Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The respondents were sued following a 2019 fire at their restaurant and issued third party claims for contribution and indemnity against the appellant architect, who had provided services during a 2001 renovation.

The appellant moved under Rule 21 to strike the third party claims, relying on the 15-year ultimate limitation period in s. 15 of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, holding that under s. 18, the ultimate limitation period did not begin to run until the respondents were served with the statements of claim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, concluding it was premature to decide the limitations defence on a pleadings motion without evidence determining the precise legal nature of the third party claims (whether derivative of duties to the plaintiffs or based on independent duties to the respondents).

The appellant appealed an order declaring him a vexatious litigant under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The underlying dispute began when a doctor refused to accept the appellant's wife as a patient, leading the appellant to launch numerous unsuccessful claims and regulatory complaints.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the appellant's disproportionate use of the justice system was abusive, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant brought a wrongful dismissal action in Ontario against the respondents.

The motion judge stayed the action, finding the appellant was an independent contractor and enforcing a forum selection clause in favour of England.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the motion judge made an extricable error of law by conflating the appellant's status as a shareholder with his role in providing services when applying the Belton factors.

Conducting a fresh analysis, the Court concluded the appellant was an employee for the purposes of the Employment Standards Act, rendering the forum selection clause void.

The Court further held that Ontario had jurisdiction simpliciter and that the respondents failed to establish England was a more convenient forum.

The appellant, a unit owner in a vacant land condominium, appealed an application judge's decision regarding her claims against neighbouring unit owners and the condominium corporation.

The neighbours had breached the condominium declaration by altering grading and removing vegetation without approval, and the corporation had failed to promptly enforce a halt work order.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred by failing to adjudicate the appellant's oppression claims under s. 135 of the Condominium Act.

The Court held that the conduct of both the neighbours and the corporation was oppressive and unfairly disregarded the appellant's interests.

The Court granted declarations of oppression and ordered the corporation to have proper regard for the appellant's interests in future approvals, but declined to order the neighbours to remediate the grading.

The Court also found the application judge erred by determining costs without allowing the parties to make submissions, and directed the parties to provide written costs submissions to the Court of Appeal.

The parties separated after a 32-year marriage.

Before the marriage, the respondent wife received shares in her father's business.

During the marriage, an estate freeze was executed, transferring the growth value of the shares to a new family trust settled by her father for $100.

The trial judge, feeling bound by prior appellate jurisprudence, excluded the wife's interest in the trust from her net family property as a gift after marriage.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, distinguishing the prior case and holding that the trust interest was traceable to the pre-marital gift.

The trust interest was included in net family property, but the equalization payment was reduced to $18 million under s. 5(6) of the Family Law Act due to unconscionability.

Retroactive spousal support was ordered, but prospective support was denied.

The trial costs award against the appellant husband was upheld.

The appellant challenged an order striking his claim alleging a long-running campaign of defamation and economic harm connected to securities-regulatory proceedings.

The Court of Appeal held that the action was barred by the ultimate 15-year limitation period under s. 15 of the Limitations Act, 2002 because the pleadings showed that the appellant knew the material facts underlying his claims by no later than 2004.

The court interpreted s. 15(4)(c) as tolling the ultimate limitation period only where wilful concealment or misleading by the defendant prevented discovery of the claim, and found that requirement was not met on the pleaded facts.

Leave to cross-appeal costs was granted, the no-costs order was set aside as an error in principle, and partial indemnity costs of the motion and agreed appeal costs were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two sexual assaults against two sex workers, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury to disregard certain Crown cross-examination, admitting a photograph of the appellant, and allowing speculation about the cleaning of blood at the scene.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's handling of the cross-examination, the admission of the photograph, or the Crown's suggestions regarding the blood evidence.

The Court noted the overwhelming evidence against the appellant, including similar fact evidence, medical evidence, and corroboration by other witnesses.

The appellants, a real estate brokerage and its realtor, appealed a summary judgment dismissing their claim for a $650,000 commission from the respondent purchaser after a commercial real estate transaction failed to close.

The motion judge found that the Buyer Representation Agreement, which listed the commission as 'TBD', did not contractually bind the purchaser to pay the commission amount set out in a separate agreement between the brokerage and the seller.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge made no reviewable error in his contractual interpretation and that his conclusion was open to him based on the highly fact-specific circumstances.

The Attorney General applied to review a Superior Court judge's order granting judicial interim release to the respondent pending his committal hearing for extradition to the United States.

The respondent, a former criminal defence lawyer, was charged with conspiracy to commit murder in connection with a transnational drug trafficking organization.

The reviewing judge admitted fresh evidence but dismissed the application, finding no error in principle in the application judge's assessment of the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds for detention.

The application judge appropriately scrutinized the flight risk, properly considered the strength of the prosecution's case from the respondent's perspective, and reasonably balanced the tertiary ground factors, including the respondent's health, safety, and the strength of the release plan.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of a faint hope application seeking a jury review of a 25-year parole ineligibility period for first degree murder.

The Court of Appeal held that the application judge applied the correct pre-2011 reasonable prospect screening standard under s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code, did not misapprehend the evidence, and was entitled to consider institutional misconduct, psychological risk assessments, limited acceptance of responsibility, and the likely loss of community support upon deportation.

The court rejected the submission that reliance on static factors foreclosed any future application, noting that the judge expressly left open a renewed application in two years.

The appeal was dismissed as the screening decision fell within the broad range of reasonableness.

The appellants appealed an order striking their statement of defence in an estate action.

The motion judge struck the pleading after finding the appellants deliberately breached a court order requiring them to produce passwords for business email accounts and prohibiting the deletion of emails.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the Falcon Lumber test and concluding that striking the defence was an appropriate sanction for the appellants' repeated and continuous failure to provide transparent disclosure of estate business documents.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge engaged in prohibited propensity reasoning.

The trial judge had used the appellant's admitted infidelity to infer that he would disregard the complainant's rule requiring condom use during intercourse.

The Court of Appeal agreed this was prohibited propensity reasoning and noted the appellant had no notice that his infidelity would be used for this purpose, rendering the trial procedurally unfair.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant, a medical doctor, appealed his convictions for 16 counts of sexual assault and 1 count of sexual exploitation against 13 patients.

The appeal centered on the trial judge's universal ruling permitting the cross-count use of similar fact evidence.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing the risk of prejudice, using acquitted counts as similar fact evidence, finding sufficient similarity, and discounting the risk of inadvertent tainting from media and the CPSO website.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's treatment of the similar fact evidence or the risk of tainting.

The dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal in part, finding the trial judge erred in her assessment of inadvertent tainting for two counts.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference (with the sexual assault conviction stayed under the Kienapple principle) following a trial in the Superior Court of Justice.

The offences involved repeated sexual touching of a complainant between the ages of 13 and 15, who attended a home daycare operated by the appellant's wife.

On appeal, the appellant raised three grounds: (1) improper use of a fabrication finding to bolster the complainant's evidence; (2) failure to expressly reject his denial of the offences under the W.(D.) framework; and (3) misapprehension of the evidence regarding the complainant's alleged motive to lie.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three grounds, finding the fabrication finding was used only as a credibility assessment tool, that the denial was plainly rejected on a holistic reading of the reasons, and that the trial judge clearly understood and implicitly rejected the motive to lie argument.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention at a mental health centre with conditions, arguing he should have been conditionally discharged.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable given the appellant's lack of insight, medication non-compliance, and intimidation of his treatment team.

The court also rejected the argument that a recent appellate decision setting aside a prior conviction undermined the Board's disposition, as the Board relied on the appellant's own testimony regarding the underlying incident.

The appellant appealed his conviction for conspiracy to import cocaine into Canada.

He argued that the trial judge erred in finding that his discussions with co-conspirators amounted to a concluded agreement, and that the trial judge misapplied the co-conspirators' exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant had agreed to join the conspiracy to import cocaine by airplane.

The court also held that the trial judge properly applied the Carter framework and did not improperly rely on hearsay evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for two counts of possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking.

He challenged the validity of the search warrant used to locate fentanyl and cocaine at a Toronto residence, arguing that the Information to Obtain lacked sufficient evidence to support its issuance and that the evidence ought to have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Three confidential sources had identified the appellant as a drug dealer through single photo identification, and police surveillance corroborated his connection to the searched address.

The Court of Appeal found no legal error, misapprehension of evidence, or failure to consider relevant evidence in the application judge's analysis, and dismissed the appeal without calling on the respondent.

The Criminal Lawyers' Association (Ontario) brought a motion for leave to intervene in a bail review application under the Extradition Act.

The proposed intervener sought to make submissions on whether the strength of the ultimate prosecution should be considered in assessing the primary ground for detention.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed arguments were consistent with those already advanced by the respondent and that the intervener would not bring a useful perspective distinct from the parties.

The appellant was convicted of importing heroin contrary to s. 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act after approximately 11 kilograms of heroin were found in a suitcase he carried into Canada from South Africa.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's findings of fact and credibility, alleged a miscarriage of justice from the Crown's purported withholding of exculpatory evidence on his electronic devices, and sought to introduce evidence regarding COVID-19 entry restrictions as new evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error in the trial judge's assessment, held there was no Crown disclosure failure, and determined the COVID-19 restrictions argument had already been considered at trial and was not determinative.

Following the dismissal of the appeal (2026 ONCA 3), the court addressed costs.

Having considered the written submissions and costs outlines of both parties, the court fixed all-inclusive costs of the appeal payable by the appellant to the respondents in the amount of $37,000.