, for particulars, for further disclosure, for examination for discovery of investigative officers, and for a stay of proceedings for abuse of process.

The court dismissed the applications to quash the indictment, change venue, for examination for discovery, and for third-party records.

The application for particulars was partially granted, and an order for further disclosure, including a Laporte inventory, was made.

The application for a stay of proceedings for abuse of process was not granted but may be revisited at trial.

The applicant sought judicial review by way of certiorari of an Ontario Court of Justice decision to transfer a Provincial Offences Act prosecution, concerning charges under the Taxation Act, from a justice of the peace to a judge.

The applicant also challenged the standing of federal Crown counsel.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice in the transfer and confirming the validity of the Crown's delegation of authority.

The court reiterated that certiorari is a discretionary remedy rarely granted in Provincial Offences Act matters.

The defendant was charged with making and possessing child pornography contrary to section 163.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's case consisted of an agreed statement of facts containing electronic communications between the defendant and another individual discussing incest roleplay, ageplay, and sexual activity with children.

The defendant pleaded not guilty.

The sole issue at trial was whether the written communications met the statutory definition of child pornography under section 163.1(1)(b), which requires material that advocates or counsels sexual activity with a person under eighteen years of age that would constitute an offence.

The court found the defendant guilty, determining that his written words, when viewed objectively, actively induced and encouraged unlawful sexual activity with children.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving and the imposed sentence.

The trial judge found the appellant's driving in a parking lot, involving excessive speed, fishtailing, and loss of control, constituted a marked departure from a reasonably prudent driver's conduct.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's findings of fact and application of the dangerous driving test, finding no palpable and overriding error.

The appeal against the 18-month driving prohibition was also dismissed, considering the appellant's prior drinking and driving convictions.

The accused was found passed out in a parked car with the engine running, lights on, seatbelt fastened, and an open beer in hand.

Police attended and arrested him.

The Crown charged him with impaired care and control and over 80 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood.

The court found the accused guilty of impaired care and control based on the totality of circumstances, including his coma-like state, strong smell of alcohol, bloodshot eyes, and the vehicle's operational status.

However, the court dismissed the over 80 charge due to unreasonable delays in breath testing.

The court found a 17-minute delay in providing rights to counsel breached the Charter, but admitted the breath test evidence under section 24(2).

The court also found an unexplained 18-minute delay at the police station meant the tests were not taken "as soon as practicable," fatally undermining the presumption relating test results to the time of the alleged offence.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood (Over 80).

The Crown's case relied entirely on breath samples obtained at a police RIDE checkpoint.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of her detention and the admissibility of the breath samples under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the defendant was arrested without lawful authority because the police officer failed to conduct a mandatory roadside screening test before making the arrest, contrary to section 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The defendant was acquitted.

Additionally, the court found that the defendant's right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter had been violated due to Crown and institutional delay spanning nearly 15 months.