Daniel Eliezer Marcovitch

The offender pleaded guilty to voyeurism, distribution of intimate images, and breach of probation after recording and sharing videos of the victim engaging in sexual activity.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted an 18-month conditional sentence but disputed whether a SOIRA order should issue.

The court imposed the conditional sentence, finding it met the principles of denunciation and deterrence.

The court declined to make a SOIRA order, concluding that the offender posed a low risk to re-offend and that the impact of a 20-year registration order would be grossly disproportionate to the public interest.

The plaintiff, a United Kingdom manufacturer, brought a motion for default judgment against the defendant for unpaid invoices totalling £65,218.67 for custom-manufactured equipment.

The defendant was noted in default for failing to defend the proceeding.

Applying the test from Elekta Ltd. v. Rodkin, the court found liability established based on deemed admissions in the statement of claim and supporting affidavit evidence.

Default judgment was granted for the full amount with pre-judgment interest at 5.3% under the Courts of Justice Act and costs of $2,527.00.

The defendant was tried concurrently on a provincial careless driving charge and a criminal charge of driving with excess blood alcohol concentration.

The court addressed two main issues for the criminal charge: the validity of the screening demand and the admissibility of the Certificate of a Qualified Breath Technician.

The court found that the investigating officer had reasonable grounds to suspect alcohol consumption, validating the screening demand and subsequent breath tests.

Furthermore, the court ruled that the photocopy of the Certificate of a Qualified Breath Technician was admissible as a true copy.

Consequently, the defendant was found guilty of both the careless driving offence and the criminal driving with excess blood alcohol concentration offence.

Olga Ajgirevitch applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a violation of her s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The key issues were the start date for calculating delay (arrest vs. information sworn) and whether the COVID-19 pandemic constituted an exceptional circumstance justifying delay.

The court, bound by Supreme Court and Court of Appeal precedents, ruled that the delay clock starts from the date the information was sworn (November 9, 2020), not the arrest date.

It also found that the COVID-19 pandemic and its systemic impacts were exceptional circumstances, justifying a deduction of delay.

After deducting defence-attributable and exceptional delays, the net delay was below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

In a historical sexual assault prosecution, the court applied the W.(D.) framework to competing testimony from the complainant and the defendant.

The complainant's account was plausible and personally convincing, but material additions and inconsistencies across her prior statements and trial evidence raised reliability concerns.

The defendant's evidence consisted largely of firm denials and an unpersuasive speculative motive theory, but it could not be rejected as self-serving deception.

The court was left unsure what, if anything, occurred and held that the Crown had not proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and having a blood alcohol level above the legal limit.

A citizen called 911 reporting dangerous driving, and police observed the vehicle swerving between lanes, nearly striking a parked bus.

Upon stopping the vehicle, the officer detected a strong odour of alcohol and observed signs of impairment.

The defence challenged the arrest and detention under sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter, and disputed the Crown's proof of impairment.

The court found reasonable grounds for arrest, no arbitrary detention, and no breach of the right to counsel despite language barriers.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts, with the second count stayed under the Kienapple rule.