R. v. Telfer-Freeman, 2026 ONSC 3981

CITATION: R. v. Telfer-Freeman, 2026 ONSC 3981

COURT FILE NO.: SCA-101967

DATE: 2026/06/08

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

SUMMARY CONVICTION APPEAL COURT

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

Respondent

– and –

PERCY TELFER-FREEMAN

Appellant

Isabelle Currie, for the Respondent

Appellant is Self-Represented

HEARD: December 30, 2025

THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE I.R. SMITH

REASONS FOR DECISION

1. Introduction

1Constable Jasmine LeClerc found the appellant asleep in his car with the motor running and an open can of beer close at hand. The car was parked in the parking lot of a restaurant at which the appellant had eaten dinner. It was a cold February evening and, so the appellant later testified, he was at that time experiencing a period of homelessness during which he often slept in his car. Cst. LeClerc formed the suspicion that the appellant had alcohol in his system. She made a demand for an approved screening device (“ASD”) breath sample, which the appellant provided, registering a “fail” result. Later, at the police station, the appellant was found to have 110 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of his blood. After a three-day trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, Katzsch J. found the appellant guilty of the offence commonly known as “over 80.”

2The appellant raises several grounds of appeal in this Court, which grounds I would summarize as follows:

a. That the trial judge erred by admitting evidence of the breath test results despite a breach of the appellant’s right to be free of arbitrary detention pursuant to section 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”).

b. That the trial judge erred by failing to consider a breach of the appellant’s s. 10(b) right to counsel.

c. That the trial judge conducted an unfair trial, failed to assist the appellant (who was unrepresented at trial), and created a reasonable apprehension of bias against the appellant.

3For the following reasons, the appeal is dismissed.

2. Did the trial judge err by admitting the evidence of the breath tests?

2.1 Background

4It is convenient to consider the first two grounds of appeal together as they are inter-related. I start with a short summary of the facts relevant to those grounds.

5All the relevant events relating to the offence in this matter occurred during the evening of February 24, 2022, and the early morning of February 25, 2022.

6After the appellant failed the ASD test at 10:59 p.m., Cst. LeClerc arrested him at 11:01 p.m. for “operation while impaired/over 80” and, at 11:04 p.m., advised him of his right to counsel. The officer asked the appellant whether he understood his rights, which she did more than once. In response, the appellant kept asking to be permitted to call his mother. When the officer asked whether the appellant wanted to call a lawyer, he said “No, I’d like to speak to my mother.” Another officer at the scene, Cst. Heaton, said that the appellant seemed to be confused about the reasons for his arrest, but said that he did not see or hear Cst. LeClerc advising the appellant of his right to counsel because that was done inside Cst. LeClerc’s cruiser.

7At 11:08 p.m., Cst. LeClerc provided the appellant with the primary police caution. When she asked the appellant whether he understood, he said “No, I want to speak to my mom.” At 11:09 p.m., Cst. LeClerc read the caution again and asked the appellant again whether he understood. He said “Yes.”

8The officer left the scene with the appellant in her cruiser at 11:17 p.m. and arrived at the police station at 11:20 p.m. The appellant was lodged in a cell at 11:34 p.m. and it was at that time that the appellant was issued a demand for a sample of his breath pursuant to section 320.28(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (the “Code”). When asked if he understood, the appellant said that he did not and asked for some water. This exchange between the appellant and Cst. LeClerc was captured on video and played in court during the trial.

9At trial, when asked by the trial judge whether the officer had issued the demand for the breath sample for the first time at the station and not at the roadside, the officer said simply, and without elaboration, “Yes. There was a delay.”

10At 12:06 a.m., Cst. LeClerc advised the breath technician, Cst. Jill Clancy, of the grounds for arresting the appellant. When the appellant was taken to the breathalyzer room at 12:16 a.m., Cst. Clancy provided him with the secondary caution which the appellant said that he did not understand. Cst. Clancy provided some explanation and when asked if her explanation “made sense” the appellant said “yeah.” Cst. Clancy then noted that although the breath demand had already been read to the appellant by Cst. LeClerc, she was going to re-read it to him and did so at 12:18 a.m.. When asked if he understood, the appellant said “yeah.” As the officer then prepared to take the first breath sample, the appellant asked if he could speak to counsel, and Cst. Clancy and other officers said that he could and facilitated that request. This exchange between the appellant and the officers was captured on video and played in court during the trial.

11Thereafter, at 1:02 a.m., Cst. Clancy received a first sample of the appellant’s breath, which was analyzed and found to have 116 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of his blood, and at 1:25 a.m. a second sample was found to have 119 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of his blood. These results were both truncated to 110 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

12Prior to trial, the appellant gave no notice of any Charter applications to be brought at trial. Nevertheless, of her own motion, early in the trial the trial judge raised the issue of the failure of the arresting officer to provide the appellant with the breath demand at the roadside, resulting in an apparent breach of the appellant’s Charter rights. She directed Crown counsel to address these issues, and the matter was the subject of closing submissions during which the Crown conceded a violation of s. 9 of the Charter, relying on Regina v. Ferose, 2019 ONSC 1052, at para. 40.

13When the appellant made his closing submissions, he started by arguing that his detention had been arbitrary from the moment Cst. LeClerc blocked his car in the restaurant parking lot. The trial judge said that she would not be entertaining Charter arguments for which no proper application had been made, on which she had not heard evidence, and for which no proper notice had been given to the court and the Crown (other than the one she raised herself – which she distinguished because it arose from the procedure set out in the Code which the arresting officer had apparently failed to follow).

14Nevertheless, during his submissions, the appellant argued that his Charter rights had been violated at the police station because the police had failed to provide him with water. He also argued that the delayed breath demand resulted in breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter, and that the evidence of the breath tests ought to be excluded pursuant to s. 24(2). The appellant made only passing reference to the right to counsel but closed his submissions by saying that although Cst. LeClerc had acted in good faith, her alleged lack of training and experience had resulted in violations of the Charter including “arbitrary detainment, unclear rights to counsel, delay of formal breath demand, and violation of basic human rights.”

2.2 The trial judge’s reasons relating to the Charter breach

15In her oral reasons for judgment at the close of the trial, Katzsch J. accepted the Crown’s concession and turned to the issue of whether the evidence of the breath tests could be admitted pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter notwithstanding the violation of the appellant’s right. The trial judge referred to the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Regina v. Guenter, 2016 ONCA 572, where the arresting officer had forgotten to read the breath demand at the roadside but did so once at the police station. As in the present case, in Guenter the demand was then also read to the accused by the breath technician after having received the grounds for arrest from the arresting officer. Brown J.A. found that the trial judge in that case made no error by concluding that the demand read by the breath technician was provided as soon as practicable and that the breath samples were taken lawfully: Guenter, at paras. 85 – 94.

16Despite the conclusion in Guenter, the trial judge said she remained concerned about the 33-minute delay between the appellant’s arrest (at 11:01 p.m.) and the first reading of the breath demand (at 11:34 p.m.). She observed as follows, however:

It is also relevant in this case that the accused was detained but given his full rights to counsel and caution and transported to the police station so those rights could be exercised. He was properly detained for the purpose of providing samples of his breath although it had not been explained to him for some time after the lawful detention. He was not questioned during this time period and Cst. LeClerc did issue the demand soon after arrival at Central Division.

17The trial judge then addressed the three-part framework for the analysis of the admissibility of evidence pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter set out in Regina v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32. With respect to the first branch, the seriousness of the breach, the trial judge found that “the officer’s conduct falls somewhere in the middle of the spectrum relating to seriousness” given that there was no reason that she could not have made the breath demand at the scene while, on the other hand, there was “no evidence that this was anything other than an inadvertent lapse” given that Cst. LeClerc advised the appellant of his right to counsel and provided the police caution at the scene and read the breath demand very shortly after having arrived at the police detachment. Nor was there evidence of any lack of good faith or of any systemic failure.

18As for the second branch of the Grant analysis, the trial judge found that the impact of the Charter breach on the appellant was also “in the middle of the spectrum.” In this respect the trial judge noted that the accused was confused and intoxicated at the scene of the arrest and the officer “did not explain to him why she was taking him to the police station or read the demand to explain next steps regarding the breath sample.” On the other hand, the appellant was provided with his right to counsel and was given an opportunity to speak to counsel at the station. Moreover, the breath demand was read to him upon arrival at the station and then again by Cst. Clancy. Katzsch J. said as follows: “He was fully informed by this point and had every opportunity to discuss the matter with counsel…”

19Last, the trial judge found that society’s interest in an adjudication of this case on its merits was high given the prevalence of drinking and driving offences and the reliability of the breath samples. Balancing all three factors, the trial judge found that the evidence ought to be admitted.

2.3 Discussion

20In this court, the appellant says that the trial judge’s reliance on Guenter is misplaced and that the delay in providing the breath demand was a serious violation of his s. 9 right which ought to have resulted in the exclusion of the results of the breath tests.

21The appellant says that Guenter is distinguishable because the scene of the arrest was chaotic and provided an explanation for the delay in reading the breath demand. The officers in that case also facilitated the accused’s contact with counsel more promptly than did the officers in the present case. With respect to the exclusion of the evidence, the appellant’s submissions both oral and written focus on the seriousness of the breach in this case, and on its impact on the appellant’s ability to exercise his right to counsel.

22Crown counsel submits that the trial judge made no error and objects to the raising of new issues on appeal, especially as they relate to the appellant’s right to counsel.

23On the issue of whether a late breath demand can result in lawfully taken breath test results, I see no error in the trial judge’s reasoning. She relied on a portion of the reasons of Brown J.A. in Guenter (paras. 87 – 90) which provide the legal justification for the conclusion that a delayed breath demand may be a lawful demand. That analysis was not dependant on the facts in Guenter and its application is therefore not limited to those facts. The trial judge correctly regarded herself bound by and free to follow that analysis.

24In any case, the trial judge’s reliance on Guenter was of limited significance given that she found (as the Crown had conceded) that there was a section 9 breach in this case and that the evidence had been obtained in a manner that infringed the Charter. The real issue on appeal, then, is whether the trial judge made any error in her consideration of each of the three Grant factors or in her weighing of those factors. Absent such an error, or the failure to consider relevant evidence, the trial judge’s conclusion respecting the admissibility of the evidence is entitled to significant deference on appeal: Regina v. Cote, 2011 SCC 46, at para. 44.

25I see no error in the reasons of the trial judge. She was alive to the factors which weigh in favour of the conclusion that the breach in this case was a serious one that had a significant impact on the appellant. Indeed, the trial judge gave voice to the very factors which the appellant relies on in this court and did so in words similar to those used by the appellant before me. In the course of her reasons, she said as follows: “A detainee is entitled to know why he or she is being detained by the police. People in police detention are in a significantly compromised position and must be properly informed.” Despite the trial judge’s recognition of these factors, she was of the view that other factors, including the fact that the appellant was advised of his right to counsel and provided with an opportunity to exercise that right, weighed in favour of the admission of the evidence. This reasoning discloses no error.

26The appellant says, however, that the trial judge failed to consider that his confusion about his right to counsel together with his confusion about the breath demand rendered the breach more serious than as assessed by the trial judge. He submitted that his right to counsel was meaningless if he did not know why he was being detained and that it is apparent that he did not understand the breath demand until it was read to him by Cst. Clancy at 12:18 a.m.. It was at this point that he asked to speak to counsel. The meaningful delay in this case then, so the appellant argued, is not 33 minutes, it is the 1 hour and 17-minute delay between the appellant’s arrest (at 11:01 p.m.) and the second reading of the breath demand (at 12:18 a.m.).

27As Crown counsel submits, these arguments – especially insofar as they invoke the right to counsel – were not made at trial and are raised for the first time on appeal. No notice was given to the Crown that s. 10(b) of the Charter was in issue at trial. At no point at trial did the appellant cross-examine any of the Crown’s witnesses about the right to counsel, nor did he testify about the right to counsel. He did not suggest to witnesses that he was confused about the right nor did he testify to that effect. As the trial judge found, he declined counsel and instead said that he wanted to speak to his mother. Contrary to the submissions of the appellant in this court, there was a basis in the evidence for this conclusion. There is no evidence that the appellant was confused about the right to counsel or advised the officers that he was confused. When asked if he wanted to call a lawyer, he said “no” and that he wished to speak to his mother instead. As the Crown was not alerted to any right to counsel argument, there was no cross-examination of the appellant on the topic. In any case, the appellant knew that he had been arrested for “impaired/over 80” and, as soon as the appellant indicated to Cst. Clancy that he did wish to speak to counsel, that request was honoured and a call to counsel was facilitated. In all these circumstances, there is an unsatisfactory record upon which to conclude either that the appellant’s right to counsel was violated or, if it was, that the violation could have affected the trial judge’s consideration of the Grant factors.

28In addition, I see no error in the trial judge’s decision at the close of the case to refuse to entertain Charter arguments (other than the one she herself identified) in the absence of any notice to the Crown and in the absence of a proper evidentiary record upon which to decide such an issue. In any case, as I have said, the appellant made almost no reference to the right to counsel at trial, including during his closing submissions.

29To the extent that the appellant says that he was confused by the breath demand, neither was this argument pursued at trial. His submissions focussed on the delay in providing the demand, not on any lack of understanding. In any case, it is apparent from the video recording in evidence that the arresting officer, Cst. LeClerc, believed the appellant to be feigning a lack of understanding of the breath demand and, indeed, it does seem that when the demand is read to him the first time, the appellant is alert, lucid and engaging in coherent and polite conversation with the officer. There seems to be little reason why the appellant could not have understood the relatively straightforward breath demand and, indeed, when it was read to him a second time 46 minutes later by Cst. Clancy, the appellant expressed no confusion whatsoever and acknowledged instead that he understood the demand.

30Finally, although I am satisfied that the failure to raise the right to counsel issue at trial was not tactical given that the appellant was acting for himself, that failure has resulted in a record that is not sufficient to allow me to conclude the matter in the appellant’s favour. Indeed, the record suggests either that there was no violation of the appellant’s right to counsel or no violation serious enough to justify the exclusion of the evidence. I am therefore satisfied that there has been no miscarriage of justice in this case: Regina v. Reid, 2017 ONCA 524, at para. 43.

31For all these reasons, I do not give effect to these grounds of appeal.

3. Was the trial unfair or tainted by a reasonable apprehension of bias?

3.1 Introduction

32The appellant alleges that the trial was unfair, that the trial judge failed to assist him, and that these alleged failures along with comments she made during closing submissions betray a reasonable apprehension of bias against him.

33In support of these arguments, the appellant points to the trial judge’s refusal to entertain Charter arguments other than the one she herself had identified, the allegedly improper admission of and reliance on the certificate of the breath technician, and the appellant’s claim that the trial judge referred to him as a “drunk homeless person.”

34Before turning to these issues, I note that a trial judge’s duty to an unrepresented accused person is “to ensure that the defendant has a fair trial and to guide him throughout the trial in such a way that his defence is brought out with its full force and effect: Regina v. Chemana, 2016 ONCA 579, at para. 13. I also note that there is a strong presumption in favour of the trial judge’s impartiality and lack of bias: Regina v. Dowholis, 2016 ONCA 801, at paras. 18 – 20.

3.2 Refusal to entertain Charter arguments

35As I have already noted, it was during the appellant’s closing submissions that the trial judge advised the appellant that she would not entertain Charter arguments other than the one she had raised of her own motion. To that point, the appellant had not conducted cross-examinations that dealt with other Charter arguments and, other than playing some of the video recordings of his time at the police station, he did not lead any evidence that did or could relate to Charter issues. He was therefore not cross-examined on any such issues.

36At one point on the second day of trial, the trial judge noted that no Charter arguments had been raised, and the appellant responded by saying that he needed more time to review disclosure, specifically the video recordings, which he had watched only twice. When asked why he needed more time, the appellant said that the videos would support his claims that the breath tests had not been properly conducted and that the mouthpiece used might have been contaminated. He did not refer to any potential Charter issue and the trial judge did not at that time say that no Charter issue could be raised.

37In any case, the second day of trial (October 11, 2024) ended with the appellant’s evidence in-chief not yet completed. The trial judge advised the appellant to watch the video before the next court date “so you could see if there’s anything relevant to your case.” Before closing court for the day, the trial judge asked the appellant if he had any questions. The appellant said, “No Your Honour, I’m good, thank you.” The trial was then adjourned, and it resumed for its third day on December 16, 2024, two months later. On that day, the appellant continued his evidence in-chief. He gave no evidence that related to potential Charter issues. Instead, he gave brief testimony about having dinner (which included several beers) on the evening in question, his homelessness and that he had been living out of his car, that he had called his mother to come and pick him up, and his lack of intention to drive his car. He was then cross-examined on these issues. Crown counsel – understandably – asked no questions relating to any Charter issue.

38In all these circumstances, the trial judge made no error in foreclosing argument on Charter arguments other than the one she herself had raised. As I have already noted, the appellant gave no notice of any Charter application, engaged in no cross-examinations that might advance a Charter argument, and led no evidence in support of such a position. In these circumstances, the appellant’s argument that the trial judge failed to assist him by failing to raise Charter issues and by failing to allow him to make Charter arguments cannot be sustained.

39The transcript reveals a trial judge extremely well-informed on the law, keenly aware of the potential issues in a case of drinking and driving, raising an argument that might have benefited the appellant, and giving the appellant every opportunity to lead whatever relevant evidence he wanted to lead, all the while giving the appellant patient and polite direction about how to put his best foot forward. Foreclosing Charter arguments during closing submissions for which there was no notice or evidentiary foundation was not unfair, or evidence of bias against the appellant, it was very simply the correct call.

40As I have already said in connection with the first and second grounds of appeal, nothing in the evidence suggested a breach of the right to counsel (or of any other right other than the one conceded by the Crown) and the trial judge’s findings of fact – including that the appellant initially declined counsel and later was afforded an opportunity to speak to counsel and did speak to counsel before providing samples of his breath – were well-founded in the evidence.

41In all these circumstances, the refusal to hear the appellant’s Charter arguments was not a failure to assist him or evidence of bias or other unfairness.

3.3 The admission of the certificate of the breath technician

42The appellant says that the trial judge erred by admitting and relying on the certificate of the breath technician when the circumstances of its admission at trial were confusing. It is true that the marking of the document as an exhibit was a matter of some confusion, but the certificate was tendered by the appellant himself on the first day of trial. Although the transcript of proceedings does not show that the certificate was marked as an exhibit on that day, on the second day of the trial, during the evidence of the breath technician, the trial judge said that she believed that it had already been marked as exhibit 1.

43The appellant agreed with the trial judge but said that he did not think the certificate could be relied upon in the absence of proof of service of the document on him. In this respect, although the certificate is signed by the appellant beside the words “I acknowledge receipt of a copy of this certificate”, the form is left blank at the points where the serving officer would normally sign and date it. The trial judge explained to the appellant that the Crown could prove the results of the breath tests either by certificate or by the viva voce evidence of the breath technician and that in this case, both kinds of evidence had been led.

44The trial judge did not fail to assist the appellant by marking as an exhibit a document which he himself had tendered. Moreover, she was correct when she said that the Crown could prove the breath results in either of two ways, including the viva voce evidence of the breath technician, which evidence Cst. Clancy provided in this case. Therefore, even if there were some issue with the service or admissibility of the certificate – which is not conceded by the Crown – the Crown was not solely relying on the certificate in this case and was able to prove – and did prove – the results of the breath tests otherwise.

45In these circumstances, there was no unfairness to the appellant, no failure to assist him, and no evidence of bias.

3.4 The trial judge’s comments during closing submissions

46One of the appellant’s primary defenses at trial was that he was not operating the motor vehicle when he was found by Cst. LeClerc sitting in the driver’s seat of his car with the motor running. Instead, he was an otherwise homeless person who had no intention of driving and who had a right to use his car for shelter on a cold evening in February. In this respect, he was arguing that he had rebutted the presumption of operation found in section 320.35 of the Code.

47The appellant says that during the presentation of this argument to the court, the trial judge was rude, insensitive, and dismissive of his position. He says that she referred to him as a “drunk homeless person” and that in doing so she revealed a reasonable apprehension of bias against him. This was especially so given that it was difficult for the appellant to reveal his homeless status in open court.

48The appellant’s position on this point cannot be sustained. The trial judge did not call him a drunk homeless person. Instead, she posed a hypothetical during a long colloquy with the appellant about the defense which he was advancing in argument.

49I reproduce some of that exchange, including the impugned comments, here (emphasis added):

The appellant: But see, your honour, if I may please, …

The Court: Yes.

The appellant: … it’s a double standard because although I may, in the court’s eyes, permitted myself to care and control, equally and opposingly I was allowing myself the basic human right to stay warm and survive.

The Court: Well, you do but the problem is once you put alcohol in your system then the law changes a bit. Like could you, as a sober person without alcohol or under 80 milligrams in your system, could you be in your car? Absolutely. But being homeless isn’t a defence to impaired driving or over 80. Do you see what I mean by that?

The appellant: What do we do for people in this country when, when …

The Court: Well, we ask them not to consume alcohol and get behind the wheel of a car.

The appellant: That’s it?

The Court: Not to consume more that the allowable lawful amount of alcohol. So that was a decision that you made, right? You chose how many beers to have. You chose then to get into your vehicle and then you put yourself at risk potentially, for an offence of this nature.

Now again, you can, the court could find the presumption is successfully rebutted if I find that you were there out of, you know, necessity, you were choosing to sit in the car because it was February 24^th, you had nowhere else to go, you had no intention to drive and you had an alternate plan. If I accept that evidence, you could successfully rebut the presumption. So, I am just trying to understand if that is your argument.

You don’t have to agree with the law, but a drunk homeless person doesn’t escape legal liability when they have also made a decision to consume alcohol and then put themselves in care and control of a vehicle. Do you see how that logic might work? Like we wouldn’t want drunk homeless people just driving all over the city and basically getting a free pass because they don’t have a stationary place to go and drink.

The appellant: Well, I don’t, I try not to think of myself as that and the thing is, is …

The Court: And I don’t mean to call you that. I’m just, I’m just using that as a hypothetical you know. The fact is that choosing to consume alcohol is a choice. It’s a voluntary choice that a person makes. You might be forced to be homeless in a situation. No one is generally forced to consume alcohol in the normal course. So that’s, so that’s the issue. So yes, should you have the right to seek refuge in a car on a cold night? Absolutely. Is that a human right? It absolutely is. The problem in your case is the amount of alcohol in the system and whether the evidence I have heard rebuts the presumption, something I will have to give careful consideration to.

50Read in context, it clear that the trial judge was not referring to the appellant personally as a drunk homeless person, she was describing for the appellant the state of the law as she understood it, and the policy reasons that weighed against the argument the appellant was making. When the appellant resisted the idea that he himself was a drunk homeless person, the trial judge made it plane that she was not calling him that and was instead setting up a hypothetical – comparing a sober homeless person to one who was not sober – for argument’s sake. Far from being unsympathetic to the appellant’s lack of housing, the exchange quoted above and other exchanges during argument show exactly the opposite. The trial judge was sensitive to the appellant’s circumstances and received his arguments respectfully, giving him every opportunity to convince her of the correctness of his submissions.

51In her oral reasons for judgment, the trial judge accepted that the evidence of the appellant that he was going through a difficult time and had been living in his car. She found the appellant guilty, however, because she was satisfied that he had intentionally occupied the driver’s seat of his car and started the engine before falling asleep – all while “over 80” – and (for well-explained reasons) because she rejected his evidence that he had not intended to drive. In all these circumstances, there was a real risk that the appellant might have set the car in motion. All these conclusions were open to the trial judge on the evidence and none of them reveals any bias, either real or reasonably apprehended.

52Moreover, a review of the entirety of the proceedings shows that the trial judge was repeatedly helpful and courteous when dealing with the appellant, whom she guided through the process politely and with patience, all the while, as I have already observed, demonstrating a detailed knowledge of the law relating to drinking and driving offences. Of her own motion, she raised on an issue of importance for the appellant and directed Crown counsel to address it. She alerted the appellant to issues he should consider and told him which sections of the Code he should read. She allowed his mother to assist him at counsel table during the trial. She offered assistance during the appellant’s cross-examinations of the three police officers. She asked questions of both the appellant and Crown counsel in an effort to understand the issues and to allow the appellant to make his case effectively. She engaged the appellant in a meaningful give and take during his final submissions. At every turn the trial judge gave detailed explanations to the appellant about the law and the court’s processes – including about how to appeal her decision. As I read the record, it is difficult to imagine how the trial judge could have been any more helpful to the appellant than she was during this trial.

53For all these reasons, this ground of appeal fails.

4. Conclusion

54The appeal is dismissed.

I.R. Smith, J.

Released: July 8, 2026

CITATION: R. v. Telfer-Freeman, 2026 ONSC 3981