Ramandeep Gill

On a pre-trial Charter application in a first degree murder prosecution, the accused alleged that his s. 10(b) rights were breached because his brief Brydges duty counsel consultation was constitutionally deficient and because police failed to facilitate a second consultation before routine post-arrest evidence-gathering steps.

The court held that the police fulfilled both their informational and implementational duties by promptly advising the accused of his rights and facilitating private contact with duty counsel at the first reasonable opportunity.

Applying Sinclair, Willier, LaFrance, and Dussault, the court found no objectively observable change in circumstances and no basis requiring police to monitor advice quality or provide renewed access before photographs, fingerprints, clothing seizure, and hand swabs.

The court further held that duty counsel providing summary legal advice is not a state actor and that s. 10(b) guarantees access to counsel, not the quality of legal advice received.

The offender pleaded guilty to uttering a death threat and domestic assault.

The threat was motivated by homophobia against a stranger, while the assault involved dragging and confining his 17-year-old intimate partner in the presence of their infant.

The court rejected a conditional discharge for the threat, imposing a suspended sentence to emphasize denunciation and deterrence.

For the assault, the court accepted a joint submission of five months' custody, satisfied by pre-sentence custody credit, followed by 18 months of probation with counselling and no-contact conditions.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion in a first-degree murder case to admit hearsay statements and video-recorded police interviews of the deceased's eight-year-old daughter.

The child witnessed a struggle between the accused and her mother, during which she heard her mother say 'let me go' and the accused reply 'wait, wait, wait, wait'.

The court ruled the mother's statement admissible as a res gestae spontaneous utterance and under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The accused's statement was admitted as a party admission.

The court also admitted the child's video statements under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code, subject to editing, and granted testimonial aids including testimony via closed-circuit television with a support person and support dog.

The accused is charged with first-degree murder of his former intimate partner.

The Crown sought to admit the expert opinion evidence of a forensic pathologist regarding the cause of death, which included neck compression.

The defence opposed the admission, arguing the expert was biased, inflexible, and failed to consider alternative causes for petechiae, such as coughing.

The court applied the two-stage test for expert evidence and found the expert was properly qualified, understood her duty to the court, and her reasoning was transparent and evidence-based.

The court admitted the expert evidence, concluding its probative value outweighed any potential prejudicial effect, leaving the ultimate assessment of weight to the jury.

The accused was charged with nine offences arising from three separate incidents of alleged domestic violence spanning from 2013 to 2022.

The charges included multiple counts of assault, assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm, assault by choking, uttering death threats, and uttering threats to cause bodily harm.

The trial turned on credibility, with the complainant and accused providing conflicting accounts of events.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and internally consistent, while finding the accused's denials of physical violence and threats inconsistent with surrounding circumstances and his own admissions in a counselling letter.

The court convicted on four counts and acquitted on the remaining charges.

The defendant, Madison Biggar, was convicted of careless driving causing death under the Highway Traffic Act after a two-day trial.

This decision outlines the sentencing, considering victim impact statements, a pre-sentence report, and principles of specific and general deterrence, as well as proportionality and parity with similar cases.

The court imposed a fine, probation, community service, and a driving prohibition, balancing the gravity of the offence with the defendant's youth and lack of prior record, while noting her failure to take responsibility by pleading not guilty.

The defendant, Madison Biggar, was charged with careless driving under section 130(3) of the Highway Traffic Act, resulting in bodily harm and death to a motorcyclist.

The collision occurred when the defendant made a left turn, striking a northbound motorcycle.

The prosecution presented expert collision reconstruction evidence and civilian witness testimony.

The defendant testified she did not see the motorcycle and her memory of the event was unclear, claiming she went unconscious upon impact.

The court found the defendant's testimony inconsistent and unreliable.

Applying the standard of care for careless driving and the requirements for left turns under section 141(5) of the Highway Traffic Act, the court determined that the defendant failed to exercise due diligence and provide a reasonable opportunity for the motorcyclist to avoid the collision.

The court found the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt and entered a finding of guilt.

The accused, Ewan Smith, brought an application for a stay of proceedings, alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from the swearing of the Information to the anticipated end of trial was 629 days.

The court applied the R. v. Jordan framework, attributing 57 days to defence delay, resulting in a net delay of 572 days, which exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Provincial Court.

The Crown argued for exceptional circumstances due to COVID-19 related delays in scheduling a judicial pre-trial and a Blitz Court date.

The court found 10 days of delay for the judicial pre-trial and 44 days for the Blitz Court date were deductible as exceptional circumstances attributable to the pandemic backlog.

With these deductions, the remaining delay fell below the presumptive ceiling.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed as the defence failed to demonstrate the delay was unreasonable.