Tony Sferruzzi

The Crown sought to vacate the accused's release order on a bail review under section 521 of the Criminal Code, arguing the initial release was "clearly inappropriate" or that a "material change in circumstances" (new video evidence) justified detention.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding the Justice of the Peace's decision was not "clearly inappropriate" and that the video evidence did not constitute a material change.

However, the court recognized the COVID-19 pandemic as a material change in circumstances, but held it did not, on its own, justify reopening a hearing where the accused was already released.

The accused was charged with two counts of sexual assault against a complainant who briefly worked for him.

The complainant alleged she was sexually assaulted at a nightclub, at a condo, and later at the accused's home, claiming she was highly intoxicated and 'blacked out' during parts of the events.

The court found significant credibility and reliability issues with the complainant's testimony, noting physical impossibilities in her descriptions, selective memory, and actions inconsistent with her stated lack of romantic interest in the accused.

Applying the W.(D.) principles to the defence evidence, the court concluded the Crown failed to prove the sexual assaults occurred beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80).

The defendant brought a Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings, alleging violations of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the defendant was unconstitutionally strip searched and that his thread bracelets were improperly removed and destroyed during the search incident to arrest.

The court also found a breach of the right to counsel when police questioned the defendant before he had consulted with duty counsel.

However, the court dismissed the application for a stay of proceedings, finding that exclusion of evidence under section 24(2) was an adequate remedy.

The Intoxilyzer results were excluded, resulting in dismissal of the over 80 charge.

The defendant was convicted of impaired driving based on the officer's observations of impairment.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood following a roadside stop at an LCBO plaza.

The defence sought exclusion of breathalyzer results on grounds that the accused, whose first language was Punjabi, was not provided with rights to counsel and breath demand in his language until arrival at the police station, and that he was not given the opportunity to contact counsel of choice.

The court found no breach of Charter rights.

Although there were language difficulties at the roadside, the officer appropriately sought assistance from a Punjabi-speaking officer.

The breath demand was provided as soon as practicable given the language barrier.

The accused was informed of his right to counsel of choice but did not indicate he wished to contact private counsel.

The breathalyzer results were admitted and the accused was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with driving in excess of 80 milligrams.

The information was sworn on January 11, 2016, and the trial was scheduled to commence on November 2, 2017—approximately 22 months later.

The trial was the third scheduled trial date.

The first trial date was not reached.

The second trial date commenced but was abandoned when defence counsel requested a mistrial after an incident with a police witness.

The defendant brought a Charter section 11(b) application alleging a breach of the right to trial within a reasonable time.

The court found the delay exceeded the presumptive ceiling of 18 months established in R. v. Jordan and that the Crown failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate delay arising from exceptional circumstances.

The charge was stayed.

The defendant was charged with having care and control of a vehicle with excess blood alcohol (over 80 mg/100 mL).

The defendant challenged the admissibility of breath test results on two grounds: first, that a breach of section 10(b) of the Charter (right to counsel) warranted exclusion of evidence under section 24(2); and second, that the Crown failed to prove the breath tests were administered as soon as practicable as required by section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that while a section 10(b) breach occurred (a nine-minute delay in informing the defendant of his right to counsel), the breach was not serious enough to warrant exclusion under the Grant test.

The court also found that the breath tests were administered as soon as practicable within the statutory two-hour window.

The defendant was convicted.

The offender was convicted of human trafficking contrary to Section 279.01 of the Criminal Code, receiving a financial benefit from human trafficking contrary to Section 279.02, and assault contrary to Section 266.

The offender, a 25-year-old permanent resident from Macedonia, exploited a vulnerable 21-year-old woman addicted to cocaine by encouraging her to work at strip clubs and spas, exercising control over her movements, threatening her with violence, and taking the majority of her earnings.

The exploitation occurred over approximately five days in late October 2014 and involved approximately $600-$800 in earnings.

The offender received an 18-month sentence on the trafficking charge, 18 months concurrent on the material benefit charge, and 90 days concurrent on the assault charge, followed by 12 months probation with conditions including no contact with the victim and a 10-year weapons prohibition.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to provide a breath sample into an Approved Screening Device.

He argued his refusal was equivocal because he believed he was not the driver and wanted to speak to counsel first, and that the demand was not made forthwith.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the trial judge's conclusions that the refusal was unequivocal, the demand was made forthwith, and no Charter breach occurred since the offence was complete before the right to counsel was engaged.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and over 80 in August 2014.

The trial was scheduled for November 2016, over two years after the charge was laid.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings based on a breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court applied the newly released framework from R. v. Jordan, which established an 18-month ceiling for cases tried without a preliminary inquiry.

The court found that while the delay was approximately 18 months (or 13-14 months excluding certain periods), the case presented exceptional circumstances warranting a flexible and contextual approach.

The court granted the stay, finding that the delay was markedly longer than reasonable given the circumstances and the reliance on the former law.

The accused was charged with two impaired driving offences arising from a motor vehicle found stuck in snow on Highway 410.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence to establish that the accused had care or control of the vehicle.

The court found that while the inference that the accused was the driver was probable, the Crown failed to discharge its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Alternative rational inferences existed, such as the accused being a passenger while the actual driver sheltered in a nearby tow truck.

Both charges were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding child custody, child support, property equalization, and costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decisions granting sole custody to the respondent, calculating child support based on 2012 income, and excluding gifts and inheritances deposited into a joint account from the respondent's net family property.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding costs, finding the trial judge erred in awarding full recovery costs based on an offer to settle that expired before trial.

The trial costs award was varied to $76,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit.

The central issue was whether breath samples were taken “as soon as practicable” as required to rely on the statutory presumption.

Although the second sample was taken within the two‑hour statutory window, there was an unexplained 28‑minute delay between the first and second tests, exceeding the typical 17–20 minute interval.

The appeal court held that the trial judge erred by failing to properly address whether the second test met the “as soon as practicable” requirement despite the unexplained delay.

As the Crown failed to establish this requirement, the conviction could not stand.

The accused pleaded guilty to theft over involving the theft of thirty-two Blackberry Smart Phones valued at approximately $14,368 from his employer, Research in Motion, over a seven-month period.

The accused, a 48-year-old first-time offender with no criminal record, was employed in a position of trust at RIM and sold the phones to a hairstylist for $2,000.

The court imposed a conditional discharge with 18 months probation, including community service and restitution, finding that despite the breach of trust, the offender's personal circumstances, genuine remorse, rehabilitation efforts, and positive antecedents warranted a discharge rather than custody.