Peter Cho

The plaintiff brought a negligence action for injuries from an automobile accident, with liability admitted by the defendants.

The trial proceeded on damages only before a jury.

The court addressed a dispute between counsel regarding the wording of jury questions.

The defendants proposed questions that included a causation question despite admitted liability, and sought to particularize damages by apportioning them between the initial accident and subsequent accidents.

The court rejected the defendants' proposed questions, finding them to contain embedded assumptions, to be overly complicated, and to risk confusion.

The court affirmed that admitted liability includes causation, making a separate causation question unnecessary.

It also reiterated principles against apportionment between tortious and non-tortious causes for indivisible injuries, and the general rule against requiring juries to provide reasons or particularize findings, especially for damages assessment.

The plaintiff's simpler, general damages questions were adopted.

The plaintiff, a prominent human rights lawyer, was struck by the defendant's motor vehicle while riding her bicycle.

The defendant failed to discharge the reverse onus under the Highway Traffic Act and was found wholly liable.

The court accepted expert medical evidence that the plaintiff suffered a permanent mild traumatic brain injury (mTBI) and chronic migraines, which effectively ended her legal career.

The court dismissed the defendants' threshold motion, finding the plaintiff sustained a permanent serious impairment of an important function, and awarded substantial damages including $250,000 in general damages, past and future income loss, and future care costs.

The plaintiff brought an urgent motion to conditionally strike the jury notice for a trial scheduled to commence on January 17, 2022, due to COVID-19 pandemic developments suspending jury selections.

The defendants opposed the motion.

The court considered factors such as court resources, local pandemic impact, prejudice to parties (especially the plaintiff due to financial implications and case age), and history of adjournments.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion, ordering that the trial proceed without a jury if juries are not being impaneled, and awarded costs to the plaintiff.

The applicants were seriously injured in a motorcycle accident and inadvertently applied for statutory accident benefits to the insurer of the motorcycle rather than their own auto insurer, with whom they had purchased optional enhanced benefits.

When they attempted to claim the optional benefits, their auto insurer denied the claim on the basis that they had already applied to another insurer.

The applicants brought an application to the Superior Court for relief from forfeiture.

The court dismissed the application, finding that under section 280 of the Insurance Act, exclusive jurisdiction to resolve disputes regarding entitlement to statutory accident benefits lies with the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT), stripping the court of jurisdiction to grant equitable relief in this context.

On a statutory appeal from a License Appeal Tribunal reconsideration decision, the insurer challenged a ruling that an injured dirt bike rider was entitled to statutory accident benefits.

The court held there was no legal error in allocating onus to the insurer on the narrow exemption issue and no reversible error in applying the Adams framework.

Interpreting s. 2(1)5 of O. Reg. 863 purposively and contextually, the court agreed that motorcycle-association sponsorship applies to both closed course competitions and rallies, so the exemption did not apply on the record.

Although the reconsideration reasons improperly referenced a document outside the hearing record, the court found no procedural unfairness because that reference did not affect the ultimate analysis.

The appeal and the insurer’s fresh-evidence motion were dismissed, with costs to the respondent.

The plaintiff fractured her ankle while disembarking from the defendant's bus on a winter day.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing it met the requisite standard of care under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the evidence regarding the condition of the stairs and the reasonableness of the defendant's cleaning policy was inconclusive.

The court held that a jury is the appropriate body to assess the common sense question of whether the bus driver should have mopped the floor during winter stopovers.

The Attorney General for Ontario (AGO) brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's Amended Statement of Claim, which sought $4.5 million in damages.

The plaintiff's action alleged wrongful non-disclosure, abuse of process, malicious prosecution, misfeasance in public office, false imprisonment, and various Charter breaches against the AGO, arising from his arrest, conviction, and subsequent appeal and acquittal for firearms-related offences.

The court granted the AGO's motion, striking all claims against the AGO without leave to amend.

The court found that the plaintiff's allegations confused legal conclusions (e.g., the unlawfulness of a search, determined on appeal) with facts that the Crown should have disclosed or known at the time of trial.

It also determined that the plaintiff failed to plead the necessary elements for the asserted torts, such as malice or improper purpose, and that the Crown's role includes advancing legal theories, even if ultimately unsuccessful.

Two consolidated appeals concerning the enforceability of liability waivers executed by ski resort patrons.

The central issue was whether the Consumer Protection Act (CPA) or the Occupiers' Liability Act (OLA) governs the relationship between ski resorts and patrons who purchased ski tickets and executed waivers as a condition of entry.

The lower courts held that the CPA applied and voided the waivers.

The Court of Appeal held that the OLA and CPA conflict, and that the more specific OLA provisions prevail over the general CPA provisions.

The court allowed the appeals and held that the waivers were valid and enforceable.

The court issued a corrigendum to correct and add the names of counsel for the plaintiffs and defendants in the original Reasons for Judgment issued on December 7, 2016.

All other contents of the original judgment remain unchanged.

The plaintiff brought a Rule 21 motion for a judicial determination of a question of law concerning the application and breadth of section 7(1) of the Consumer Protection Act (CPA) in the context of a negligence claim where the plaintiff was injured while skiing at the defendant's ski resort.

The issue engaged the interplay between consumer rights under the CPA and occupier liabilities under the Occupiers Liability Act (OLA).

The court found that the defendant's broad waiver of liability offended CPA requirements by attempting to waive the deemed warranty of "reasonably acceptable quality" under section 9(1) of the CPA.

However, the court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the entire waiver should be voided.

Instead, it applied the doctrine of notional severance to read down the waiver, making it unenforceable only for claims involving substantive and procedural rights under the CPA, while preserving its enforceability for negligence claims under the OLA.

This approach allows the plaintiff to pursue both negligence (subject to the OLA waiver) and breach of warranty (not subject to waiver) claims.

The plaintiff was rendered a quadriplegic after the minivan he was a passenger in was struck by a vehicle driven by the defendant Ellis at an intersection.

Ellis had stopped at a stop sign rather than the faded stop line, resulting in poor sightlines, and pulled into the intersection when it was unsafe.

The court found the City of Hamilton 50% liable for failing to maintain the stop line, which created an unreasonable risk of harm.

Ellis was found 50% liable for failing to ensure it was safe to proceed.

Claims against the driver of the minivan were dismissed.

Following a seven‑day personal injury trial arising from an accident at an amusement park, the plaintiffs obtained damages totalling $304,863.23 and the defendant’s counterclaim for contribution and indemnity against the father was dismissed.

The plaintiffs sought partial indemnity costs exceeding $226,000, while the defendant by counterclaim sought its own costs.

The court applied the principles under s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rules 49 and 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing proportionality, the principle of indemnity, and the reasonableness of preparation time and disbursements.

The court reduced excessive preparation hours and excluded certain disbursements but accepted the reasonableness of counsel’s hourly rates.

Costs were fixed at amounts considered fair and reasonable in light of the trial result and proportionality considerations.

Following a trial, the defendant requested production of opposing counsel’s computer dockets to obtain evidence of the time and expenses incurred for the purpose of assessing costs.

The plaintiffs objected, arguing such detailed disclosure was not required under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court reviewed the principles governing costs assessments, emphasizing that fixing costs is not a mechanical calculation based on hours multiplied by rates.

Considering the significant expense and privilege concerns associated with producing detailed dockets, the court held that such production was not appropriate in the circumstances.

The request for production of the dockets was dismissed and the responding party was directed to deliver its costs submissions within two weeks.

The minor plaintiff, who had a pre-existing condition making his bones prone to fracture, was injured while attempting to board a continuously moving amusement park ride.

The plaintiffs sued the amusement park operator for negligence under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The court found the defendant breached its duty of care by failing to post warning signs, failing to provide verbal instructions that the ride did not stop, and failing to have sufficient staff present.

The court dismissed the defendant's claims of contributory negligence against the minor and his father.

Damages were awarded to the minor plaintiff and his parents, taking into account the minor's pre-existing condition under the crumbling skull rule.

During a personal injury trial arising from a golf cart accident, the court was asked to determine whether a severance package received by the plaintiff after his termination should be deducted from any damages awarded for loss of income.

The plaintiff argued the severance fell under the private insurance exception to the rule against double recovery.

The court agreed, finding that the severance package was obtained in exchange for the plaintiff giving up his rights as a long-term employee, and was not merely a continuation of salary.

Therefore, no deduction for the severance allowance would be made from any jury award for past or future loss of income.

The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing a personal injury action arising from a workplace fall, arguing there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and no evidence of negligence or breach of statutory duty under the Occupiers Liability Act.

The plaintiff, an experienced contractor hired to replace a water tank, fell from structural studs above a suspended ceiling while accessing a water valve located more than ten feet above the floor.

The defendants argued the plaintiff chose an unsafe method of access and could not identify the cause of his fall.

The court held that genuine issues remained for trial, including whether the defendants directed the plaintiff to access the valve in that manner and whether the condition of the premises breached the statutory duty under the Occupiers Liability Act.

Credibility conflicts between the plaintiff and the defendants’ agent and unresolved factual issues made summary judgment inappropriate.

The plaintiffs sought costs following a 22-day product liability trial where the jury awarded them $1,157,850 in damages but found the plaintiff 25% contributorily negligent.

The court awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, rejecting the plaintiffs' request for substantial indemnity costs and a cost premium.

The court also declined the defendants' request to reduce the costs award by 25% to reflect the contributory negligence finding, noting that the plaintiff's negligence did not materially affect the prospects for settlement.

The plaintiffs were awarded $387,140 in fees, plus HST and disbursements.

During a product liability jury trial, the defendants requested that the jury be charged on the doctrine of spoliation because the plaintiffs discarded the broken pieces of the cookware that allegedly caused the injury.

The court declined to charge the jury on spoliation, finding no evidence that the plaintiffs intentionally destroyed the evidence to affect ongoing or contemplated litigation.

The plaintiffs discarded the broken pieces shortly after the accident without contemplating a lawsuit.

The defendant brought a motion under Rule 21.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the plaintiffs’ statement of claim on the basis that the action was commenced outside the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiffs alleged that damage to their home occurred after a technician installation, but that significant damage only manifested during a later flooding event.

The court held that the limitation issue involved questions of discoverability and factual context that could not be determined at this preliminary stage.

However, the court found that the plaintiffs’ alternative claim for public nuisance failed to plead the essential elements of the tort, including interference with a public right affecting a substantial number of people.

The public nuisance claim was struck, but the remainder of the action was permitted to proceed.