W. James Blacklock

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings based on an alleged violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter, citing a total delay of 24 months and 22 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for summary conviction matters.

The court found that the defence was "markedly indifferent" to securing an earlier trial date, as evidenced by their failure to clearly assert an 11(b) breach or take proactive steps to expedite the matter after trial dates were set.

Consequently, the court apportioned a significant portion of the delay (7 months and 3 days) to the defence, resulting in a net delay of 17 months and 19 days, which falls below the Jordan ceiling.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The accused, charged with impaired operation, objected to the admissibility of Intoxilyzer printouts and breath technician/analyst certificates.

The defence argued that the analyst's certification of the solution could not be proven by the breath technician's viva voce evidence or certificate, citing R. v. Goldson.

The court rejected this argument, affirming that a Supreme Court of Canada refusal of leave to appeal does not add precedential value to a lower court decision.

Following Ontario precedent, the court found the breath technician's evidence and certificate admissible to prove the solution was certified by an analyst, and that the analyst's certificate, though referring to an old section, was sufficient to establish suitability for the Intoxilyzer.

The objection was dismissed, and the evidence was admitted.

The accused, A.V., brought a Charter application challenging the constitutionality of section 7(4.1) of the Criminal Code, arguing it was overbroad and infringed his liberty interests under section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The provision grants extraterritorial jurisdiction over Canadian citizens and permanent residents for certain child sexual exploitation offences committed abroad.

The court examined the legislative objective of section 7(4.1) and assessed whether reasonable hypotheticals, such as consensual sexual activity with a 15-year-old in France (where the age of consent is 15), fell outside the objective.

The court found the objective was broad: to deter Canadian nationals from engaging in conduct viewed by Canadian standards as sexually exploitative of children abroad, regardless of dual criminality or international comity.

The court concluded that the hypotheticals, while potentially leading to "ill-advised prosecutions," were technically connected to this broad objective and therefore dismissed the overbreadth challenge.

A.V. was convicted of sexual interference for conduct in Dubai.

Prior to sentencing, he applied to challenge the court's territorial jurisdiction, arguing that s. 7(4.1) of the Criminal Code is unconstitutional.

The application raised two constitutional arguments under the Charter: a breach of the right to make full answer and defence (s. 7 and 11(b)) due to difficulties in gathering foreign evidence, and overbreadth (s. 7) due to the section potentially capturing consensual conduct legal in other jurisdictions.

The court dismissed the first argument, finding that existing legal mechanisms and case-specific remedies address the concerns.

However, the court found arguable merit in the overbreadth argument, particularly concerning differing ages of consent, and adjourned sentencing to allow this aspect of the defence application to proceed.

The accused, Amandeep Malhi, applied to stay criminal proceedings for assault and threats, alleging unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter, citing a total delay of 19 months.

The court, applying the *Jordan* framework, found the net delay to be approximately 17 months and 1 week after deducting time attributable to the defence's inaction regarding disclosure and trial date setting.

As the net delay was below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court, the onus was on the defence to show the case took markedly too long and that they made meaningful and sustained efforts to expedite.

The court found the defence failed to demonstrate sustained efforts, particularly by rejecting the Crown's willingness to set dates before full disclosure and by delaying communication with the trial coordinator.

The application to stay proceedings was dismissed.

The accused was charged with assault arising in a domestic context.

The accused brought a motion alleging a breach of his section 11(b) Charter rights regarding trial delay.

The Crown and defence disagreed on when the section 11(b) clock begins to run.

The defence argued it starts when the information is sworn; the Crown argued it starts when process is executed or brought to the attention of the accused.

The court found that the information was sworn on August 27, 2014, but the warrant was not executed until October 16, 2016—approximately two years and two months later.

The court held that the section 11(b) clock starts when the information is sworn and process is issued, and that the delay far exceeded the 18-month threshold established in R. v. Jordan.

Finding no exceptional circumstances justifying the delay, the court granted a stay of charges.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle over the legal limit contrary to the Criminal Code of Canada.

The Crown proved the essential elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defence raised three Charter-based issues: two alleged breaches of section 9 (arbitrary detention) relating to placement in the police cruiser and overholding at the station, and one alleged breach of section 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) relating to a pat-down search.

The court found that placing the accused in the cruiser was reasonable and necessary for administering the ASD test.

The pat-down search was found to be unlawful and a breach of section 8, but evidence was not excluded under section 24(2) as the breach was not serious enough.

The court assumed a breach of section 9 regarding overholding for approximately three hours but declined to grant a stay of proceedings.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with drug-related offences following a search warrant executed at his residence.

The defence brought an application to exclude evidence seized during the search, arguing that the Information to Obtain (ITO) supporting the warrant contained erroneous and misleading information and that the search breached section 8 of the Charter.

The Crown argued that the ITO contained sufficient reliable grounds to support the warrant's issuance.

The court conducted a detailed review of the warrant application, examining allegations of errors in the ITO regarding surveillance observations, and determined that despite certain inaccuracies, the warrant was supported by reliable grounds and that any breach would not warrant exclusion of evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and over 80 in August 2014.

The trial was scheduled for November 2016, over two years after the charge was laid.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings based on a breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court applied the newly released framework from R. v. Jordan, which established an 18-month ceiling for cases tried without a preliminary inquiry.

The court found that while the delay was approximately 18 months (or 13-14 months excluding certain periods), the case presented exceptional circumstances warranting a flexible and contextual approach.

The court granted the stay, finding that the delay was markedly longer than reasonable given the circumstances and the reliance on the former law.

A young person was charged with assault causing bodily harm following a consensual fist fight at a recreation centre.

The accused struck the complainant with an uppercut while holding him by the neck, causing the loss of two front teeth.

The court examined the law governing consent to street fights, particularly as it applies to young persons, and determined that consent could be vitiated on public policy grounds when bodily harm beyond the trivial is intended and caused.

The court found the accused guilty, holding that the facts met the test established in Jobidon and Paice, and that the circumstances fell within the core policy concerns underlying the law on consent to fights.