Douglas Usher

The offender was convicted by a jury of possession of methamphetamine and fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a 6-year prison sentence, while the defence proposed a conditional sentence.

The court found the offender to be a mid-level trafficker motivated by commercial gain, but noted her lack of a criminal record and strong potential for rehabilitation.

Emphasizing the dangers of fentanyl and the need for denunciation and deterrence, the court rejected a conditional sentence and imposed a 4-year custodial sentence.

Egypt Morgan was sentenced for manslaughter after being jointly charged with first-degree murder.

The jury found her guilty of manslaughter, while her co-accused, Shamoi Palmer, was found guilty of first-degree murder.

The victim, Jermaine Titus, was an innocent bystander killed by a bullet intended for another individual.

Morgan's role involved alerting Palmer to the victim's location, knowing Palmer possessed a firearm and intended to discharge it recklessly.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the use of a firearm, the planned nature of Morgan's actions, the innocent victim, and her post-offence assistance to Palmer.

Mitigating factors included her status as a youthful first offender, family support, participation in rehabilitation programs, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, including during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Crown sought a 12-year sentence, while the defence sought time served.

The court imposed a 10-year sentence, with credit for pre-sentence custody, leaving 3 years, 9 months, and 21 days to serve.

The accused was charged with firearms, drug, and driving offences following police surveillance, a vehicle stop, and an apartment search.

The court found that the accused did not know unmarked police vehicles were pursuing him when he fled an intersection, believing instead he was escaping gang violence.

Furthermore, the Crown failed to prove the accused had constructive possession of a firearm and marijuana found in a friend's apartment.

The accused was acquitted of all charges, including dangerous driving and mischief to property, as the Crown failed to prove the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown charged two accused jointly with two counts of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, with the first accused facing an additional count.

At a preliminary inquiry, both accused contested committal, arguing insufficient evidence of knowledge and control.

The court applied the test from R v Arcuri, examining circumstantial evidence including extensive police surveillance of hand-to-hand transactions, large quantities of cash and drugs found in a locked apartment, drug paraphernalia, and documentary evidence linking both accused to the premises.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit both accused to trial on the joint possession counts and the first accused on the additional count.

The Crown brought a motion on a voir dire to qualify a police officer as an expert witness in drug trafficking.

The accused was charged with possession of marijuana and a prohibited firearm.

The court considered the officer's 12 years of police experience, including two years on the drug squad, involvement in numerous drug investigations, surveillance, undercover buys, informant handling, and specialized training courses.

Applying the R. v. Mohan criteria, the court found the expert evidence relevant, necessary, and not subject to any exclusionary rule.

The officer was deemed properly qualified based on his extensive practical experience and formal training.

The application to admit the officer's expert testimony was granted.

The applicant sought an order quashing his committal for trial on a charge of possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, arguing there was no evidence of trafficking intent.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, including the large quantity of marijuana (232 grams) and the presence of a firearm in the same unit.

The court found that the preliminary inquiry judge reasonably inferred trafficking intent from the combination of the large quantity of marijuana and the firearm, providing a proper evidentiary basis for committal.

The application to quash the committal was dismissed.

Pre‑trial motions concerning severance and the admissibility of similar fact evidence in a multi‑count indictment arising from four bank robberies and an attempted armoured truck robbery.

The Crown sought to rely on evidence from separate robberies as similar fact evidence to establish identity, motive, and intent.

The court held that evidence of the second, third, and fourth robberies was admissible count‑to‑count on the issue of identity for one accused due to significant similarities and linking evidence, but evidence from the first robbery was not sufficiently similar.

The court further ruled that the bank robbery evidence was not admissible as similar fact evidence to prove motive or intent regarding the attempted armoured truck robbery.

Applying the severance factors in R. v. Last, the court ordered the armoured truck counts severed from the bank robbery counts and also severed the first robbery from the remaining robbery counts.

During a jury trial for attempted murder, the accused sought to exclude evidence that he had provided a cell phone number to his probation officer, which the police later used to obtain records placing him near the scene of the attack.

The accused argued that the statement was compelled and its admission would violate the common law confessions rule and the constitutional principle against self‑incrimination.

The court held that the probation officer was not a “person in authority” within the meaning of the confessions rule because there was no investigation or prosecution underway when the number was provided.

The court further found the number was given voluntarily in a voicemail message and was not compelled by the probation order, which required only that the accused provide an address.

Balancing the contextual factors under s. 7 of the Charter, the court concluded that admitting the phone number did not infringe the right against self‑incrimination and was admissible.

A preliminary inquiry voir dire addressing whether a complainant in a sexual assault case could testify while wearing a niqab.

The complainant sought to wear her niqab for religious reasons, while the accused objected on the grounds that it would impair their fair trial rights by preventing observation of the witness's demeanour and credibility assessment.

The court applied the Dagenais/Mentuck framework to balance the complainant's Charter right to freedom of religion against the accused's right to a fair trial.

The court found that while the complainant's religious beliefs were sincere and strong, permitting her to wear the niqab would create a serious risk to trial fairness.

No accommodation was possible.

The court concluded that the salutary effects of requiring removal of the niqab outweighed the deleterious effects, particularly given that the accused's liberty was at stake and the complainant's credibility was central to the case.

In a criminal appeal involving a niqab-wearing complainant at a preliminary inquiry, the Court addressed how to reconcile freedom of religion with fair-trial rights.

The majority held neither an absolute ban nor an absolute permission rule is acceptable, and adopted a contextual four-step framework.

A witness may be required to remove a niqab only where necessary to prevent a serious trial-fairness risk that cannot be avoided by alternatives, and where the benefits of removal outweigh the harms.

The appeal was dismissed and the matter remitted for application of that framework.

The young person appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge was not obliged to articulate a Vetrovec warning and adequately cautioned himself regarding a witness's evidence.

However, the Crown conceded the sentence was illegal.

The Court granted leave to appeal the sentence, reducing the probation period from two years to one year and varying the assault sentence to one year concurrent to correct the illegality.