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The court granted an application to recognize and enforce a US $1.202 billion international arbitration award against Venezuela.
Crystallex International Corporation applied for the recognition and enforcement of a US $1.202 billion international arbitration award against the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.
The award stemmed from Venezuela's expropriation of Crystallex's investment in a gold mining project, in breach of a bilateral investment treaty.
The court found that service on Venezuela was properly effected under the State Immunity Act and that Crystallex satisfied the requirements of Article 35 of the UNCITRAL Model Law for recognition and enforcement.
No grounds for refusal under Article 36 were raised or found, as the dispute was arbitrable and enforcement consistent with Ontario public policy.
The court granted the order for recognition and enforcement, including pre and post-award interest, and awarded costs to Crystallex.
Prepayment option unavailable where mortgage had already matured and become due and payable.
The appellant purchased commercial land from the respondent and granted a Vendor Take Back Mortgage.
The mortgage contained a provision making it due and payable five days after the appellant obtained a shoring and excavation permit, and another provision allowing for prepayment on specific dates.
The permit was issued on January 10, making the mortgage due on January 15.
The appellant attempted to exercise the prepayment option on January 15.
The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that because the mortgage had matured and become due and payable on January 15, it could not be prepaid on that date.
Appeal of stay based on forum non conveniens dismissed; costs award significantly reduced on appeal.
The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision staying its action for breach of contract and negligence on the basis of forum non conveniens.
The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that West Virginia, where the respondent processed the steel coils, was the more convenient forum.
However, the Court granted leave to appeal the costs order and reduced the motion judge's costs award from $36,000 to $15,000, finding the original amount unreasonable for a two-hour motion.
Statutory condominium voting rights cannot be cut down by private agreement or estoppel.
Appeal from an application judgment reducing the voting rights attached to 18 commercial condominium basement units from 18 votes to three.
The court held that condominiums are creatures of statute and that the voting scheme mandated by the Condominium Act could not be altered by unilateral undertakings, by-laws inconsistent with the declaration, settlement arrangements, or equitable doctrines absent compliance with the statutory amendment process.
The court further held that proprietary estoppel was unavailable because there was no inducement, reliance, or detriment as between the relevant parties, and any prior representation was not made to the respondent owner nor binding on successors in title.
The appeal was allowed, the judgment below was set aside, and the application was dismissed with costs to the appellant here and below.
Human rights complaints dismissed for abuse of process due to extreme delay and irremediable prejudice.
The respondents brought preliminary motions to stay or dismiss the 1994 human rights complaints against them on the grounds of abuse of process.
The complaints alleged discrimination on the basis of handicap regarding the placement of the complainant following a workplace injury.
The Board of Inquiry found that the Ontario Human Rights Commission's handling of the complaints involved significant delay, failure to provide timely notice, and inadequate disclosure.
Combined with the closure of the workplace, the destruction of relevant documents, and the deaths of key witnesses including the complainant, the respondents suffered irremediable prejudice.
The Board concluded that continuing the hearing would constitute an abuse of process and dismissed the complaints against all respondents.
Human rights complaint dismissed; hospital's termination of nurse was based on insubordination, not racial discrimination.
The complainant, a psychiatric nurse of Burmese descent, alleged that her employer, North York General Hospital, and her unit administrator discriminated against her on the basis of race and colour.
She claimed that constructive criticisms of her nursing care and subsequent disciplinary actions, including suspensions and termination, constituted racial harassment and reprisals for filing a human rights complaint.
The Board of Inquiry dismissed the complaints, finding that the unit administrator's actions were motivated by genuine concerns for patient care and the complainant's insubordination, not racial prejudice.
The evidence demonstrated that the complainant refused to accept constructive criticism and exhibited a distorted perception of reality, leading to the deterioration of her employment relationship.
Age discrimination complaint dismissed; employment denial based on oral communication skills, not age.
The complainant, a 40-year-old immigrant from India, alleged discrimination on the basis of race and age after being denied a welding technician position with Ontario Hydro.
The Board of Inquiry dismissed the race-based allegations due to a lack of evidence.
Regarding age discrimination, the Board found that while the complainant was equally qualified technically as the successful candidate, the respondent's decision was based on the complainant's oral communication difficulties, specifically a tendency to mumble, rather than his age.
The complaint was dismissed.
Subpoenas duces tecum set aside as human rights legislation does not authorize pre-hearing discovery.
The respondent hospital raised two preliminary objections in a human rights complaint alleging employment discrimination.
First, the hospital argued that the particulars provided by the Commission were inadequate.
The Board dismissed this objection, finding the particulars sufficient to define the issues and allow preparation for the hearing.
Second, the hospital moved to set aside two subpoenas duces tecum requiring staff to produce documents.
The Board granted the motion and set aside the subpoenas, holding that while the Code allows for document production during the investigation stage, it does not authorize a right to discovery prior to a hearing.
Employer liable for failing to intervene when employee was ostracized for assisting with human rights complaint.
The complainant alleged that he was discriminated against and ultimately discharged by his employer in retaliation for assisting a co-worker with a human rights complaint, and because he was perceived to be a communist.
The Board of Inquiry found that while the complainant was discharged for just cause due to his poor attendance and work record, a management representative violated the Ontario Human Rights Code by failing to intervene when the complainant was socially ostracized by fellow employees for his involvement in the co-worker's complaint.
The allegations of discrimination based on creed and monetary discrimination were dismissed.
The employer was ordered to pay $200 in damages for emotional suffering and to post Human Rights Codes in the workplace.
Subpoenas duces tecum set aside as they were improperly used for discovery of documents.
The complainant alleged refusal to employ and promote because of nationality.
In this interim decision, the Board of Inquiry considered motions to set aside subpoenas duces tecum served on behalf of the Commission and the respondent.
The Board found that the subpoenas were issued for the purpose of obtaining discovery of documents rather than producing them in evidence at the hearing.
As there is no common-law right to discovery and the Statutory Powers Procedure Act only authorizes subpoenas for producing documents in evidence, the Board ordered the subpoenas set aside.
Tribunal holds SPPA s. 8 requires disclosure of material facts but not evidence or document discovery.
The respondent company in a human rights complaint brought a motion to adjourn the hearing, arguing the Commission failed to provide reasonable information of the allegations as required by s. 8 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.
The company sought discovery of documents and the evidence the Commission intended to rely upon.
The Board of Inquiry held it had jurisdiction to order compliance with s. 8.
However, it ruled that s. 8 only requires the disclosure of material facts, including times, places, and names of individuals involved in the allegations, but does not grant a right to discovery of documents or the evidence by which the case will be proved.