Kathryn Elaine Kirkpatrick

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action regarding a defective boiler system installation, arguing the claim was statute-barred by the two-year limitation period.

The plaintiff argued it did not discover the fundamental incompatibility of the boiler systems until it received a draft engineering report in July 2015, having previously relied on advice that the issues were minor operational problems.

The court dismissed the motion, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding when the plaintiff had actual or constructive knowledge of the material facts giving rise to the claim, particularly given the plaintiff's reliance on the defendants' professional advice.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order staying his action for non-payment of previous costs awards.

The moving party had initially appealed to the Court of Appeal, which quashed the appeal, and then delayed three months before bringing this motion.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding it utterly without merit and noting the moving party's long delays and failure to pay costs.

Costs of the motion were awarded to the responding parties in the amount of $8,000.

The moving parties sought a stay of five construction lien actions commenced by the construction manager and general contractor, arguing the disputes were subject to contractual arbitration clauses.

The dispute arose from a large construction project involving numerous subcontractors and more than fifty lien claims consolidated into a construction lien reference under the Construction Lien Act.

The court considered whether arbitration should proceed despite the risk of multiplicity of proceedings and the exclusion of subcontractor lien claimants from the arbitral process.

The court held that the moving parties had waived arbitration by first commencing litigation, had delayed unduly before seeking arbitration, and that a stay would cause unfairness and fragmented proceedings.

Exercising discretion under the Arbitration Act, 1991 and the Courts of Justice Act, the court refused the stay so that all disputes could proceed in the single court reference.

The moving party sought review of a single-judge order refusing an extension of time to perfect an appeal from a civil action.

The court held the proposed appeal lacked merit and further found that the moving party had still provided no reasonable explanation for the delay, notwithstanding extensive affidavit material.

The court also rejected requests for a forensic audit of opposing counsel's billing practices and for injunctive relief.

The review application was dismissed with fixed costs to the respondents.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the self-represented plaintiff's statement of claim in its entirety and for particulars.

The plaintiff's action arose from his arrest for criminal harassment, which was later withdrawn upon him entering into a peace bond.

The court found the statement of claim to be a verbose, disorganized diatribe that failed to properly plead material facts for causes of action including false arrest, assault, intimidation, abuse of power, negligent investigation, and defamation.

The court struck the majority of the pleading, granting leave to amend for some claims and striking others without leave, and ordered the plaintiff to provide the requested particulars.

The defendant brought a motion under Rule 21.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the plaintiff’s claim on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action and constituted an abuse of process.

The plaintiff argued the defendant lacked standing due to alleged default and that the motion was not brought promptly.

The court rejected these arguments, finding the defendant was not in default and could bring the motion.

The court held the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action and duplicated earlier pleadings previously struck as abusive.

The pleadings were struck without leave to amend and the defendant was awarded $5,000 in costs.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion alleging contempt by the defendants for failing to comply with prior procedural directions, seeking to strike an affidavit sworn by defence counsel, remove the defendants’ law firm due to an alleged conflict of interest, and compel disclosure based on a prior criminal court proceeding.

The court held that the defendants’ failure to comply with earlier procedural directions resulted from oversight rather than deliberate or calculated disobedience and therefore did not constitute contempt.

The court rejected the alleged conflict of interest, finding the plaintiff failed to establish that any confidential consultation with the defendants’ law firm had occurred.

The court further held that any disclosure obligations arising from the earlier criminal proceeding had expired when that prosecution ended and were not binding on the defendants in the civil action.

The motion was dismissed and each party was ordered to bear its own costs.

The appellant, a lawyer, sued the police and Crown attorneys for malicious prosecution, Charter breaches, and other torts following his acquittal on sexual assault charges.

The motion judge struck most of his fresh amended statement of claim under Rules 21 and 25.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by effectively conducting a summary judgment motion rather than accepting the pleaded facts as true, and by applying too narrow a test for malice at the pleadings stage.

The action was permitted to proceed against all defendants except the Police Services Board (save for vicarious liability).

The appellant, a lawyer, was acquitted of sexual assault charges and subsequently sued the Crown, police, and others for malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, and other torts.

The motion judge struck the statements of claim and refused leave to amend.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal against Her Majesty the Queen due to failure to provide the required 60 days' notice under the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

However, the Court set aside the order striking the claim against the Crown Attorney and Police defendants, finding that while the pleading was deficient, the motion judge erred in refusing leave to amend, as the allegations, if properly pleaded with material facts, could support valid causes of action.

The appellants appealed an order striking out their statement of claim without leave to amend.

The claim alleged conspiracy to injure and abuse of process by the police and government defendants in relation to an investigation targeting the adult entertainment industry.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge took an overly technical approach and that the material facts pleaded were reasonably capable of supporting the causes of action.

The respondent tripped and fell on a city sidewalk, sustaining a shoulder injury.

She commenced an action against the city six months later, beyond the three-month limitation period in the Municipal Act.

The motion judge dismissed the city's motion for summary judgment, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding when the respondent discovered the severity of her injury.

On appeal, the Divisional Court reversed the decision, holding that the limitation period begins when the plaintiff knows some damage has occurred, not when the full extent of the injury is diagnosed.

The appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.