Bruce Ritter

The accused was stopped at a RIDE program where an officer observed a used bong within reach in the vehicle.

The officer conducted a search under the Cannabis Control Act, locating drugs, cash, and weapons.

The accused brought a pre-trial Charter application alleging breaches of his s. 8 and s. 10(b) rights.

The court found no s. 8 breach, as the used bong provided reasonable grounds for the search.

While the court found a s. 10(b) breach due to delayed access to counsel, it declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding the breach was not serious and the evidence was highly reliable and essential to the prosecution.

The accused, Michael Meinzinger, pleaded guilty to careless storage of a firearm and possessing a loaded restricted handgun.

The offences occurred during a severe mental health crisis where he expressed suicidal ideations and a desire for "suicide by police" via text messages and photographs of a handgun.

Police apprehended him under the Mental Health Act.

The court found a causal link between his transient mental health crisis and the offending conduct, which attenuated his moral blameworthiness.

Despite the seriousness of the offences, the court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, along with concurrent probation orders for 12 months, a lifetime weapons prohibition, and a DNA order, emphasizing rehabilitation over strict denunciation given the unique circumstances.

The offender was convicted of aggravated assault and uttering threats against his spouse after an unprovoked attack that left her with a fractured jaw requiring surgery.

The Crown sought 3.5 years imprisonment, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for domestic violence, the court rejected a conditional sentence and imposed 30 months' imprisonment for the aggravated assault, with a concurrent 6-month sentence for uttering threats.

The accused was charged with uttering a threat and aggravated assault against his spouse following a party at their residence.

The Crown alleged the accused became enraged upon finding the complainant with another man, threatened to kill her, and struck her multiple times, fracturing her jaw.

The accused denied the allegations, suggesting the injuries resulted from a fall.

Applying the W. (D.) framework, the court rejected the accused's exculpatory evidence as unbelievable and found the complainant's testimony corroborated by physical evidence, a 911 call, and the accused's adoptive admission by silence in text messages.

The accused was found guilty of both counts.

K.R. was charged with first-degree murder of his mother.

He sought to plead guilty to second-degree murder, which the Crown refused.

The trial focused on whether the murder was planned and deliberate, which would elevate it to first-degree murder.

The court found that while K.R. murdered his mother, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was planned and deliberate, dismissing the Crown's theory based on an internet search and the nature of the attack.

K.R. was found guilty of second-degree murder.

The defendant pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography, making child pornography available, and agreeing by telecommunication to commit an offense under section 163.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought a three-year sentence, while the defence sought 18 months.

The court imposed a global sentence of three years in custody, with credit for 315 days of pretrial custody enhanced at a 1.5:1 ratio.

The court emphasized that denunciation and deterrence are paramount sentencing principles in child pornography cases, particularly given the egregious nature of the written material discovered in chat logs that reached the highest level of depravity on the Oliver scale.

The defendant was convicted of making and possessing written child pornography following a trial.

The defendant engaged in an online dialogue involving "daddy-daughter roleplay and ageplay" with references to actual children, including sharing photographs of his stepdaughters and describing sexual activity with them.

The defendant applied under section 12 of the Charter arguing that the mandatory minimum sentences of six months for making and three months for possessing child pornography constituted cruel and unusual punishment.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding that the mandatory minimums were not grossly disproportionate to the offences and circumstances.

The court imposed a sentence of seven months jail for making child pornography and three months concurrent for possession.

The offender pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual interference involving a 12-year-old daughter and her similarly aged friend.

The Crown sought 3 to 3.5 years in penitentiary; the defence sought 15 months in a reformatory.

The court imposed a total sentence of 27 months jail (24 months for the daughter, 3 months consecutive for the friend), finding that denunciation, general deterrence, and separation from society must take precedence over rehabilitation in child sexual abuse cases.

The sentence reflects the serious breach of trust, the nature of the sexual conduct, and the early guilty plea.

The offender pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography, making it available to others, and breaching bail conditions by being in proximity to children.

The offender accessed child pornography online, created a profile on a Russian website facilitating such material, distributed files to an undercover officer on two occasions, and maintained a Dropbox account containing child abuse images.

Forensic examination revealed 3,555 images and 2,155 videos meeting the Criminal Code definition of child pornography, with material classified at the fourth level of the Oliver scale involving penetrative sexual activity between adults and children.

The offender also breached bail by attending a retirement party where children were present.

The court imposed an 18-month custodial sentence, balancing the serious nature of the offences and aggravating factors against the offender's guilty plea, remorse, insight, rehabilitative efforts, and the impact on his elderly wife.

The defendant was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample contrary to section 254(5) of the Criminal Code following a roadside sobriety check.

The defendant claimed he used the word "prefer" rather than "refuse" and believed he had the right to decline the roadside test based on legal advice received in the United States.

The court found the defendant guilty, determining that he unequivocally refused to comply with a lawful demand and that his conduct constituted a refusal regardless of the specific words used.

The court rejected the defendant's credibility and accepted the officer's evidence as reliable and truthful.

The defendant was charged with making and possessing child pornography contrary to section 163.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's case consisted of an agreed statement of facts containing electronic communications between the defendant and another individual discussing incest roleplay, ageplay, and sexual activity with children.

The defendant pleaded not guilty.

The sole issue at trial was whether the written communications met the statutory definition of child pornography under section 163.1(1)(b), which requires material that advocates or counsels sexual activity with a person under eighteen years of age that would constitute an offence.

The court found the defendant guilty, determining that his written words, when viewed objectively, actively induced and encouraged unlawful sexual activity with children.

The accused was charged with four sexual offences against a child complainant: two counts of sexual assault and two counts of sexual interference (touching for a sexual purpose), occurring during two distinct time periods.

The first alleged incident (the "shopping incident") occurred in May or June 2011 when the accused was left alone with the complainant.

The second set of allegations (the "babysitting incidents") involved repeated alleged touching over approximately 18 months between January 2012 and June 2013.

The Crown called the complainant and her mother as witnesses.

The accused testified in his own defence, denying the allegations and providing alternative explanations for the complainant's account.

The trial judge found significant credibility and reliability issues with the Crown's evidence, including material inconsistencies in the complainant's account, the absence of the grandmother as a witness despite her alleged presence during most of the alleged abuse, and implausibilities regarding the complainant's delayed disclosure.

While the judge concluded the accused was "probably guilty," the Crown failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all counts but was subject to a common law peace bond for three years.

The accused, a nurse in a long-term care facility, was tried on five counts of sexual assault involving co-workers and a student trainee in a supervisory workplace context.

The court admitted the evidence on four counts as similar fact evidence, finding a distinctive pattern of unsolicited, spontaneous touching of subordinate workers in the same workplace.

Applying the W. (D.) framework and the sexual assault analysis from Chase, the court found the Crown proved guilt on three counts, including incidents involving grabbing a complainant's bottom, lifting a complainant's top to inspect whether pants were sheer, and multiple sexualized touching incidents against another complainant.

The accused was acquitted on two counts because the court either retained a reasonable doubt or was not satisfied the proven touching was sexual in nature beyond a reasonable doubt.

Catherine Roberts pleaded guilty to fraud over $5,000, perpetrated over seven years as a branch manager at BMO, resulting in a loss of $277,787.78.

The court considered aggravating factors including breach of trust, sophistication, and duration, and mitigating factors such as no prior record, remorse, and family support.

The primary sentencing principles of general deterrence and denunciation were emphasized.

The court imposed a two-year custodial sentence, a restitution order for $277,787.78, and a fine in lieu of forfeiture for the same amount, with the restitution taking priority.

A conditional sentence was deemed inappropriate due to the lack of unique and exceptional circumstances.

Sentencing following conviction for sexual interference involving the prolonged sexual abuse of a child stepdaughter between ages 10 and 12 by an offender in a position of trust.

The court held that denunciation, deterrence, and separation from society were the primary sentencing objectives under ss. 718 and 718.01 of the Criminal Code, and treated the victim’s age, vulnerability, grooming, oral sex, persistence of abuse, and breach of trust as significant aggravating factors.

Although the offender had no prior record and had suffered collateral personal consequences, the court found a penitentiary sentence was required.

A sentence of four years’ imprisonment was imposed, together with DNA, weapons prohibition, child-contact prohibition, SOIRA, and custodial no-contact orders.

The accused, an adult firefighter, was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference against the 14-year-old daughter of a fellow firefighter.

The Crown relied on the complainant's testimony and electronic communications between the parties.

The court found significant inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, particularly when contrasted with the testimony of her friend, an independent witness.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court concluded that while the accused's denials were not entirely credible, the totality of the evidence left a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The accused was tried on charges of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching arising from repeated sexualized conduct involving his stepdaughter when she was between 10 and 12 years old.

Applying the W. (D.) framework, the court rejected the accused's denial and found his attempt to explain incriminating statements to police to be illogical and unbelievable.

The court accepted the complainant's evidence as credible and sufficiently reliable notwithstanding inconsistencies about dates, duration, and frequency, treating those imperfections in light of her age at the time of the events and her learning disability.

The accused's utterances to police materially corroborated the complainant's account.

The Crown proved all three counts beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that overturned the accused's conviction for driving over 80.

The summary conviction appeal judge had found that an unexplained 28-minute delay between the first and second breath samples meant the samples were not taken 'as soon as practicable' under the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the trial judge correctly applied the law by looking at the whole chain of events and that the Crown is not required to provide a detailed explanation for every minute the accused is in custody.

The appellant municipality appealed a Superior Court decision that rescinded a remedial order issued against the respondent property owner for violating a property standards by-law regarding external lighting.

The appeal judge had found the order overly broad and the by-law impermissibly retrospective.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the by-law was prospective in requiring future compliance and clearly intended to affect vested rights.

The Court also found the remedial order was not overly broad, though it amended the wording slightly to conform to the by-law by adding the word 'likely'.

The remedial order was reinstated as amended.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown relied on breath test results from an Intoxilyzer 8000C.

The trial judge addressed three key issues: (1) whether the Crown should be permitted to reopen its case to lead evidence that samples were provided directly into the approved instrument; (2) whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that samples were received directly into the approved instrument; and (3) whether the tests were conducted as soon as practicable.

The Crown was denied leave to reopen.

However, the court found sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish that samples were provided directly into the instrument and that the tests were conducted within a reasonably prompt timeframe.

The accused was convicted.