Maeve A. Mungovan

A.A. was found guilty after trial of numerous offences against his intimate partner, Y.L., including arson endangering life and property, aggravated assault, mischief, uttering a death threat, and voyeurism, along with subsequent breaches of court orders and criminal harassment.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the pattern of abuse, the profound impact on the victims, lack of insight, and planned nature of the offences, as well as mitigating factors including no prior criminal record and personal tragedies.

The court also considered the collateral consequence of A.A. contracting COVID-19 in pre-sentence custody and the harsh conditions of detention.

A total sentence of eight years was imposed, with credit for pre-sentence custody and harsh conditions, resulting in a further 34 months to serve.

Ancillary orders for DNA sample, weapons prohibition, and communication prohibition were also made.

H.K. sought a review of his detention order under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, arguing material changes due to the COVID-19 pandemic, reduced privileges, and preliminary hearing adjournment.

The court found COVID-19 constituted a material change, requiring a de novo analysis.

However, the proposed surety (H.K.'s father, IK) was deemed unsuitable due to credibility issues and lack of influence over H.K., leading to a substantial risk of reoffending.

The court also found that H.K.'s detention was necessary on tertiary grounds to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice, despite his pre-existing medical condition and the heightened risks of COVID-19 in correctional facilities, given the inadequate release plan.

The application for detention review was dismissed.

The applicant sought a bail review to vacate a prior detention order and be released under revised terms, citing the COVID-19 pandemic as a material change in circumstances.

The court found the pandemic constituted a material change, warranting a de novo hearing.

However, the application was dismissed as the applicant failed to demonstrate that his continued detention was not necessary on both secondary and tertiary grounds, given his history of non-compliance, the unsuitability of proposed sureties, the strength of the Crown's case, and the gravity of the offences.

The court also found that the pandemic circumstances did not sufficiently mitigate the risks to public safety or confidence in the administration of justice.

The applicant, charged with second-degree murder, sought to exclude a videotaped statement made to police, alleging a breach of her s. 10(b) Charter right to consult counsel without delay.

The court found a minor s. 10(b) breach due to a police officer's general practice of not facilitating counsel contact at the hospital.

However, the court determined that the subsequent statement was not obtained as a consequence of the breach, as there was a "fresh start" after the applicant consulted duty counsel, and the applicant would have spoken to the police regardless.

Applying the Grant factors, the court concluded that the breach was minor, had no impact on the applicant's Charter-protected interests, and society's interest in a trial on the merits favored inclusion.

The statement was ruled admissible.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault against his wife and daughter.

The Crown brought two applications: one for the admission of uncharged prior discreditable conduct towards both complainants, and a second for the application of the similar fact rule to allow evidence of each count to apply to other counts.

The court granted the first application, admitting prior discreditable conduct for each complainant.

The second application was granted in part, allowing similar fact evidence for counts pertaining to the same complainant but denying its use between different complainants due to lack of sufficient similarity.

The accused, O.K., was charged with sexual assault.

The complainant, S.H., testified that the sexual contact (oral sex and vaginal penetration) occurred without her consent while she was heavily intoxicated.

The accused claimed consensual activity and honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The court disbelieved the accused's testimony, finding his claims of consent and lack of awareness of intoxication to be untrue and lacking an air of reality.

The court accepted the complainant's account, finding her memory issues due to intoxication did not undermine her credibility regarding the assault itself.

The accused was found guilty.

The Crown sought committal on first-degree murder under section 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code based on constructive murder arising from unlawful confinement.

The accused was charged with second-degree murder in the stabbing death of the victim.

The Crown argued that the victim was unlawfully confined in his bedroom following the stabbing in the living room, and that the confinement and murder formed part of the same transaction.

The defence argued that the confinement occurred after the victim was stabbed and that the victim managed to escape the apartment.

The court found insufficient evidence that the accused exploited a position of dominance over the victim through confinement to justify committal on first-degree murder.

The accused was committed to stand trial on second-degree murder only.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was pulled over at 3:11 AM on June 4, 2013, after failing an approved screening device test.

He provided breath samples at 4:20 AM and 4:42 AM showing readings of 160 and 150 mg of alcohol per 100 mL of blood respectively.

The accused challenged the validity of the approved instrument demand under s. 24(2) of the Charter and argued that the statutory presumptions of identity under s. 258(1)(c) and (d.1) had been rebutted by evidence of "bolus drinking" (rapid consumption of alcohol immediately before being pulled over).

The court found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds for the breath demand and that the presumptions had not been rebutted.

The accused was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while his blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit, contrary to sections 253(1)(a) and 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

Following a RIDE spot-check on December 9, 2011, the defendant was arrested and provided breath samples showing blood alcohol concentrations well in excess of the legal limit.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of evidence on Charter grounds, alleging violations of sections 10(a), 10(b), and 8 of the Charter.

The court found that the defendant's Charter rights were violated and excluded all evidence obtained following the violations pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter.

Both charges were dismissed.