Dennis J. Reeve

The defendant, Madison Biggar, was convicted of careless driving causing death under the Highway Traffic Act after a two-day trial.

This decision outlines the sentencing, considering victim impact statements, a pre-sentence report, and principles of specific and general deterrence, as well as proportionality and parity with similar cases.

The court imposed a fine, probation, community service, and a driving prohibition, balancing the gravity of the offence with the defendant's youth and lack of prior record, while noting her failure to take responsibility by pleading not guilty.

The defendant, Madison Biggar, was charged with careless driving under section 130(3) of the Highway Traffic Act, resulting in bodily harm and death to a motorcyclist.

The collision occurred when the defendant made a left turn, striking a northbound motorcycle.

The prosecution presented expert collision reconstruction evidence and civilian witness testimony.

The defendant testified she did not see the motorcycle and her memory of the event was unclear, claiming she went unconscious upon impact.

The court found the defendant's testimony inconsistent and unreliable.

Applying the standard of care for careless driving and the requirements for left turns under section 141(5) of the Highway Traffic Act, the court determined that the defendant failed to exercise due diligence and provide a reasonable opportunity for the motorcyclist to avoid the collision.

The court found the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt and entered a finding of guilt.

The applicants, Ethan Racanelli and Zachariah Morales, jointly charged with sexual assault, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter for an alleged breach of their s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the Information being sworn to the anticipated trial completion was 28 months and 12 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown argued for subtracting periods of delay due to an electronic disclosure system transition and defence requests for outstanding disclosure.

The court rejected the Crown's arguments, finding that the Crown's delay in providing crucial disclosure (complainants' video statements) was not an exceptional circumstance and that defence requests for such disclosure were legitimate.

The court found the delay prima facie unreasonable and granted a stay of proceedings for both applicants.

The Law Society of Upper Canada brought a motion to determine the penalty for Lee Edward Fingold, who was previously found in contempt of court for breaching a 2010 order prohibiting him from practicing law or providing legal services.

The court considered Fingold's history of similar breaches, his medical condition, and sentencing principles for contempt.

Despite the LSUC requesting 9-12 months incarceration, the court imposed a $5,000 fine, finding that incarceration was not appropriate given the circumstances and that a financial penalty would serve as a sufficient deterrent.

The Law Society of Upper Canada brought a motion for contempt against Lee Edward Fingold for breaching a 2010 court order prohibiting him from practicing law or providing legal services.

The allegations stemmed from his involvement in arranging a mortgage registration for a client in 2011 and providing payout statements for private mortgages in 2016.

The court found Fingold in contempt for the 2011 mortgage registration and the 2016 payout statements, concluding he applied legal principles and judgment, thereby providing legal services in circumvention of the order.

However, the court found reasonable doubt regarding a 2015 correspondence due to insufficient evidence from the applicant.

The hearing was bifurcated for a separate penalty determination.

The applicant sought a finding of civil contempt against the respondent for breaching a prior court order prohibiting him from practising law or providing legal services contrary to s. 26.1 of the Law Society Act.

The respondent, a disbarred lawyer, sent correspondence on letterhead identifying himself as a paralegal and offering to negotiate settlement of a civil action on behalf of defendants.

The court held that the order was clear and that the respondent deliberately held himself out as providing legal services and negotiating legal rights despite being prohibited from doing so.

The evidence established contempt beyond a reasonable doubt and the court rejected arguments that the conduct was minor or inadvertent.

Considering the respondent’s history and lack of remorse, the court imposed a custodial sentence to achieve denunciation and deterrence.