Ayderus Abdusalam Alawi

The defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a loaded prohibited firearm (Glock handgun), two counts of unlawful possession of overcapacity cartridge magazines, and breaches of a weapons prohibition order.

The Crown sought five years imprisonment; the defence sought a conditional sentence and probation.

The court imposed a global sentence of 17 months after accounting for Summers credit, Duncan consideration, Downes credit, and a three-month reduction for Charter breaches.

The sentencing considered the defendant's strong rehabilitative potential, experiences with systemic anti-Black racism, remorse, and family support, balanced against the serious nature of firearm offences and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

This decision addresses the constitutionality of routine strip searches of young persons in pre-trial custody, focusing on four Black adolescent female applicants charged in the high-profile homicide of Kenneth Lee.

The court found that routine strip searches, conducted without individualized grounds or prior authorization and involving complete nudity, violated sections 7 and 8 of the Charter.

The court declined to grant a stay of proceedings, instead holding that the appropriate remedy was a reduction in sentence for any applicant found guilty, to reflect the Charter breach.

The ruling provides detailed analysis of the legal and regulatory framework, the psychological impact of strip searches, and the evolving standards for custodial searches in youth justice settings.

An application was brought by eight young persons to vary a previous court order to explicitly prevent media from disseminating their identifying information, including through private social media messages, in relation to charges of second-degree murder.

The court found that a reporter's actions of contacting individuals on social media and disclosing a young person's name and charges contravened the spirit of the Youth Criminal Justice Act's publication ban under section 110, even if not an intentional breach of the specific prior order.

The court clarified that "publication" under the YCJA includes indiscriminate communication on social media that risks making information known to the general public.

The applicant sought a review of a detention order under s. 520(1) of the Criminal Code, citing two material changes in circumstances: a more stringent release plan including GPS monitoring and a higher surety pledge, and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

The Crown conceded the pandemic constituted a material change.

The court found that the applicant's detention was not necessary on either the secondary or tertiary grounds, considering the lack of a criminal record, the enhanced bail plan, and the risks posed by the pandemic in a detention centre.

The court ordered the applicant's release on a $50,000 recognizance with three sureties and strict conditions, including GPS ankle monitoring and a residence requirement.

The offenders, Romario Brissett and Devar Francis, were convicted by a jury of living off the avails of juvenile prostitution and exercising control over a minor for prostitution.

The Crown sought sentences of 2.5 years concurrent with 5 years for both.

The offenders sought 5 months consecutive or time served.

The court rejected the application of new mandatory minimums not in effect at the time of the offence and declined to apply the reasoning from R. v. Jackson regarding systemic racism for African-Canadian offenders due to lack of direct connection to the offenders' circumstances.

The court also rejected the argument for reduced sentences based on immigration consequences, finding the proposed sentences disproportionate.

Romario Brissett was sentenced to four years' incarceration, and Devar Francis was sentenced to three years' incarceration, with credit for pre-sentence custody.

The accused was charged with assault arising in a domestic context.

The accused brought a motion alleging a breach of his section 11(b) Charter rights regarding trial delay.

The Crown and defence disagreed on when the section 11(b) clock begins to run.

The defence argued it starts when the information is sworn; the Crown argued it starts when process is executed or brought to the attention of the accused.

The court found that the information was sworn on August 27, 2014, but the warrant was not executed until October 16, 2016—approximately two years and two months later.

The court held that the section 11(b) clock starts when the information is sworn and process is issued, and that the delay far exceeded the 18-month threshold established in R. v. Jordan.

Finding no exceptional circumstances justifying the delay, the court granted a stay of charges.

Khary White was found guilty of two counts of trafficking cocaine, one count of obstruct justice, and one count of possession of the proceeds of crime.

The Crown sought 18 months to 2 years incarceration, while the defence proposed 90 days custody for trafficking/obstruct and a 12-month conditional sentence for proceeds of crime.

The court considered White's prior record, the nature of the offences (street-level sales, non-violent obstruction), and significant community and family support.

Emphasizing rehabilitation, the court sentenced White to 6 months in custody for trafficking and obstruct, with credit for pre-trial custody, followed by a 12-month conditional sentence for possession of proceeds of crime, subject to various conditions including house arrest.

A 10-year firearms prohibition and a DNA order were also imposed.

A preliminary inquiry into eight charges arising from the shooting of a victim in a Toronto parking lot on July 16, 2014.

Three co-accused were charged with attempted murder, conspiracy to commit murder, firearm offences, and assault with a weapon.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the victim's testimony and circumstantial evidence including phone records and security camera footage.

Defence counsel conceded the sufficiency of evidence identifying each accused's role at the scene.

The court applied the Sheppard test and found sufficient evidence to commit all three accused to trial on all charges.

The accused was charged with failing to provide the necessaries of life to his spouse, who suffered from advanced multiple sclerosis.

At the preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to establish that the accused failed to provide adequate nutrition and medical care, resulting in severe malnutrition, bedsores, and ultimately contributing to the spouse's death from sepsis.

The defence argued that the accused had been a devoted caregiver for many years and that the evidence contained inferential gaps.

The court found that the Crown met the committal test, as a reasonable jury could infer that the accused failed to provide necessaries of life and that this failure constituted a marked departure from what a reasonably prudent person would do.

However, the court acknowledged significant countervailing evidence and live issues regarding the spouse's capacity to refuse treatment.

A young person pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery and one count of using an imitation firearm while committing robbery.

The offences were committed five days before the offender turned 18.

The court imposed a sentence of four months' secure custody followed by two months of supervision, and one year of probation with various conditions including a five-year weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The court considered the violent nature of the offences, the planning involved, the vulnerability of the victims, and the offender's lack of insight or rehabilitative progress.

A sixteen-year-old was charged with seven offences relating to the unlawful possession of a loaded firearm found in a vehicle.

The Crown alleged the accused possessed the firearm either directly, constructively, or jointly, and alternatively that he was an occupant in a vehicle knowing there was a firearm.

The court found that while the accused may have known of the firearm's existence, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had both knowledge and control of the weapon.

The firearm was not visible or accessible to the accused in the rear seat, and his presence in the vehicle and subsequent flight could be explained by circumstances other than knowledge of the gun.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.