Tricia Ann Holmes

Julio Maldonado Vallejos, charged with human trafficking and related offences, sought directions from the court regarding the applicability of s. 276 of the Criminal Code to evidence of the complainant's sexual history.

The court addressed two issues: whether s. 276 applies when the accused is providing his response to allegations, and whether it applies when the charges are not enumerated offences under s. 276.

The court ruled that a s. 276 application is required in both scenarios, emphasizing a broad interpretation of the provision to protect complainants and trial integrity, particularly in cases connected to sexual exploitation like human trafficking.

This ruling addresses a motion brought by the accused, Julio Maldonado Vallejos, during his judge-alone trial for human trafficking and related offences.

The motion sought directions on whether certain "impugned evidence" – text messages and discussions where the accused spoke about procuring other women for sex work as part of a "team" – required a discreditable conduct application for admissibility.

The court ruled that the impugned evidence directly relates to the actus reus and mens rea of the human trafficking and procuring charges, as it demonstrates the accused's control, direction, or influence over the complainant and his purpose of exploitation.

Therefore, a discreditable conduct application was not required for its admission regarding these specific charges.

The court found the evidence did not support the advertising or material benefit counts.

The accused pleaded guilty to one count of sexual interference with a 14-year-old victim.

The offence occurred between September 2015 and June 2016 while the accused was living with her father and stepmother.

The sexual activity included intercourse, oral sex, and masturbation occurring between three and six times.

The accused admitted to the conduct and provided an inculpatory statement to police.

The court imposed a sentence of 18 months' imprisonment followed by 18 months' probation, along with ancillary orders including DNA sampling, SOIRA registration for 20 years, and a section 161 prohibition order for five years.

The accused brought an application under s. 276(2) of the Criminal Code seeking leave to adduce evidence of the complainant’s sexual activity with a third party.

The defence argued that the evidence was relevant to explain bruising alleged to have resulted from the charged sexual assault and to support a theory that the complainant had a motive to fabricate allegations in order to remove the accused from the matrimonial home and pursue a relationship with the third party.

The Crown opposed the application and raised a preliminary objection to the use of the complainant’s preliminary inquiry testimony.

The court held that such prior testimony could be relied upon and that the proposed evidence constituted specific instances of sexual activity with significant probative value.

Balancing the accused’s right to make full answer and defence against the complainant’s privacy interests, the court concluded the evidence met the requirements of s. 276(2) and granted the application.

The Crown brought a motion to admit other discreditable conduct evidence in a prosecution for first degree murder after the defence indicated it may raise not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder.

The proposed evidence included prior incidents of violence and jealousy within the accused’s relationship with the deceased, as well as unrelated statements reflecting violent and sexual attitudes.

Applying the balancing test from R. v. Handy, the court assessed whether the probative value of the evidence outweighed its potential moral and reasoning prejudice.

Evidence from several witnesses describing prior violent conduct toward the deceased and a jealous reaction toward a third party was admitted as contextual evidence relevant to motive and intent.

Evidence concerning unrelated sexually violent remarks was excluded as insufficiently connected to the alleged offence and highly prejudicial.