Philip Edward Mercantini Ghosh

The court considered whether third party claims for contribution and indemnity brought by the defendants against Maurizio Martignano were barred by the 15-year ultimate limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that, pursuant to section 18 of the Act, the limitation period for such claims commences on the date the defendants were served with the statement of claim, not the date of the original act or omission.

As a result, the third party claims were not statute-barred and the motions to dismiss were denied.

The plaintiff fractured her ankle while disembarking from the defendant's bus on a winter day.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing it met the requisite standard of care under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the evidence regarding the condition of the stairs and the reasonableness of the defendant's cleaning policy was inconclusive.

The court held that a jury is the appropriate body to assess the common sense question of whether the bus driver should have mopped the floor during winter stopovers.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision denying most of the proposed amendments to the statement of claim.

The core issue was whether the proposed amendments asserted a new cause of action after the expiry of the limitation period.

The motion judge found that the addition of allegations of an intentional tort and new heads of damages constituted a new cause of action under Rule 26.06.

The motion judge also determined that discoverability was not an issue requiring trial, based on admissions that the appellant was aware of the relevant facts in 2015.

The appeal was dismissed with limited exceptions.

This endorsement, issued by the Case Management Judge, addresses a request for leave by Aviva General Insurance Company to bring a motion to amend a prior order to add Aviva as a statutory third party in various actions arising from a specific incident.

The court directs that any such request for leave must be made by way of a motion in writing, on notice to all necessary parties, in accordance with Rule 37.12.1(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The endorsement also includes directions for distributing the order and notifying an incarcerated defendant.

An appeal from a motion judge's decision to dismiss third-party claims against all persons except Barton Thomas Burron in a fraud matter involving Saint Luke Lutheran Church, an unincorporated association.

The motion judge had dismissed the third-party claims on the basis that only Burron had a distinct fiduciary duty and independent standard of care.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that complex issues regarding the status of the plaintiff, the application of law to unincorporated associations, the Negligence Act, and the Rules of Civil Procedure required a full evidentiary record and should proceed to trial rather than be dismissed on a motion.

The defendant Club Pro Adult Entertainment Inc. brought a motion to transfer a related Brampton action (George Niras v. Mandrake Khan) to the Toronto Region and to have it heard together with the current Toronto action.

The court dismissed the transfer motion, finding that Club Pro was not a party to the Brampton proceeding and therefore lacked standing to seek its transfer.

The motion for the actions to be heard together was held in abeyance pending a proper transfer motion by a party in the Brampton action.

The defendant moved for leave to appeal an order dismissing his motion for summary judgment.

The underlying action arose from a motor vehicle accident, and the defendant argued the claim was statute-barred because the plaintiff ought to have discovered his chronic pain claim within two years of the accident.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision.

The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to rely on the discovery evidence filed by the defendant on the summary judgment motion, and that the motion judge correctly applied the discoverability principles to find the plaintiff had exercised reasonable diligence in investigating whether his injuries met the statutory threshold.