J. Cameron

Dellen Millard was convicted of the first-degree murder of his father, Wayne Millard, his third first-degree murder conviction.

The court considered whether the mandatory 25-year parole ineligibility period for this murder should be served concurrently or consecutively to his existing 50-year parole ineligibility for two previous first-degree murders.

Applying the totality principle and considering the paramount sentencing objectives of denunciation and retribution, the court ordered the 25-year parole ineligibility period to be served consecutively, resulting in a global parole ineligibility of 75 years.

The accused was charged with the first degree murder of his father, who died from a gunshot wound to the eye while sleeping.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including the accused's purchase of the murder weapon, his presence near the scene at the time of death, and his fabrication of a false alibi.

The court rejected the defence theory of suicide, finding that the cumulative effect of the circumstantial evidence led to the inescapable conclusion that the accused planned and deliberated the intentional killing of his father.

The accused was found guilty of first degree murder.

In a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to admit expert opinion evidence on shooting scene reconstruction.

The court ruled on the admissibility of Detective Constable Grant Sutherland's expert testimony.

While evidence concerning the general operation of revolvers and the specific firearm's design and gunshot residue (GSR) dispersal was deemed admissible, the expert's opinions on the gun's position, orientation, and the likelihood of the deceased discharging the shot were excluded.

The exclusion was primarily due to concerns about the expert's methodology and demonstrated confirmation bias, indicating an unwillingness or inability to provide impartial, independent, and unbiased evidence.

Dellen Millard, charged with first-degree murder of his father, Wayne Millard, elected trial by judge alone.

The Crown sought to introduce a photograph from the accused's online gaming profile, depicting him with a bloody eye wound, posted two weeks before his father's death by a gunshot wound to the eye.

The Crown argued its relevance to whether the death was suicide or homicide, suggesting it indicated a contemplation of murder or an improbable reaction if it were suicide.

The defence opposed, arguing irrelevance or excessive prejudice.

The court ruled the evidence inadmissible, finding it not relevant and material, as the Crown's reasoning was speculative propensity reasoning rather than logical inference.

Even if relevant, its minimal probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

Criminal prosecution arising from the possession, production, advertising, sale, import and export of films marketed as nudist films depicting boys.

The court held that numerous films and related images were child pornography because their dominant characteristic was the depiction of sexual organs and buttocks of persons under 18 for a sexual purpose, applying an objective contextual analysis under s. 163.1 of the Criminal Code.

The court accepted an officially induced error argument in part, finding that state advice in 2006 that certain films were lawful barred conviction for five specific films later found to be child pornography.

The accused was convicted on multiple child pornography and proceeds counts, but acquitted of the criminal organization count.

The accused was charged with possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and possession of a firearm without a licence following a search warrant execution at his residence.

After initially being detained pending bail, he was released on house arrest bail in May 2013.

He entered guilty pleas in February 2014, some weeks before scheduled preliminary inquiry dates.

The court imposed concurrent sentences of 18 months imprisonment, rejecting the Crown's position that a three-year penitentiary term was appropriate and the defence position that an 18-month sentence should be reduced further by credits for pre-trial custody and restrictive bail conditions.

The court also imposed a two-year probation order with conditions including community service, weapons prohibition, and reporting requirements.

The offender pleaded guilty to recklessly discharging a firearm, possessing a loaded prohibited firearm, and possessing an over-capacity magazine after firing shots in a residential complex.

He brought a Charter challenge arguing the five-year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 244.2(3)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code constituted cruel and unusual punishment.

The court dismissed the constitutional challenge, finding the sentence was not grossly disproportionate given the gravity of the offence and the risk to the public.

The offender was sentenced to the mandatory minimum of five years, reduced to two years net after credit for pre-trial custody.

The applicant, charged with child pornography offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings alleging breaches of his rights under ss. 7, 8, 9, and 10 of the Charter.

The court found no breach of ss. 8 or 10, as the police questioning at his home did not constitute a search or psychological detention.

However, the court found breaches of s. 9, due to an arbitrary three-day detention based on faulty police information, and s. 7, due to mistreatment in custody including the denial of medication for his obsessive-compulsive disorder.

Despite these breaches, the court dismissed the application for a stay, concluding that the prejudice could be adequately addressed through other remedies, such as a sentence reduction if convicted.

A preliminary inquiry voir dire addressing whether a complainant in a sexual assault case could testify while wearing a niqab.

The complainant sought to wear her niqab for religious reasons, while the accused objected on the grounds that it would impair their fair trial rights by preventing observation of the witness's demeanour and credibility assessment.

The court applied the Dagenais/Mentuck framework to balance the complainant's Charter right to freedom of religion against the accused's right to a fair trial.

The court found that while the complainant's religious beliefs were sincere and strong, permitting her to wear the niqab would create a serious risk to trial fairness.

No accommodation was possible.

The court concluded that the salutary effects of requiring removal of the niqab outweighed the deleterious effects, particularly given that the accused's liberty was at stake and the complainant's credibility was central to the case.