Robert Frank

The plaintiff, a food and beverage operator, sued the defendant hotel for unlawful and bad faith termination of their commercial leases and service agreements.

The hotel terminated the agreements during the COVID-19 pandemic, alleging unpaid rent and other breaches, while secretly negotiating with a replacement operator.

The court found the termination was unlawful and in bad faith, as the hotel wrongfully withheld deposits, owed the plaintiff money, and unreasonably refused to assist with a government rent subsidy application.

The court awarded the plaintiff reliance damages for its capital investments and employee termination costs, less a set-off for the hotel's proven counterclaim.

The London Transit Commission (LTC) appealed a motion judge's decision to strike its third-party claim against Eaton Industries (Canada) Company (Eaton) as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

LTC argued the motion judge erred in determining when it had actual or constructive knowledge of the claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's findings that LTC had actual or constructive knowledge of its claim against Eaton by May 22, 2013, and failed to exercise due diligence in investigating the contamination.

The court rejected LTC's arguments regarding a general rule for discoverability in environmental claims, continuing torts, and standalone claims, and declined to consider a new argument under the Environmental Protection Act.

Indigenous peoples from Ecuador obtained a US$9.5 billion judgment against Chevron Corporation for environmental devastation caused by oil exploration.

After failing to enforce the judgment in the United States due to findings of fraud by the plaintiffs' counsel, they sought to enforce it in Ontario against Chevron Canada, a seventh-level subsidiary.

The motion judge dismissed the claim, finding that Chevron Canada's shares and assets were not exigible under the Execution Act and that the corporate veil should not be pierced.

The appellants appealed, arguing both that the Execution Act permitted seizure of Chevron Canada's assets and that the corporate veil should be pierced in the interests of justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the merits but reduced the costs award, recognizing the litigation as public interest litigation.

The plaintiffs moved to add Chevron Canada Capital Company (CCCC) as a party defendant to their action seeking to enforce an Ecuadorian judgment against Chevron Corporation.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed amendment was not legally tenable and disclosed no cause of action against CCCC, as the court had previously ruled that Chevron Canada's corporate veil could not be pierced.

Furthermore, the court found no basis for jurisdiction over CCCC, a Nova Scotia company with no assets or operations in Ontario, and noted that Rule 17.02(o) regarding necessary parties had been repealed.

The plaintiffs sought to enforce a US$9.5 billion Ecuadorian judgment against Chevron Corporation and its seventh-level indirect subsidiary, Chevron Canada Limited.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claim against Chevron Canada, arguing it was a separate legal entity not liable for the judgment.

The plaintiffs argued Chevron Canada's assets were exigible under the Execution Act or that the corporate veil should be pierced.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the claim against Chevron Canada, finding the Execution Act does not override corporate separateness and there was no basis to pierce the corporate veil absent allegations of wrongdoing by the subsidiary.

The plaintiffs also moved to strike Chevron's statement of defence.

The court struck defences relating to retroactive legislation and international law, but permitted defences alleging the Ecuadorian judgment was procured by fraud, bribery, and a denial of natural justice to proceed to trial.

The appellant was wrongfully dismissed after 14 years of employment.

The motion judge awarded a 17-month reasonable notice period but denied damages for lost bonuses, finding the bonus plan required 'active employment'.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred in principle by focusing on whether the 'active employment' term was ambiguous rather than whether it unambiguously limited the appellant's common law right to damages.

The Court found the term did not oust the common law entitlement and awarded the appellant damages for the bonuses he would have earned during the notice period.

In a foreign judgment recognition and enforcement appeal, the Court held that an enforcing forum need not establish a real and substantial connection between itself and either the dispute or the judgment debtor.

The only jurisdictional prerequisite is that the foreign court issuing the judgment had proper jurisdiction under the real and substantial connection framework or traditional grounds.

The Court also held that traditional presence-based jurisdiction over a corporate defendant is established where the corporation carries on business in the province and is served there.

Questions about ultimate enforceability against related corporate entities were left for later procedural stages.

The appellants, unionized masonry contractors, appealed an order staying their action against the respondents and denying injunctive relief.

The appellants sought to challenge the legality of a Memorandum of Agreement and collective agreements that prohibited independent contractor arrangements with individual bricklayers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the essential character of the dispute fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Ontario Labour Relations Board and that the appellants had avenues within the labour relations regime to challenge the agreements.

Following a motion in which the defendants successfully obtained a stay of the civil action pending determination by the Ontario Labour Relations Board, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The moving parties sought substantial or partial indemnity costs, arguing they were entirely successful and had proceeded on an expedited timeline at the insistence of the responding parties.

The responding parties argued the amounts claimed exceeded reasonable expectations and that substantial indemnity costs were inappropriate because the motion concerned jurisdiction and did not determine substantive rights.

Applying the principles under s.131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that successful parties are generally entitled to costs but that the amount must be fair and reasonable.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded to each group of moving parties.

Unionized masonry contractors commenced a civil action alleging that employer associations and construction unions conspired to prevent them from using independent operator payment arrangements with bricklayers through amendments to provincial collective agreements.

The plaintiffs sought declarations that the collective agreements and memorandum of agreement were unlawful, injunctive relief, and damages for economic torts.

The defendants moved to dismiss or stay the action on the basis that the dispute fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Ontario Labour Relations Board.

Applying the framework from Weber v. Ontario Hydro, the court held that the essential character of the dispute concerned labour relations issues including the validity and scope of collective agreements and the relationship between employers and unionized workers.

Because those matters fall within the OLRB’s exclusive jurisdiction under the Labour Relations Act, the court stayed the action and declined to consider the requested injunctive relief.

On a motion for a stay pending leave applications to the Supreme Court of Canada, the moving parties sought to suspend an order holding that Ontario had jurisdiction over an action to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment of approximately $9.51 billion.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test as modified for stays pending leave applications, requiring consideration not only of a serious issue but also of the merit and public importance requirements under s. 40(1) of the Supreme Court Act.

The court found serious questions concerning recognition and enforcement jurisdiction, enforcement against a non-party to the foreign judgment, and the possible role of corporate veil-piercing, all of which met the public importance threshold.

Although irreparable harm was shown only weakly, the balance of convenience and interests of justice favoured a temporary pause pending the Supreme Court of Canada’s leave determinations.

The motions were granted and the parties bore their own costs.

The appellants, indigenous Ecuadorian villagers, obtained a multi-billion dollar judgment in Ecuador against the respondent corporation for environmental pollution.

They brought an action in Ontario to recognize and enforce the judgment against the corporation and its Canadian subsidiary.

The motion judge found that Ontario had jurisdiction but stayed the action on his own initiative, finding the corporation had no assets in Ontario and the corporate veil of the subsidiary could not be pierced.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the stay, holding that the motion judge erred in granting an unrequested discretionary stay and prematurely deciding the merits of the enforcement action.

The Court dismissed the respondents' cross-appeal, confirming that a real and substantial connection between the subject matter of the litigation and Ontario is not required to establish jurisdiction for an action to enforce a foreign judgment.

The applicants, a wireless telecommunications group operating under the Mobilicity brand, sought protection under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act due to significant debt obligations and an imminent liquidity crisis.

The court considered approval of an Initial Order including debtor‑in‑possession financing, administration charges, continuation of a chief restructuring officer, and a stay of proceedings affecting related oppression litigation.

Applying the statutory factors in s. 11.2 of the CCAA, the court held that the proposed DIP financing and related charges were reasonable and necessary to maintain stability and preserve the possibility of a going‑concern restructuring or sale.

The court rejected objections from a major secured creditor and concluded that the financing structure would not materially prejudice creditors because it ranked subordinate to existing first‑lien security.

The Initial Order was therefore granted.

The appellants sought to commence proceedings against the Russian respondents in Ontario and attempted to serve them in Russia under the Hague Convention.

The Russian government refused service citing sovereignty and national security.

The appellants brought a motion in Ontario to dispense with or validate service under rules 16.04 and 16.08.

The Court of Appeal held that rule 17.05(3), which incorporates the Convention, is a complete code for service on foreign defendants in contracting states, and Ontario courts have no discretion to substitute, dispense with, or validate service where the Convention applies.

The plaintiffs commenced an action in Ontario against Russian defendants and attempted to serve them in Russia pursuant to the Hague Service Convention.

The Russian Ministry of Justice refused to facilitate service, citing sovereignty or security concerns under Article 13 of the Convention.

The plaintiffs obtained an order from a Master validating service under Rule 16.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The defendants appealed.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, holding that Rule 17.05(3) implements the Convention's exclusive methods for service in a contracting state, precluding the application of Rules 16.04 and 16.08 to substitute or validate service.

The appellants sought to lift a stay of proceedings under the CCAA to terminate long-term gas supply contracts with the insolvent respondent.

They argued the contracts were 'eligible financial contracts' (EFCs) under s. 11.1(1) of the CCAA, which would exempt them from the stay.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's dismissal, finding the contracts lacked the hallmarks of financial risk management required to be EFCs.

Furthermore, the court held that even if the contracts were EFCs, the appellants could not terminate them because the contract terms only allowed termination for non-payment, and the respondent was not in default.

The appellants appealed an order of a motions judge awarding costs of an interlocutory injunction motion to the respondents, payable within 30 days.

The appellants argued that, following established principles, costs of an interlocutory injunction should typically be reserved to the trial judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Rule 57.03(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure preserves the motions judge's residual discretion to fix costs payable forthwith.

The court found the motions judge reasonably exercised her discretion based on the appellants' conduct, including unauthorized cashing of cheques and retention of property.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an order requiring the payment of costs forthwith following the granting and continuance of an ex parte injunction against them.

The court granted leave to appeal, noting that recent changes to Rule 57.03(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the unique nature of interlocutory injunctions warranted appellate consideration on how discretion should be exercised in awarding costs in such cases.

The appellants appealed an order granting a sending order under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act and dismissing their applications to set aside search warrants and evidence-gathering orders.

The investigation related to alleged price-fixing and output restriction in the sulfuric acid industry contrary to the United States Sherman Act.

The Court of Appeal held that the warrants and orders were valid, the informations provided sufficient grounds, and the Sherman Act offences qualified as offences under the Act and Treaty.

The court also found that section 8(1) of the Act does not contain a reciprocal offence requirement and upheld the refusal to continue a sealing order.

Leave to appeal was granted but the appeal was dismissed.