Jonah Parkin

The Ontario Court of Justice dismissed Morgan Lindo’s application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, finding that although the total delay from the swearing of the Information to the last scheduled trial date exceeded the Jordan presumptive ceiling of 18 months for provincial court trials, the net delay after deducting defence delay was just under the ceiling.

The defence failed to demonstrate meaningful and sustained efforts to expedite the trial, including delays in correcting contact information, scheduling trial conferences, and filing the 11(b) application.

The Court emphasized the need for defence counsel to act reasonably and proactively to avoid unreasonable delay and held that the delay was not markedly longer than reasonably necessary given the case complexity and local backlog.

The court sentenced Marlon Ramon-Vasquez for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

The decision reviews the facts of the offence, the offender’s background, the impact of fentanyl on the community, and the applicable sentencing principles.

After considering aggravating and mitigating factors, including the offender’s youth, lack of criminal record, and significant rehabilitative steps, the court imposed a sentence of 30 months’ imprisonment, along with ancillary orders.

This ruling addresses an application by the defendant, Marquis Clark, for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a breach of his section 11(b) right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the information being sworn to the scheduled end of the second trial was 789 days, exceeding the presumptive ceiling set in R. v. Jordan.

The court analyzed the delay, deducting 195 days conceded by the defence and an additional 90 days attributed to the systemic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, as per the estimate in R. v. Korovchenko.

After deductions, the net delay of 504 days fell below the Jordan ceiling.

The court also considered the mistrial, finding it was due to an inadvertent disclosure mistake that was quickly remedied, and subsequent delays were largely due to defence counsel's schedules.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings based on an alleged violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter, citing a total delay of 24 months and 22 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for summary conviction matters.

The court found that the defence was "markedly indifferent" to securing an earlier trial date, as evidenced by their failure to clearly assert an 11(b) breach or take proactive steps to expedite the matter after trial dates were set.

Consequently, the court apportioned a significant portion of the delay (7 months and 3 days) to the defence, resulting in a net delay of 17 months and 19 days, which falls below the Jordan ceiling.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The accused, Mauricio Carrillo, was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg/100 mL following a motor vehicle collision where he sustained a broken femur.

He filed a Charter application alleging violations of his s. 7, s. 8, and s. 9 rights.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding that the police had reasonable grounds for arrest and breath demand, and that the breath sample procedure, though painful for the accused, did not violate his s. 7 right to security of the person given medical clearance and the accused's cooperation.

While the Crown proved the "Over 80" charge, the court found that impairment beyond a reasonable doubt was not established, leading to an acquittal on the impaired driving charge.

The accused, Ewan Smith, brought an application for a stay of proceedings, alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from the swearing of the Information to the anticipated end of trial was 629 days.

The court applied the R. v. Jordan framework, attributing 57 days to defence delay, resulting in a net delay of 572 days, which exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Provincial Court.

The Crown argued for exceptional circumstances due to COVID-19 related delays in scheduling a judicial pre-trial and a Blitz Court date.

The court found 10 days of delay for the judicial pre-trial and 44 days for the Blitz Court date were deductible as exceptional circumstances attributable to the pandemic backlog.

With these deductions, the remaining delay fell below the presumptive ceiling.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed as the defence failed to demonstrate the delay was unreasonable.

The accused was charged with operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg.

At trial, he brought a Charter application alleging breaches of his rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found the officer had reasonable grounds to make the roadside screening demand, dismissing the ss. 8 and 9 claims.

However, the court found a breach of s. 10(b) because the officer delayed informing the accused of his right to counsel for approximately 6 to 8 minutes after arrest, and provided confusing information about duty counsel.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breath sample evidence under s. 24(2) due to the officer's lack of understanding of the immediacy requirement and the impact on the accused.

The accused was acquitted.

Olga Ajgirevitch was charged with operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg within two hours of ceasing operation.

She challenged the admissibility of breath samples based on alleged breaches of her Charter rights (ss. 8, 9, 10(b)) and argued the Crown failed to prove the evidentiary requirements for the breath samples.

The court found no Charter breaches, specifically that there was no arbitrary detention or realistic opportunity to consult counsel before the Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand.

The court also found the breath samples met the evidentiary requirements despite a deficient sample during the second test.

The accused was found guilty as charged.

M.E.D. was convicted of multiple sexual violence offences, including human trafficking, receiving financial benefit from sexual services, procuring, advertising sexual services, and sexual assault, committed between August 2016 and January 2017.

The Crown sought an eight-year global sentence, while the defence proposed five years.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the profound victim impact, profit motive, victim's attempts to escape, and the sexual assault.

Mitigating factors included the offender's age, difficult upbringing, mental health issues, family support, minimal criminal record, and the harsh conditions of pre-sentence custody and bail, as well as the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on incarceration.

The court imposed a global sentence of six years imprisonment, with credit for pre-sentence custody, resulting in five years and nine months remaining to serve, along with various ancillary orders including a $10,000 restitution order.

The defendant, Edward Bobbitt, brought a s. 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay in his trial for operating a motor vehicle with an excess blood alcohol concentration.

The total delay from the swearing of the Information to the anticipated trial conclusion was 989 days.

The court applied the Jordan framework, deducting 322 days attributable to the defence (including periods of counsel unavailability and inaction in rescheduling) and 146 days attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic as an exceptional circumstance.

The resulting net institutional delay was 521 days (approximately 17 months and one week), which fell below the 18-month ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court found that the defendant had not made a concerted effort to advance the case and protect his s. 11(b) right.

The application was dismissed, and the trial was ordered to proceed.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and having a blood alcohol level above the legal limit.

A citizen called 911 reporting dangerous driving, and police observed the vehicle swerving between lanes, nearly striking a parked bus.

Upon stopping the vehicle, the officer detected a strong odour of alcohol and observed signs of impairment.

The defence challenged the arrest and detention under sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter, and disputed the Crown's proof of impairment.

The court found reasonable grounds for arrest, no arbitrary detention, and no breach of the right to counsel despite language barriers.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts, with the second count stayed under the Kienapple rule.

The appellant appealed the 90-day suspension of his driver's licence under section 48.3 of the Highway Traffic Act for failing to provide a breath sample.

He argued that he was unable to provide the sample due to asthma and panic attacks.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found that the appellant failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that he was medically unable to provide the sample.

The Tribunal preferred the evidence of the arresting officer, who testified that the appellant made weak blows, failed to make a seal, and exhibited no signs of respiratory distress, over the evidence of the appellant and his family physician.

The appeal was dismissed and the suspension confirmed.