Douglas Forsyth Harrison

The appellants appealed a preventative measures order issued by the Director under s. 18 of the Environmental Protection Act regarding a steel mill and mining operations.

The order was issued in response to risks related to the insolvency of Essar Steel Algoma Inc. The parties requested a further adjournment of the appeal proceedings to finalize a settlement agreement in the context of ongoing CCAA proceedings.

The Tribunal granted the adjournment and scheduled a status update telephone conference call.

The offender was convicted following a focused Charter voir dire of possession of 75 grams of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The offender admitted possession and that the methamphetamine was for trafficking purposes.

The offender had a prior record including a 2016 conviction for possession of methamphetamine.

The sentencing court imposed a 30-month custodial sentence, considering the significant quantity of the dangerous Schedule 1 substance, the offender's motivation for financial gain, prior related convictions, and mitigating factors including child care responsibilities and prospects for rehabilitation.

Crystallex International Corporation applied for the recognition and enforcement of a US $1.202 billion international arbitration award against the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

The award stemmed from Venezuela's expropriation of Crystallex's investment in a gold mining project, in breach of a bilateral investment treaty.

The court found that service on Venezuela was properly effected under the State Immunity Act and that Crystallex satisfied the requirements of Article 35 of the UNCITRAL Model Law for recognition and enforcement.

No grounds for refusal under Article 36 were raised or found, as the dispute was arbitrable and enforcement consistent with Ontario public policy.

The court granted the order for recognition and enforcement, including pre and post-award interest, and awarded costs to Crystallex.

The appellants, directors of Essar Steel Algoma Inc., brought a consent motion for a stay of section 2.11 of a Director's order requiring them to undertake work and submit a final report regarding environmental conditions.

The Tribunal found that the section was not an order to monitor, record and report, and that granting the stay would not result in danger to health, safety, or the environment.

The Tribunal granted the stay until the appeals are finally disposed of.

The appellants brought motions to stay various sections of a Director's Order requiring them to maintain environmental protection measures and assess environmental conditions at steel mill and mining operations.

The Tribunal granted the Company Directors' motion to stay section 2.9 on consent.

The Tribunal also granted the Company and Company Officers' motion to stay section 2.11, but dismissed the request to stay the remaining sections.

The third party moved to stay a third party claim for lack of jurisdiction or, alternatively, on forum non conveniens grounds in litigation arising from leaks in an Alberta pipeline project.

Applying the real and substantial connection framework, the court held that Ontario had jurisdiction because the alleged tort had a pleaded situs in Ontario, the litigation involved an Ontario contract pleaded to be governed by the Sale of Goods Act, and the engineering design work lay at the core of the dispute among all parties.

The court emphasized that the jurisdiction inquiry must consider the overall subject-matter of the litigation rather than the third party's characteristics in isolation.

The motion was dismissed, and the court declined to stay the proceeding in favour of Alberta because separate proceedings would risk inconsistent judgments and procedural inefficiency.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing its action against a foreign state on sovereign immunity grounds.

The court held that the appellant failed to meet its burden under the State Immunity Act to show that the foreign state's alleged involvement in a state-owned airline's decision-making constituted commercial activity rather than sovereign oversight as shareholder and pursuit of governmental objectives.

The court rejected the submission that the motion should await discoveries, holding that sovereign immunity must be determined before the action proceeds.

The appeal was dismissed with agreed costs.

Following a successful motion, the defendants sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff objected to several items in the defendants’ costs outline, including recovery of costs for cross-examining the plaintiff’s affiant, the attendance of two defence lawyers at a cross-examination in London, and recovery of business class airfare.

The court held that the cross-examination was reasonable and materially relied upon in the reasons for judgment, and that it was reasonable for two lawyers to attend given the complexity and stakes of the litigation involving a foreign government.

However, applying principles of proportionality and fairness in costs awards, the court found that business class airfare should not be imposed on the opposing party and reduced the disbursement to the equivalent of economy travel.

Costs were awarded accordingly.

The plaintiff, Bombardier Inc., sued the Republic of Estonia and its state-owned airline, Estonian Air, alleging tortious interference in an aircraft purchase agreement.

The Republic brought a motion to stay the action against it, claiming state immunity under the State Immunity Act.

The court found that the Republic's waiver of immunity in a shareholders' agreement did not extend to the plaintiff, a non-party.

Furthermore, the commercial activity exception did not apply, as the Republic's role as a shareholder was not inherently commercial in the context of the transaction, and there was no evidence of the state unlawfully interfering with the purchase.

The motion was granted and the action against the Republic was permanently stayed.

The applicants, companies engaged in leasing motor vehicles and equipment, sought a declaration that the Bulk Sales Act did not apply to a proposed asset securitization financing transaction involving the periodic sale of leases and related equipment to a special purpose vehicle.

The transaction was designed to raise operational financing while the applicants continued operating their businesses.

The court examined the purpose and scope of the Bulk Sales Act and the definition of a "sale in bulk".

It held that the proposed transaction constituted an ordinary-course financing technique and did not amount to a sale of assets out of the usual course of business.

Accordingly, the Act did not apply to the transaction.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner order requiring the disclosure of records containing homeowners' addresses and environmental test results.

The Divisional Court set aside the order and remitted the matter for a new hearing.

The court found that the information arguably constituted 'personal information' and that procedural fairness, as well as potentially section 28 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, required that the affected homeowners be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before their information could be disclosed.

The appellant, manager of an income trust, appealed a decision regarding the interpretation of the trust's declaration of trust.

The dispute centered on the method and date for calculating the 'Net Realized Proceeds per Unit' for units redeemed by the respondents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the valuation date was the correct date for determining the redemption price under both calculation methods provided in the declaration of trust.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed the special education placement of her child, who was identified with autism.

The appellant brought several preliminary motions regarding procedural fairness, including requests for the Tribunal to order the school board or the Tribunal itself to provide legal counsel for the child, and to require the use of collaborative lawyers.

The school board brought a motion arguing the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the appellant had agreed with the Special Education Appeal Board's placement decision.

The Tribunal dismissed all of the appellant's motions, finding it lacked jurisdiction to order legal representation or dictate the choice of counsel.

The Tribunal upheld the school board's motion, concluding it had no jurisdiction to hear the merits of the appeal because the appellant had not demonstrated dissatisfaction with the placement decision as required by section 57(3) of the Education Act.

The appellant brought a series of preliminary motions at the outset of an appeal regarding her child's special education placement.

In one motion, she requested that the Tribunal order the respondent school board to provide legal counsel for her child.

The Tribunal dismissed the motion, finding that it lacked the jurisdiction to order the school board to provide legal representation for the child.

Reasons for the decision were to be released at a later date.

The appellant brought an action in Ontario for injuries sustained in a slip and fall on a cruise ship owned by the respondent.

The respondent successfully moved to stay the action based on a forum selection clause in the cruise contract.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the appellant was bound by the contract and failed to show strong cause why the forum selection clause should not be enforced.

The appellant appealed a judgment regarding the respondent's compliance with a due diligence undertaking.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the motion judge erred by failing to apply an objective test, applying an objective standard would lead to the same conclusion: the respondent took sufficient steps to comply with its contractual obligation and exercise its discretion reasonably.