Ian R. Smith

The plaintiff, a masonry subcontractor, sued the defendant general contractor for breach of a Contract A formed during a public construction tendering process, alleging the defendant was obligated to use it as the masonry subcontractor after naming it on its tender form submitted to the school board.

The court found no contract existed between the parties because the defendant never issued a call for tenders to subcontractors and no bid depository system was in place, meaning the Ron Engineering Contract A framework did not apply.

The court further held that even if a contract existed, the plaintiff's bid was materially non-compliant with the tender specifications, and the plaintiff failed to prove it suffered any damages given its inability to isolate expected profit from overhead costs and its mitigation income from other projects.

On a summary conviction appeal, the Crown challenged a trial judge’s refusal to adjourn a domestic-assault trial when an accredited Punjabi interpreter was unavailable and an unaccredited interpreter was rejected after a voir dire.

The appeal court held there was no breach of the accused’s interpreter rights because no trial had proceeded without competent interpretation, and an adjournment was the proper mechanism to prevent any Charter infringement.

The court found legal error in both finding a Charter breach and imposing a s. 24(1) stay without applying the governing stay test.

The reasons also found procedural unfairness to the Crown, including lack of proper notice and failure to receive submissions on the stay remedy.

The stay was set aside and a new trial ordered before a different judge.

The moving party sought release from a terminated agreement of purchase and sale and relief from forfeiture of a 15% condominium deposit after failing to close due to significant post-contract mental health and financial deterioration.

The court held rescission was unavailable because the agreement was entered without duress, fraud, mistake, or other inequitable formation circumstances, and the responding party had no knowledge of disability at contract formation.

Applying s. 98 of the Courts of Justice Act and Redstone, the court found the deposit was not disproportionate to anticipated loss and that unconscionability was not established on the evidentiary record.

The court emphasized arm’s-length bargaining, purchaser sophistication, good-faith conduct by the seller, and the fundamental nature of the breach.

The application was dismissed, with reduced partial indemnity costs fixed at $5,000 all-inclusive.

The applicant unit owner sought oppression relief under sections 37 and 135 of the Condominium Act, 1998, alleging unfair and bad-faith conduct by the condominium corporation in relation to service-dog accommodation, noise and access disputes, counsel communications, and other governance conflicts, and also sought relief under section 76 concerning an allegedly deficient status certificate.

The court held that most allegations of bad faith, dishonesty, intimidation, and procedural unfairness were not established, and found the corporation generally acted reasonably, including in retaining counsel, pursuing entry relief, and addressing building and noise concerns.

However, the court found one breach of reasonable expectations: the corporation became too entrenched and insufficiently responsive in accommodating two service dogs, amounting to unfair prejudice and unfair disregard, though not oppression.

A declaration was granted on that limited basis, but no compensation was awarded because prior CAT damages had already compensated the same accommodation-related harm and double recovery would be inappropriate.

The status-certificate claim was dismissed for failure to prove a material misstatement or omission.

The applicant was charged with possession of fentanyl and cocaine for trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime under $5,000, and failing to comply with a release order on December 21, 2021.

The jury trial was scheduled to commence on February 23, 2026, more than 50 months after the charge.

The applicant brought a section 11(b) Charter application arguing that the delay violated his right to be tried within a reasonable time under the Jordan framework.

The court found that after deducting defence delay and accounting for discrete events, the remaining delay of 34.14 months exceeded the 30-month ceiling established in Jordan.

The court concluded that the delay was not justified by case complexity and granted a stay of proceedings.

Buyers sought rescission of an agreement of purchase and sale for a residential property and return of their deposit after discovering water in the basement on their third pre-closing visit.

Sellers sought a declaration of breach, damages, and forfeiture of the deposit.

The court found that the detrimental condition warranty clause in the agreement was limited to the sellers' knowledge and belief at the time of execution, not at closing.

Since the sellers had no knowledge of any water problem before signing the agreement, they did not breach the warranty.

The buyers breached by refusing to close.

The court awarded damages to the sellers totaling $206,703.56, representing the difference in sale price, rental costs, and other incidental expenses.

The plaintiff claimed ownership of either 50% or 33.3% of a meat retail business (Robert's Boxed Meats) operated through a numbered company.

The plaintiff alleged an oral agreement in 1997 whereby he and the defendant would be equal 50% owners, or alternatively, that share purchase and escrow agreements from 1996-1997 preserved a 33.3% interest in the company held in escrow.

The court found no credible evidence of the alleged oral agreement and determined that the plaintiff's alternative claim for 33.3% ownership was statute-barred under the applicable limitations legislation.

The court granted the defendant's counterclaim for delivery of the escrowed shares for cancellation.

The plaintiff, Claire Lesley Crampton, contributed two-thirds of the purchase price for a property in Cayuga, Ontario, with the understanding she would have a corresponding ownership interest, though title was taken in the defendant David Lightfoot’s name alone.

When the relationship between the parties broke down, the plaintiff sought the return of her investment or a declaration of her ownership.

The court found that a resulting trust existed in favour of the plaintiff, entitling her to 66.67% of the property and ordered its sale under the Partition Act.

The court considered an application by Donna Mary Whibbs for an order declaring Daniel Lee Dobson a vexatious litigant under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The decision reviews the parties' history of litigation, including proceedings before the Landlord and Tenant Board, restraining order applications, and multiple Small Claims Court actions.

The court found that Dobson had persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted vexatious proceedings and conducted litigation in a vexatious manner, primarily to harass the applicant and her counsel.

The court granted a tailored vexatious litigant order prohibiting Dobson from instituting or continuing proceedings against Whibbs and her counsel without leave of the court.

The plaintiff, Rose Marie Sprowl, slipped and fell on ice in the parking lot of Bridgeport Plaza in Waterloo, Ontario, suffering a hip fracture.

She alleged that the defendants, as occupiers of the plaza, failed in their duty under the Occupiers' Liability Act to keep the premises reasonably safe.

The court found that the winter maintenance contractor, Clintar, failed to adequately monitor, salt, and inspect the parking spaces, and that the owner, First Capital, failed to ensure the work was properly done.

Both were found liable for the plaintiff’s injuries.

The court rejected arguments of contributory negligence and found the defendants 100% responsible for damages.

The applicant, Jose Silva, sought a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) against a house formerly co-owned by his late son and daughter-in-law, now solely owned by the respondent, Filipa Andreia Valadao.

Silva claimed an interest in the property based on funds he contributed, variously described as a loan, trust, or entitlement to sale proceeds.

The court found that while Silva raised a triable issue regarding a possible resulting trust, the claim was weak, inconsistent, and could be satisfied by damages rather than an interest in land.

The court also found the CPL was sought for improper purposes, including malice toward the respondent.

The motion for a CPL was dismissed.

The court sentenced Mouhamad Al Jalmoud for two counts of dangerous operation of a conveyance causing death and one count of dangerous operation causing bodily harm, following a jury trial.

The jury found him not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder for three related counts of failing to stop after an accident.

The court reviewed the facts, aggravating and mitigating factors, and the applicable sentencing principles and case law.

Al Jalmoud was sentenced to 3 years and 3 months in custody (after credit for pre-trial custody and strict bail conditions), with a 15-year driving prohibition to follow, and a DNA order.

The decision discusses the impact of mental illness on moral culpability, the range of sentences for similar offences, and the significance of both aggravating and mitigating factors.

The plaintiff, Gabriela Lucuta, sought to set aside a 2019 consent order dismissing her medical malpractice action against Dr. David Stevens, Dr. Peter Stevenson, and Grand River Hospital, arguing that her agreement to settle was obtained under duress and unconscionability.

The court found no evidence of threats, coercion, or improvident bargain, and held that the settlement was fairly negotiated.

The motion was dismissed.

The court considered motions regarding the production of documents and attendance at discovery in a dispute over unpaid legal fees between a law firm and its former client.

The plaintiff law firm sought to strike the defence or compel the defendant to provide an affidavit of documents and attend discovery.

The defendant cross-moved for a further and better affidavit of documents from the plaintiff, including the law firm's accident benefits file.

The court held that both parties must fulfill their discovery obligations independently, ordered production of the accident benefits file (with privilege claims to be listed in Schedule B), and declined to strike the defence.

No costs were awarded due to divided success.

This costs endorsement followed two applications concerning the interpretation and rectification of a will.

The court had previously dismissed the interpretation application brought by Bishop Moussa and granted the rectification application brought by Sarwat Mansour, supported by Samia Messieh.

The court applied the modern approach to costs in estate litigation, scrutinizing the conduct of the parties.

While acknowledging the initial drafting error in the will necessitated legal advice, the court found Bishop Moussa's continued pursuit of an "absurd" interpretation led to unnecessary litigation.

Consequently, Bishop Moussa was ordered to pay a significant portion of the costs incurred by Ms. Messieh and Mr. Mansour, with some allowances from the estate for initial advice related to the drafting error.

The Crown appealed an absolute discharge granted to the respondent for mischief and breach of undertaking, arguing the sentencing judge erred in applying the "best interests of the accused" and "public interest" tests under s. 730(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal court found the sentencing judge erred by failing to consider the respondent's criminal record and specific deterrence, and by narrowly defining "public interest" to exclude the broader community.

The appeal was allowed, the absolute discharge vacated, a conviction entered, and a suspended sentence with probation was imposed, but its execution was permanently stayed due to the passage of time and the respondent's compliance with conditions.

This case involves competing applications concerning the estate of Ignazia Rizzo, where her three children were named as co-executors and beneficiaries.

The primary dispute arose from the will's provision for Salvatore Rizzo to purchase the family home at fair market value, leading to a deadlock over the sale price and the allocation of estate taxes and expenses.

Angela Farruggia, one of the siblings, insisted on receiving her share net of taxes, contrary to the will and a prior agreement, and linked her renunciation as trustee to this demand.

Angela brought an application seeking the sale of the house and occupation rent from Salvatore, while Salvatore and Eduardo Rizzo applied for Angela's removal as estate trustee.

The court dismissed Angela's application, finding she lacked standing as a beneficiary to compel sale or claim occupation rent, as her interest was in the residue, not a direct property interest.

The court granted Salvatore and Eduardo's application, removing Angela as estate trustee due to her unreasonable conduct, changing positions, and conflict of interest in leveraging her trustee position for a greater share of the estate.

Salvatore and Eduardo were authorized to administer the estate in accordance with the will.

The parties brought competing interim motions concerning child and spousal support.

The applicant sought support based on his CPP disability income, while the respondent sought to impute income to the applicant due to alleged underemployment.

The court declined to impute income to the applicant at the interim stage, citing an incomplete and untested evidentiary record.

Interim child and spousal support were ordered based on the parties' reported incomes, and section 7 expenses were apportioned.

A disclosure order was also granted by consent.

The applicants sought a declaration of a prescriptive easement or an ancillary right to park on a private road (Hunters Road) owned by the respondent, which they used to access their cottages.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicants failed to establish the elements for a prescriptive easement, specifically that their use was "peaceful" and "uninterrupted" for the requisite 20-year period due to the respondent's consistent objections.

Furthermore, the court found that parking on Hunters Road was not "reasonably necessary" for the enjoyment of their properties, as their respective title documents provided for alternative parking solutions.