James Kendik

The applicants sought leave to appeal the Director's decision to issue an Amended Environmental Compliance Approval (ECA) to an adjacent industrial facility, arguing the approval failed to consider noise and vibration impacts on their proposed residential development.

The Ontario Land Tribunal dismissed the application for leave to appeal.

The Tribunal found that the Director's decision was reasonable, as it followed Ministry guidelines and the proposed residential development was a hypothetical scenario pending zoning approval.

Furthermore, the applicants failed to establish that the Amended ECA could result in significant environmental harm, as the facility's emissions met established standards and the ECA included conditions for future reassessment if zoning changes occurred.

The appellant, Wessuc Inc., appealed a Provincial Officer's Order requiring it to cease operation of a vehicle and retain a Qualified Person to inspect and repair it for emissions tampering.

Following several prehearing conference calls, the appellant complied with the Order and withdrew its appeal.

The Environmental Review Tribunal dismissed the appeal in accordance with its Rules of Practice.

The plaintiffs sued various provincial and municipal officials for negligent investigation, malfeasance in public office, and Charter breaches after the plaintiff Hilary Payne was charged with arson by negligence following a fire at a student rental property.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the claims.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the claims against one defendant (an engineer-in-training) and the Charter claims under ss. 8, 11(d), and 11(g).

However, the court dismissed the balance of the summary judgment motions, finding that the novel issues of duty of care, standard of care, causation, and statutory immunity required a full trial to resolve conflicting evidence and assess credibility.

The applicants, companies engaged in leasing motor vehicles and equipment, sought a declaration that the Bulk Sales Act did not apply to a proposed asset securitization financing transaction involving the periodic sale of leases and related equipment to a special purpose vehicle.

The transaction was designed to raise operational financing while the applicants continued operating their businesses.

The court examined the purpose and scope of the Bulk Sales Act and the definition of a "sale in bulk".

It held that the proposed transaction constituted an ordinary-course financing technique and did not amount to a sale of assets out of the usual course of business.

Accordingly, the Act did not apply to the transaction.

The plaintiffs, family members of a young man fatally shot by police, sued the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) for negligent investigation.

The defendants moved to strike the claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The motion judge and Divisional Court allowed the claim to proceed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and struck the claim, holding that it was plain and obvious that the SIU does not owe a private law duty of care to victims of crime or their families.

The SIU's statutory duty is owed to the public at large, and recognizing a private duty would conflict with its overarching public mandate.

The plaintiffs, family members of a young man shot and killed by police, brought an action against the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) alleging negligent investigation.

The defendants moved to strike the claim under Rule 21, arguing the SIU owed no private law duty of care to the family.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding it was not plain and obvious the claim would fail.

The Divisional Court dismissed the defendants' appeal, holding that the existence of a duty of care in these circumstances is a novel question of law that should be determined on a full evidentiary record at trial, applying the Anns/Cooper test.

The Toronto Police Association (TPA) brought an application for judicial review seeking an order of mandamus to compel the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services to conduct a public inquiry under s. 25 of the Police Services Act into various matters, including a dispute between officers at a gas pump.

The Commission had previously conducted a screening review and declined to hold a formal inquiry, but made several recommendations under s. 22(1)(e.2) of the Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commission's decision not to investigate the TPA's complaints while recommending an investigation into a related human rights complaint was entirely reasonable and within its broad statutory discretion.

The Court also noted that mandamus was not available as a remedy on the facts of the case.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing their Rule 21 motion to strike the plaintiffs' claim for negligent investigation against the Special Investigations Unit (SIU).

The plaintiffs, family members of a youth killed in a police shooting, alleged the SIU's inadequate investigation compromised their participation in an inquest and civil action.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding conflicting jurisprudence on whether police or the SIU owe a private law duty of care to victims' families, and noting the issue is of general importance to the development of the law.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their claim for delay.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision, noting that the appellant did nothing to pursue his claim for 10 years and offered no explanation or excuse.

The court also noted there was no evidence of steps taken to gain entry into Canada to comply with a previous order, and the appellant did not have a strong prima facie case.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant, a lawyer, sued the police and Crown attorneys for malicious prosecution, Charter breaches, and other torts following his acquittal on sexual assault charges.

The motion judge struck most of his fresh amended statement of claim under Rules 21 and 25.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by effectively conducting a summary judgment motion rather than accepting the pleaded facts as true, and by applying too narrow a test for malice at the pleadings stage.

The action was permitted to proceed against all defendants except the Police Services Board (save for vicarious liability).

Seven generic drug manufacturers sought judicial review of a decision by the Executive Officer of the Ontario Public Drug Programs to designate Apotex's product, Apo-Lisinopril, as a benefit under the Ontario Drug Benefit Formulary.

The applicants argued that Apotex could not meet the supply pre-condition at the time of its application due to a patent injunction.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Executive Officer correctly interpreted the regulations to require a prospective assessment of the manufacturer's capability to supply the product to meet anticipated demand, rather than requiring sufficient inventory on hand at the moment of application.

The applicants sought leave to bring an application for judicial review before a single judge of the Superior Court pursuant to s. 6(2) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, arguing urgency.

The matter concerned the proposed designation of Apotex Inc.'s version of Lisinopril as a benefit under the Ontario Drug Benefit Act.

The respondent Minister opposed the application, arguing the urgency was self-created and economic loss was insufficient.

The court granted leave, finding the potential economic loss significant and the applicants' prior inaction not fatal.

The Lieutenant Governor in Council, Minister of Health, and Attorney General of Ontario appealed a Divisional Court order quashing a regulation that removed Apo-Flavoxate as an interchangeable drug product under the Drug Interchangeability and Dispensing Fee Act (DIDFA).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the de-listing was accomplished by a regulation enacted by the LGIC pursuant to s. 14(1.1) of the DIDFA, which grants broad power to remove designations in the public interest.

The Court held that the rules of procedural fairness do not apply to public bodies exercising legislative functions, and the regulation was not outside the statutory purpose.

Apotex Inc. sought judicial review of regulations enacted by the Ontario government that reduced the reimbursement price of generic prescription drugs to 50% of brand-name drugs.

Apotex argued the government failed to meet its statutory obligations for public consultation and consideration under Bill 102, and breached procedural fairness based on legitimate expectations.

The Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association intervened.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the government met the notice and consultation requirements, the Lieutenant Governor in Council did not exceed its jurisdiction in altering the proposed regulations, and the doctrine of legitimate expectations does not apply to purely legislative functions.

Apotex Inc. sought judicial review of the Respondents' decision to remove the designation of its generic drug, Apo-Flavoxate, as an interchangeable drug product under the Drug Interchangeability and Dispensing Fee Act (DIDFA) and to delist it from the Comparative Drug Index.

The Divisional Court found that the decision to delist the drug under DIDFA was not rationally connected to the decision to delist it as an eligible benefit under the Ontario Drug Benefit Act.

The majority held that the circumstances surrounding the decision constituted a denial of natural justice and quashed the regulation, restoring the drug's interchangeable status.

A dissenting opinion would have upheld the decision as a valid exercise of public interest discretion.

The applicants brought an application for judicial review seeking a declaration and mandamus to compel the Coroners' Council to complete its deliberations on a 1995 complaint.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, noting that the Coroners' Council was abolished in 1998 without grandfathering provisions.

The power to consider the complaint now rests with the Chief Coroner, who had already reviewed and dismissed the complaint in 2000.

The court concluded that the applicants had an adequate alternative remedy which had been exercised, and the requested declaration would have no practical effect.

The appellant sued several Crown Attorneys, a probation officer, and a lawyer for intentional torts, including abuse of public office, arising from his prosecution for breach of bail conditions and domestic assault.

The motion judge struck the statement of claim, finding it failed to plead sufficient facts to establish the requisite malice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming that a high threshold of proof is required to establish liability for prosecutorial misconduct and that the appellant's allegations amounted to mere speculation or impermissible collateral attacks on his bail order.

The appellant, a lawyer, was acquitted of sexual assault charges and subsequently sued the Crown, police, and others for malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, and other torts.

The motion judge struck the statements of claim and refused leave to amend.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal against Her Majesty the Queen due to failure to provide the required 60 days' notice under the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

However, the Court set aside the order striking the claim against the Crown Attorney and Police defendants, finding that while the pleading was deficient, the motion judge erred in refusing leave to amend, as the allegations, if properly pleaded with material facts, could support valid causes of action.

The appellants appealed an order striking out their statement of claim without leave to amend.

The claim alleged conspiracy to injure and abuse of process by the police and government defendants in relation to an investigation targeting the adult entertainment industry.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge took an overly technical approach and that the material facts pleaded were reasonably capable of supporting the causes of action.

The Minister of Health and Genpharm appealed a decision granting judicial review that quashed the extension of a cut-off date for generic drug submissions to the Ontario Drug Benefit Formulary.

The application judge had found the process procedurally unfair and ordered a new cut-off date, resulting in all five competing generic drug companies having their products listed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals as moot, finding that the new Formulary had already been published, the legal landscape had changed, and Genpharm's proposed future action for damages did not justify hearing the appeal on the merits.