Eric Uhlmann

The appellant, M.J., appealed his conviction on one count of sexual assault and one count of sexual interference, as well as a 15-month custodial sentence.

The appeal grounds included allegations of uneven scrutiny of evidence, material misapprehension of evidence, failure to instruct on the meaning of beyond a reasonable doubt, and an unreasonable verdict.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility findings were owed deference, there was no material misapprehension of evidence, the standard of proof was properly applied, and the verdict was reasonable.

The court also found the imposed sentence was not demonstrably unfit, considering the aggravating factors and the need for denunciation and deterrence in sexual offense cases involving a position of trust.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on an "over 80" charge, while the respondent had been convicted of failing to stop after an accident.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's interpretation of the statutory defence under s. 320.14(5) of the Criminal Code (post-driving alcohol consumption) and the exclusion of Intoxilyzer evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found the trial judge erred in concluding there was an "air of reality" to the s. 320.14(5) defence without expert evidence and in characterizing the Charter breach as "egregious" for evidence exclusion.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered for the "over 80" charge.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault, assault with a weapon, unlawful confinement, uttering threats, and two counts of breach of recognizance.

The appeal argued that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient, specifically regarding "gaps" in the complainant's testimony, the absence of a key witness, and the failure to explicitly instruct on legal principles like *W.(D.)*.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient and that no cumulative errors warranted a new trial.

Leave to appeal sentence was also denied as no grounds were advanced.

Julio Maldonado Vallejos, charged with human trafficking and related offences, sought directions from the court regarding the applicability of s. 276 of the Criminal Code to evidence of the complainant's sexual history.

The court addressed two issues: whether s. 276 applies when the accused is providing his response to allegations, and whether it applies when the charges are not enumerated offences under s. 276.

The court ruled that a s. 276 application is required in both scenarios, emphasizing a broad interpretation of the provision to protect complainants and trial integrity, particularly in cases connected to sexual exploitation like human trafficking.

This ruling addresses a motion brought by the accused, Julio Maldonado Vallejos, during his judge-alone trial for human trafficking and related offences.

The motion sought directions on whether certain "impugned evidence" – text messages and discussions where the accused spoke about procuring other women for sex work as part of a "team" – required a discreditable conduct application for admissibility.

The court ruled that the impugned evidence directly relates to the actus reus and mens rea of the human trafficking and procuring charges, as it demonstrates the accused's control, direction, or influence over the complainant and his purpose of exploitation.

Therefore, a discreditable conduct application was not required for its admission regarding these specific charges.

The court found the evidence did not support the advertising or material benefit counts.

The applicant, charged with human trafficking and prostitution-related offences, brought a pre-trial application challenging the constitutionality of sections 286.3 and 286.4 of the Criminal Code.

The applicant relied on a recent Superior Court decision that declared the provisions unconstitutional.

The court declined to follow the prior decision, finding it plainly wrong in its conclusion that Parliament allowed the sale of sexual services.

Instead, the court followed other concurrent decisions upholding the provisions, ruling that the trial would proceed and the constitutional challenge would be fully litigated after the evidence is called.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

The accused raised four issues: three Charter violations by the arresting officer (failure to form requisite suspicion, failure to make ASD demand forthwith, and failure to inform of right to counsel immediately upon arrest) and one issue regarding identity (whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the driver).

The court rejected all Charter challenges and found the accused was the driver based on compelling eyewitness identification evidence.

The court convicted the accused.

The defendants brought pretrial applications alleging breaches of their rights under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter, seeking the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2).

The charges of possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking arose after police stopped the defendants' vehicle based on confidential informant tips, surveillance, and tracking device data.

The court found the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest all three defendants, making the arrests lawful and not arbitrary.

Consequently, the searches incident to arrest were also lawful.

Furthermore, the court upheld the validity of the search warrants issued for the cellular phones found in the vehicle, concluding the Information to Obtain (ITO) affidavits contained sufficient credible evidence.

The applications were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with excessive blood alcohol, arguing that his Charter rights under sections 9 and 10(b) were infringed due to a delay in being informed of his right to counsel in French.

The trial judge admitted the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the police acted in good faith and the breach had minimal impact on the appellant's rights.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's decision, deferring to the trial judge's application of the R. v. Grant analysis.

The court found no error in the trial judge's assessment of police conduct or the impact of the delay on the appellant's ability to exercise his rights, noting that breath samples are considered non-intrusive.

The offender was convicted following a focused Charter voir dire of possession of 75 grams of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The offender admitted possession and that the methamphetamine was for trafficking purposes.

The offender had a prior record including a 2016 conviction for possession of methamphetamine.

The sentencing court imposed a 30-month custodial sentence, considering the significant quantity of the dangerous Schedule 1 substance, the offender's motivation for financial gain, prior related convictions, and mitigating factors including child care responsibilities and prospects for rehabilitation.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug.

The trial involved a Charter application regarding the legality of the detention and the failure to provide rights to counsel without delay upon arrest.

The court found a violation of section 10(b) of the Charter due to an eight-minute delay in providing rights to counsel.

Certain evidence was excluded as a result.

On the merits, despite evidence of drug use and observations consistent with impairment, the court found that the Crown had not proven impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly given the exclusion of certain roadside observations obtained through conscriptive means and the ambiguity of the remaining evidence.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) and section 255(1) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a motion alleging violations of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that while there was no violation of section 8 rights regarding the breath samples, there was a serious violation of section 10(b) rights regarding access to counsel.

The officer failed to facilitate access to counsel for over one hour and forty-three minutes following detention.

Despite the Charter violation, the court admitted the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that exclusion would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was convicted.

The offender was convicted by a jury of theft over $5,000 for stealing approximately $21,600 from his employer while working as a vending machine route driver.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for employee breach of trust cases, rejecting the defence's request for an intermittent sentence.

The offender was sentenced to four months' incarceration, one year of probation, 50 hours of community service, and ordered to pay full restitution.

The applicant, found guilty of theft over $5,000, brought a constitutional challenge under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, seeking a declaration of invalidity for s. 742.1(f)(viii) of the Criminal Code.

This provision prohibits conditional sentences for theft over $5,000.

The applicant argued the provision was arbitrary and overbroad, contrary to s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the provision engaged liberty rights under s. 7, it did not offend the principles of fundamental justice as it was neither overbroad nor arbitrary, serving Parliament's objective to emphasize denunciation and deterrence for serious property offences.