Julia Marie Mahoney Bellehumeur

Following a conviction for indecent assault, the applicant brought a post-conviction motion seeking a mistrial or leave to reopen the trial.

The applicant argued the court misapprehended evidence about the nature of the touching and failed to find that a prior inconsistent statement by the complainant was a deliberate lie.

The court held it did not misapprehend the evidence and declined to provide further clarification.

The court found the defence made a tactical decision at trial not to recall the witness to cross-examine on the inconsistency, relying instead on an Agreed Statement of Fact.

Applying the Palmer test and principles from Kowall, the court declined to reopen the trial or order a mistrial based on this tactical choice.

In a judge-alone historic sexual assault trial involving multiple complainants and allegations spanning several decades, the court acquitted on most counts but convicted on one count of indecent assault and one count of sexual assault.

The court held that count-to-count similar fact evidence was inadmissible because the proposed similarities were generic, one complainant's evidence was incapable of belief, and the overall probative value did not outweigh prejudice.

The abuse of process application was not pursued to a stay at the close of the case, and the court treated the investigative shortcomings as matters potentially bearing on reliability rather than as grounds for terminating the proceedings.

Applying orthodox principles of credibility, reliability, consent, and mens rea in historic sexual assault cases, the court found two complainants reliable on the central acts alleged and found the remaining allegations too uncertain to meet the criminal standard.

The defendant/applicant brought a certiorari application to quash his committal for trial on a charge of rape contrary to the former s. 144 of the Criminal Code, alleged to have occurred between July 1980 and July 1981.

The complainant testified she had no memory of events between being at a bar and waking up during intercourse with the accused, and stated she would not have consented.

The applicant argued the preliminary inquiry judge failed to engage in the limited weighing of circumstantial evidence required by Arcuri.

The reviewing court held that the preliminary inquiry judge correctly applied the committal test, finding available circumstantial evidence sufficient to support an inference favourable to the Crown, and that the existence of competing inferences was irrelevant at this stage.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with sexual assault against a 17-year-old complainant.

The alleged offence occurred during a truck ride from Quebec to Ontario in November 2022.

The Crown alleged multiple instances of forced oral sex and digital penetration.

The accused claimed the complainant initiated and consented to all sexual activity.

The court rejected the accused's testimony as lacking credibility due to deliberate lies to police and inconsistencies between his police statement and trial testimony.

The court accepted the complainant's credible and coherent account of non-consensual sexual contact.

The court found the accused guilty of sexual assault, rejecting the defence that the complainant had initiated the sexual activity.

The court ordered a mistrial in a sexual assault case after finding that the accused, RE, did not receive effective assistance of counsel.

The trial judge found that defence counsel's lack of competence in questioning, knowledge of law, and submissions resulted in an unfair trial and compromised the reliability of the verdict.

The decision details the evidence, procedural history, and legal principles regarding the right to a fair trial and effective assistance of counsel, ultimately concluding that no remedy short of a new trial could address the prejudice to the accused.

The offender, D.F., was sentenced for sexual assault, sexual interference, and breach of a probation order involving a 14-year-old complainant.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 6 to 8 years, while the Defence proposed 3 to 4 years.

The court considered significant aggravating factors, including the complainant's vulnerability, the use of force, the offender's extensive criminal record, and his disregard for court orders.

Mitigating factors included the offender's own childhood trauma, delays in the sentencing process, stringent bail conditions, and demonstrated remorse.

Applying the principles from R. v. Friesen, the court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for sexual offenses against children.

D.F. was sentenced to 5 years, 6 months, and 5 days for sexual interference (sexual assault stayed), plus 30 days concurrent for the probation breach, along with various ancillary orders.

The applicant, Amarjeet Chouhan, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 999 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court found 282 days of defence-caused delay and 368 days of waived delay (explicit waiver and failure to bring a timely s. 11(b) application).

Additionally, 70 days were deducted as exceptional circumstances due to the assigned Crown's illness.

After deductions, the net delay was 279 days, which is below the 18-month ceiling.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

A.R. was convicted by a jury of four counts of assault and one count of sexual assault against his intimate partner (R.V.), and one count of assault (choking) against his young son (K.R.).

The Crown sought a global 22-month sentence, two years probation, and a 20-year Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order.

The defence sought an 18-month conditional sentence and opposed probation and SOIRA.

The court imposed a global sentence of 18 months imprisonment, two years probation, and a DNA order, but declined to impose a SOIRA order, finding a low risk of re-offending despite the serious nature of the domestic violence.

The defendant applied for a stay of proceedings, alleging a violation of their right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from charge to anticipated end of trial was 26 months and 8 days (800 days).

The court analyzed periods of delay, attributing 161 days to defence delay due to failure to promptly set a trial date and incorrect availability advice.

An additional 193 days of delay were equally apportioned between the defence and the court due to defence counsel's unavailability and the court's inability to offer earlier dates.

After deductions, the net delay was 446 days (approximately 14.6 months), which is well below the Jordan ceiling.

The application for a stay was dismissed as the defence could not demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite proceedings, nor did the case take markedly longer than it should have.

The defendant, Mikal Richards, brought a s. 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 15 months and 26 days for a 5-day in-custody trial, which is below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found that the defence did not demonstrate sustained efforts to expedite the proceedings, citing repeated postponements of the bail hearing and delays in scheduling judicial pre-trials.

While acknowledging the Crown's unreasonable delay in disclosure, particularly the ITO, the court concluded that the case did not take "markedly longer than it reasonably should have" when viewed holistically, considering the actions of both parties and local conditions.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The defendant, Adrian Thomas, was charged with multiple offences, including assault with intent to resist arrest and various firearm-related charges, following a traffic stop and struggle with police.

The court found the initial traffic stop lawful and the prolonged detention not arbitrary.

However, it found that the police used excessive force during the arrest, constituting a breach of the defendant's section 7 Charter rights, and that there were unjustified delays in providing and facilitating access to counsel, breaching section 10(b) Charter rights.

While the search of the vehicle was deemed a lawful inventory search, the court applied the Grant analysis and determined that the serious section 7 violation necessitated the exclusion of the handgun evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

Consequently, the defendant was found not guilty of all gun-related charges but guilty of resisting arrest.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting a former employee.

The complainant alleged that the accused exposed himself, touched her breasts, and demanded oral sex under threat of termination.

The accused denied the allegations.

The court found significant inconsistencies in the testimony of both the accused and the complainant.

Although the court did not believe the accused's evidence, the inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony left the court with a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted.

The applicants, Ethan Racanelli and Zachariah Morales, jointly charged with sexual assault, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter for an alleged breach of their s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the Information being sworn to the anticipated trial completion was 28 months and 12 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown argued for subtracting periods of delay due to an electronic disclosure system transition and defence requests for outstanding disclosure.

The court rejected the Crown's arguments, finding that the Crown's delay in providing crucial disclosure (complainants' video statements) was not an exceptional circumstance and that defence requests for such disclosure were legitimate.

The court found the delay prima facie unreasonable and granted a stay of proceedings for both applicants.

The applicant sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code to modify a no-contact condition, seeking limited access to his children.

The applicant faced serious charges including sexual assault, assault with a weapon, and uttering death threats, with some allegations involving the children.

The court dismissed the application as premature, holding that the family court is the appropriate forum to determine child access based on the best interests of the children.

The court noted that a future family court order granting access could constitute a material change in circumstances justifying a renewed bail review application.

The accused, R.N., pleaded guilty to one count of sexual interference involving his 13-year-old step-granddaughter, A.B. The incidents occurred five times over a three-month period in the victim's home, involving digital penetration and touching of breasts.

The Crown sought a four-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought a reformatory sentence of two years less a day.

The court considered the profound impact on the victim, the high breach of trust, and the principles of sentencing, particularly denunciation and deterrence as emphasized by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Friesen.

Despite the offender's intellectual delay, remorse, and low risk of reoffending, the court imposed a sentence of two years less one day imprisonment, followed by three years of probation with specific conditions, a 10-year weapons prohibition, and a 20-year SOIRA order, aligning with the defence's request for the length of incarceration.

The Crown applied under s. 714.1 of the Criminal Code for the complainant in a sexual assault case to testify via video link from her home, citing her childcare responsibilities and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The defendant opposed, raising concerns about evidentiary risks (witness tampering, reduced psychological controls, technological limitations) and trial fairness.

The court dismissed the application, finding insufficient evidence regarding the suitability of the complainant's home, the adequacy of the technology, and the actual inconvenience to the witness, despite acknowledging the pandemic context.

The applicant was charged with assault, assault with a weapon, uttering threats, and mischief on September 1, 2018.

His trial was scheduled for September 25-26, 2019, but was adjourned when he was charged with new offences on the first day of trial.

Those charges were withdrawn approximately six weeks later.

The rescheduled trial was set for December 23-24, 2020, resulting in total delay of 27 months and 23 days.

The applicant applied for a stay of proceedings on the grounds of unreasonable delay in violation of s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the net delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan and that the Crown failed to justify the excess delay by taking reasonable steps to mitigate it.