Terrence R. Shillington

The court issued a corrigendum to correct and add the names of counsel for the plaintiffs and defendants in the original Reasons for Judgment issued on December 7, 2016.

All other contents of the original judgment remain unchanged.

The plaintiff was rendered a quadriplegic after the minivan he was a passenger in was struck by a vehicle driven by the defendant Ellis at an intersection.

Ellis had stopped at a stop sign rather than the faded stop line, resulting in poor sightlines, and pulled into the intersection when it was unsafe.

The court found the City of Hamilton 50% liable for failing to maintain the stop line, which created an unreasonable risk of harm.

Ellis was found 50% liable for failing to ensure it was safe to proceed.

Claims against the driver of the minivan were dismissed.

The appellant municipality appealed a trial judgment finding it liable under the Occupiers' Liability Act for catastrophic injuries sustained by the respondent at a municipal mountain bike park.

The respondent fell from a wooden obstacle and was rendered quadriplegic.

The trial judge found the municipality breached its duty of care by failing to post proper warning signs, negligently promoting the park, failing to monitor risks, and failing to provide an adequate progression of qualifiers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's application of the duty of care, standard of care, causation, or assessment of contributory negligence.

The defendant sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that bifurcated the trial into liability and damages phases.

The moving party argued that the bifurcation order conflicted with appellate jurisprudence, specifically the rule that a trial cannot be bifurcated without consent when a valid jury notice is in place.

The court found that there was a conflicting decision and good reason to doubt the correctness of the bifurcation order, satisfying the test for leave to appeal.

The motion for leave to appeal was granted.

The respondent, a 16-year-old driver, drove through a stop sign at 80 km/h on an unfamiliar rural road, lost control on a curve, and crashed into a concrete bridge.

He sued the municipality for non-repair, arguing it should have posted a warning sign for the curve.

The trial judge found the municipality 50% liable, holding that ordinary rural drivers do not always stop at stop signs and the curve was a hidden hazard.

The Court of Appeal allowed the municipality's appeal and dismissed the action, holding that a municipality's statutory duty of repair is limited to ensuring roads are safe for ordinary drivers exercising reasonable care.

The municipality has no duty to keep roads safe for negligent drivers who ignore stop signs.

The plaintiff was severely injured in a single-vehicle rollover accident on a rural gravel road.

She sued the municipality, alleging the accident was caused by the road's poor state of repair, specifically the presence of potholes and loose gravel.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the action, finding that the road was in a reasonable state of repair for a rural gravel road and that the potholes did not constitute a state of disrepair.

Furthermore, the court concluded that the accident was caused entirely by the plaintiff's own negligence, including driving at an excessive speed and overcorrecting after encountering an oncoming vehicle.

The court also found that the plaintiff was not wearing her seatbelt, which would have resulted in a 25% reduction in damages for contributory negligence had the municipality been found liable.

The applicants were involved in a motor vehicle accident which resulted in the death of their unborn child.

They applied for death benefits under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The insurer denied the claim on the basis that an unborn child does not qualify as a dependant.

The arbitrator held that the law does not recognize an unborn fetus as a person, and therefore the unborn child was not an 'insured person' under the Schedule.

The application for death benefits was dismissed.

The appellant insurer argued on appeal that a 1989 letter did not create a binding agreement and, alternatively, that the respondent's claim was out of time after the insurer indicated in 1991 it would no longer be bound.

The court held the trial judge properly relied not only on the letter itself but also on the agent's cross-examination evidence acknowledging an agreement.

The court further held that the 1991 letter constituted repudiation, but because the respondent did not accept that repudiation, the contract remained in force and the respondent was not required to commence proceedings by the date asserted by the appellant.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received weekly income benefits for 156 weeks.

The insurer terminated benefits, arguing she did not meet the post-156 week disability test under section 12(5)(b) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The arbitrator found that while the applicant was reasonably suited for light assembly work or her pre-accident work as a motor repair technician, she required a graduated work hardening program to build up her working tolerance before returning to full-time employment.

The arbitrator ordered the insurer to pay ongoing weekly income benefits until the completion of the recommended work hardening program.