David N. Tice

The offender pleaded guilty to unauthorized use of a computer, mischief to data, and failing to comply with a release order after hacking and defacing the Texas GOP website and distributing 180 GB of stolen data.

The court weighed the significant aggravating factors of a sophisticated, large-scale cyber attack targeting a political organization against mitigating factors including the offender's lack of a prior record, guilty pleas, and harsh pre-trial custody conditions.

A global sentence of 18 months was imposed, reduced to 175 days to serve after credit for pre-trial custody.

In a judge-alone historic sexual assault trial involving multiple complainants and allegations spanning several decades, the court acquitted on most counts but convicted on one count of indecent assault and one count of sexual assault.

The court held that count-to-count similar fact evidence was inadmissible because the proposed similarities were generic, one complainant's evidence was incapable of belief, and the overall probative value did not outweigh prejudice.

The abuse of process application was not pursued to a stay at the close of the case, and the court treated the investigative shortcomings as matters potentially bearing on reliability rather than as grounds for terminating the proceedings.

Applying orthodox principles of credibility, reliability, consent, and mens rea in historic sexual assault cases, the court found two complainants reliable on the central acts alleged and found the remaining allegations too uncertain to meet the criminal standard.

The offender pleaded guilty to fraud over $5,000 for his participation in an online scheme reselling stolen loyalty points.

The Crown sought a reformatory sentence, while the defence sought a suspended or short conditional sentence.

The court found that while the offence was serious and part of a large-scale fraud, the offender's moral culpability was reduced due to his youth, emotional immaturity, social anxiety, and deference to his older brother, who was the directing mind.

The court imposed a 12-month conditional sentence, including four months of house arrest and four months of curfew, along with forfeiture of $7,200.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered the appeals of Rushawn Anderson and Nicholas Rhoden from convictions for attempted murder and aggravated assault.

The appellants argued that the trial judge erred in admitting out-of-court statements, in his rulings on Charter violations, in instructing the jury on fabrication, and that the verdicts were unreasonable.

The majority dismissed the appeals, finding the fabrication instruction sufficient and the verdicts reasonable.

In dissent, Gomery J.A. would have allowed the appeals, finding the fabrication instruction flawed and the verdicts unreasonable, and would have substituted acquittals.

The appellant sought to strike his guilty plea to possession of a loaded restricted firearm, alleging material non-disclosure.

The Crown had requested an adjournment of a Charter motion, citing a police officer's medical unavailability.

Fresh evidence revealed the officer was facing criminal charges, which were not disclosed to the defence.

The appellant asserted he would not have pleaded guilty if aware of these charges.

The Crown conceded the fresh evidence's admissibility, the material non-disclosure, and that it likely influenced the plea.

The Court of Appeal accepted these concessions, allowed the appeal, set aside the guilty plea, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant, a young person, appealed convictions for sexually assaulting two complainants.

The appeal raised two grounds: an alleged error in dismissing a severance application and the trial judge's assessment of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no injustice in the severance ruling and no palpable and overriding error in the evidence assessment.

Sentencing following guilty pleas to one count of child luring and two counts of possession of child pornography arising from online sexual communications with a 16-year-old complainant and the storage of child sexual abuse material involving multiple young persons.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for sexual offences against children, relying on post-Friesen sentencing principles and the inherent harm identified in Sharpe.

It treated the offender's guilty plea, lack of record, difficult personal history, and four years on restrictive bail as mitigating factors, but found the quantity of images, the age disparity, the deception used online, and the exploitation of vulnerable minors to be significant aggravating factors.

A global sentence of four years' imprisonment was imposed, together with SOIRA registration, forfeiture, DNA, s. 161 prohibitions, and a no-contact order.

The appellant, P.K., appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving his 15-year-old niece.

The appeal raised two grounds: the trial judge's response to a jury question concerning forensic evidence and the instruction given on the complainant's videotaped statement under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's response to the jury's request for a read-back of expert testimony was appropriate, given the practical difficulties and the lack of material prejudice.

The court also affirmed that the instruction on the s. 715.1 statement was correct, as such statements are admissible for their truth and as part of the in-court testimony.

The appeal was dismissed.

Egypt Morgan was sentenced for manslaughter after being jointly charged with first-degree murder.

The jury found her guilty of manslaughter, while her co-accused, Shamoi Palmer, was found guilty of first-degree murder.

The victim, Jermaine Titus, was an innocent bystander killed by a bullet intended for another individual.

Morgan's role involved alerting Palmer to the victim's location, knowing Palmer possessed a firearm and intended to discharge it recklessly.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the use of a firearm, the planned nature of Morgan's actions, the innocent victim, and her post-offence assistance to Palmer.

Mitigating factors included her status as a youthful first offender, family support, participation in rehabilitation programs, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, including during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Crown sought a 12-year sentence, while the defence sought time served.

The court imposed a 10-year sentence, with credit for pre-sentence custody, leaving 3 years, 9 months, and 21 days to serve.

The appellant, K.C., appealed his conviction for sexual assault, having abandoned his sentence appeal.

The incident involved conflicting accounts of a sexual encounter.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's testimony, finding it contradicted by text messages, and accepted the complainant's evidence as logical, consistent, and supported by other evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no legal error or material misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge, affirming the high degree of deference owed to credibility findings on appeal.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible (NCR) for past offences, appealed a disposition by the Ontario Review Board (ORB) that ordered her detention in custody and rehabilitation at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH).

Previously, she had been on a conditional discharge but exhibited declining mental stability and inconsistent attendance at appointments.

Despite recommendations from her physician, hospital counsel, and the Crown for a continued conditional discharge, the ORB found she posed a significant public safety threat due to marked deterioration in her stability and past threatening behaviour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the ORB's decision as reasonable, emphasizing the ORB's expertise and the need to consider future treatment beyond mere reattendance mechanisms.

C.H. appealed convictions for mischief under $5000, uttering threats, common assault, and sexual assault committed against his former fiancée.

The appeal raised several grounds, including the trial judge's treatment of character evidence, application of the rule in R. v. W.(D.), evaluation of motive and delay in reporting, treatment of exculpatory evidence for sexual assault, and misuse of a prior consistent statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in most grounds.

While acknowledging an error in the trial judge's hypothetical comment on exculpatory evidence for sexual assault and the misuse of a prior consistent statement, the court concluded these errors did not contribute to the convictions or warrant setting them aside.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder for allegedly shooting an innocent bystander during a drive-by shooting, applied for bail.

The court found the Crown's case to be extremely strong and noted the accused's extensive criminal record, including numerous bail breaches and violent offences.

The court dismissed the application, concluding the accused failed to meet his onus on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds, as he posed a significant risk to public safety and his release would undermine confidence in the administration of justice.

Following convictions for child luring, sexual assault, sexual interference, and related breaches involving two complainants, the Crown sought a psychiatric assessment order under s. 752.1(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court held that the threshold for such an order is low and requires reasonable grounds to believe the offender might be found to be a dangerous offender or long-term offender.

Applying that standard, the court found the record disclosed an apparent failure to control sexual impulses, repeated targeting of underage complainants, and offending while bound by protective recognizance conditions.

The application for an assessment order was allowed.

Following a judge-alone criminal trial, the court convicted the accused of child luring, sexual assault, sexual interference, multiple recognizance breaches, and breach of probation arising from online communications and in-person sexual assaults involving two complainants under 16.

The court accepted the complainants’ evidence, relied on social media, Facetime, phone, and text-message evidence, admitted prior discreditable conduct and after-the-fact conduct evidence, and found no collusion.

Applying the mistake-of-age jurisprudence, the court held the accused either knew the complainants were underage or failed to take all reasonable steps to ascertain age.

The court also used cross-count similar act reasoning as additional support for the sexual offence findings.

The accused was acquitted on two recognizance counts concerning attendance at school grounds or a park, and on the SOIRA reporting count because the Crown did not prove the address change fell outside the seven-day reporting period.

The defendant sought to exclude evidence (a sawed-off shotgun and ammunition) seized under a search warrant, arguing the warrant was invalid due to a breach of his s. 7 Charter rights (loss of surveillance video) and insufficient grounds.

The court found a s. 7 Charter breach due to unacceptable police negligence in losing the video, remedying it by excising a subjective observation from the Information To Obtain (ITO).

However, the court determined that even with the excision, there were sufficient credible and corroborated grounds from a confidential informant and police surveillance for the justice of the peace to issue the warrant for the defendant's associated residence.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The accused brought a severance motion in a prosecution involving child luring, sexual assault, sexual interference, and related breach charges arising from allegations by two young complainants.

The court accepted that the fail to comply charges should be severed from the sexual offence counts, but refused to sever the counts relating to each complainant from one another.

Applying the interests of justice analysis under s. 591(3) of the Criminal Code and the framework in Last, the court found a strong factual nexus, significant overlap in digital and disclosure evidence, the prospect of similar fact reasoning, and a serious risk of re-traumatizing vulnerable complainants through duplicate testimony.

The court held that any prejudice to the accused could be managed by jury instructions and that separate trials would undermine efficiency and the truth-seeking function.

The accused was arrested for armed robbery and immediately requested to speak to his lawyer.

The police failed to facilitate his right to counsel for over three hours, despite having easy access to the lawyer's contact information.

During a search of the accused's vehicle incident to arrest, police located a firearm.

The accused brought an application to exclude the firearm under s. 24(2) of the Charter, arguing his s. 10(b) rights were violated.

The court found a serious breach of the right to counsel due to police negligence and excluded the firearm, concluding its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault, uttering threats, and breach of probation following a violent attack on his sisters-in-law and niece.

After pleading guilty to aggravated assault and breach of probation, the trial proceeded on the remaining charges.

The accused argued that his severe intoxication negated the specific intent required for attempted murder.

The court found that despite a high blood alcohol concentration, the accused had an operating mind, foresaw the consequences of his actions, and possessed the specific intent to cause death.

The accused was found guilty of attempted murder and uttering threats.

The accused was charged with robbery with a firearm and other offences after police tracked a GPS device from stolen cell phones to a plaza.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging arbitrary arrest, unreasonable search of his satchel and vehicle, and denial of his right to counsel.

The court dismissed the application, finding the police had reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest, the searches were validly conducted incident to arrest, and the accused was properly advised of his right to counsel.

The court also noted that even if Charter breaches had occurred, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2).