Patrick William Brennan

The plaintiff, CLC Tree Services Ltd., brought a motion to compel answers to undertakings and refusals from examinations for discovery, alleging that the City of London granted preferential treatment in awarding arboricultural and vegetation management contracts to Davey Tree Expert Co. of Canada, Limited to the exclusion of CLC.

The defendant, the City of London, brought a cross-motion seeking answers to undertakings and refusals from CLC's examination, arguing that CLC's allegations were based on rumours and unnamed sources and that the scope of the claim needed to be defined.

The court addressed numerous undertakings and refusals, emphasizing the importance of parties working collaboratively to resolve discovery disputes and the broad scope of oral discovery under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court granted many of CLC's requests for disclosure while also ordering CLC to provide greater particularity regarding its damages claims and the factual basis for its allegations.

The London & Middlesex Housing Corporation (LMHC) brought a summary judgment motion to dismiss a claim against it by a tenant, Keith Horn.

Horn alleged LMHC was liable for an assault and battery committed by another tenant, Brian Latondress, who was also employed by LMHC as a Resident Contact.

Horn claimed direct negligence in hiring Latondress and/or vicarious liability.

LMHC argued that Latondress's actions were either self-defence or an independent intentional act outside the scope of his employment.

The court dismissed LMHC's motion, finding that there was a genuine issue for trial regarding the nexus between Latondress's conduct and his employment, particularly concerning vicarious liability under the Salmond test and the "enterprise risk" principle.

The applicant sought income replacement benefits (IRBs) and the cost of an OCF-19 following a motor vehicle accident.

The respondent raised a preliminary issue that the IRB claim was statute-barred.

The Tribunal found that the respondent's termination letter was a clear and unequivocal denial, triggering the two-year limitation period under s. 56 of the Schedule.

The Tribunal declined to extend the limitation period under s. 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, noting the lack of explanation for the delay and prejudice to the respondent.

The Tribunal also ordered the applicant to repay $5,653.93 in overpaid IRBs due to his receipt of CPP Disability benefits, and denied the $2,200.00 claim for the OCF-19 as excessive and not reasonable and necessary.

The applicant, who sustained catastrophic impairments in a motorcycle accident, sought various statutory accident benefits denied by the respondent insurer.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found the applicant entitled to attendant care benefits of $6,000 per month, preferring the evidence of the applicant's occupational therapists who accounted for his fluctuating daily functionality over the respondent's assessor.

The Tribunal also awarded $87,809 for home modifications and capped the assessment cost at $2,200, finding most proposed modifications reasonable and necessary.

The claim for dietician services was granted due to the applicant's accident-related appetite loss and blood sugar management issues.

However, the Tribunal denied funding for service dog training, finding insufficient evidence that it was a reasonable and necessary medical benefit, and declined to order a special award as the insurer's denials were not unreasonable.

The respondent insurer requested a reconsideration of a preliminary issue decision which found that the exclusion under s. 31(1)(a)(i) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule did not apply to the applicant.

The respondent argued the Tribunal made an error of law by applying a subjective test rather than an objective test to determine whether the applicant knew or ought reasonably to have known he was operating his motorcycle without liability insurance.

The Vice-Chair agreed, finding that the Tribunal erred in law by applying a subjective test.

Applying the correct objective test, the Vice-Chair concluded that an ordinary, rational person with the applicant's background ought reasonably to have known the motorcycle was uninsured.

The request for reconsideration was granted, and the applicant's claim was found subject to the exclusion.

The applicant was injured in a motorcycle accident and sought statutory accident benefits.

The respondent insurer denied benefits, arguing the applicant knew or ought reasonably to have known he was driving without liability insurance, triggering the exclusion under s. 31(1)(a)(i) of the Schedule.

The Tribunal found that the applicant had requested his broker to adjust his coverage while the motorcycle was in storage, but did not know this meant liability coverage was removed.

Applying a subjective test, the Tribunal concluded the respondent failed to prove the applicant knew or ought reasonably to have known he lacked liability insurance.

The exclusion did not apply.

The respondent insurer requested a reconsideration of a Tribunal decision that found the applicant had sustained a catastrophic impairment with a 54% whole person impairment (rounded to 55%).

The respondent argued the Tribunal erred in its WPI ratings for leg disfigurement, sleep disorder, and a discretionary increase, alleging it relied on discredited expert evidence and ignored surveillance footage.

The adjudicator dismissed the request, finding that the Tribunal had properly considered the evidence, including the surveillance, and made no errors of law or fact in its impairment ratings.

The original catastrophic impairment designation was upheld.

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision awarding $1,000 in costs to the respondent.

The costs were awarded after the applicant withdrew their application on the eve of a multi-day hearing for the second time.

The applicant argued that the Vice Chair's prior comments describing the applicant's conduct as 'cavalier' created a reasonable apprehension of bias, and that the decision relied on false evidence.

The Tribunal dismissed the reconsideration request, finding that an informed person would view the applicant's conduct as unreasonable and subject to censure, and that no false or misleading evidence was relied upon.

The applicant sought income replacement benefits (IRBs) following a motor vehicle accident.

The Tribunal found the applicant was substantially unable to perform the essential tasks of her pre-accident employment as a nanny and hotel housekeeper within the first 104 weeks post-accident due to physical injuries, awarding IRBs for that period.

However, the Tribunal denied IRBs beyond the 104-week mark, finding the applicant failed to prove she was completely unable to engage in any reasonably suitable employment, noting she had returned to work in a lighter capacity and giving little weight to her expert reports due to the lack of an interpreter during assessments.

The applicant was injured in a rear-end motor vehicle accident and sought medical benefits under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The respondent denied the benefits on the basis that the applicant's injuries fell within the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG).

The applicant argued that psychological impairments and pre-existing conditions (toe fracture, tuberculosis, sciatica) removed him from the MIG.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's physical injuries were predominantly minor and that he failed to provide compelling evidence from a health practitioner that his pre-existing conditions would prevent maximal recovery under the MIG limit.

The Tribunal also found insufficient evidence of a psychological impairment.

As the $3,500 MIG limit was exhausted, the disputed treatment plans and interest were denied.

The applicant, a bus driver, was injured in a motor vehicle accident when a transport truck collided with her bus.

She applied for a determination of catastrophic impairment under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The central issue was whether her injuries resulted in a 55% or more Whole Person Impairment (WPI) in accordance with the AMA Guides.

The adjudicator evaluated competing expert medical reports regarding the applicant's mental/behavioural disorders, lower extremity impairments, facial disfigurement, spinal issues, sleep disorder, and chronic pain.

After weighing the evidence and assigning WPI percentages for each category, the adjudicator concluded that the applicant sustained a 54% WPI.

Applying the rounding principles permitted by the AMA Guides, this met the 55% threshold.

The Tribunal declared the applicant catastrophically impaired.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

During the first day of the in-person hearing, an issue arose regarding the applicant's attendance at clinics owned by the spouse of a lawyer involved in another matter before the same adjudicator.

The adjudicator disclosed this potential conflict to the parties.

As neither party was willing to provide a waiver, the adjudicator recused himself to avoid any reasonable apprehension of bias.

A new hearing before a different adjudicator was ordered.

The defendants, Kristopher Purdy (an ambulance driver) and The Corporation of The City of Greater Sudbury, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss claims of negligence arising from a motorcycle accident.

The plaintiff alleged that Purdy's operation of the ambulance caused the accident by startling traffic, leading an unidentified driver to brake suddenly, which forced the plaintiff to lay down his motorcycle.

The court found the plaintiff's expert report problematic, as its conclusions were based on inadmissible hearsay and contradicted by objective evidence (Automatic Vehicle Location video data).

The court granted the defendants' motion, dismissing the action against them, concluding there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought post-104 week income replacement benefits (IRBs).

The respondent denied the benefits, arguing the applicant did not suffer a complete inability to engage in suitable employment.

The Tribunal found the applicant credible and preferred the evidence of her medical experts, concluding that her chronic pain and psychological impairments prevented her from returning to work.

The Tribunal ordered the respondent to pay IRBs of $400 per week from October 4, 2016, ongoing, plus interest.

The appellants constructed a detached garage on their property pursuant to a building permit issued by the respondent municipality.

During construction, the appellants accessed an unopened road allowance (Ninth Street).

After completion, the respondent took the position that access via Ninth Street was not permitted and blocked the street with concrete barriers.

The appellants sued seeking removal of the barriers, an easement, or damages for breach of promissory estoppel and negligent misrepresentation, plus punitive damages.

The trial judge dismissed all claims.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no merit in the appellants' arguments regarding negligence, promissory estoppel, negligent misrepresentation, or punitive damages.

The applicant, a pedestrian struck by a motor vehicle, sought a weekly non-earner benefit and interest on overdue payments.

The respondent denied the claim.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found that the applicant failed to demonstrate a complete inability to carry on a normal life, as she was still able to engage in most pre-accident activities, albeit in a more limited manner.

Medical reports indicated she had recovered by at least 50%.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant, having successfully dismissed the plaintiffs' action, sought partial indemnity costs.

The plaintiffs opposed, arguing public interest litigation, novelty of issues, and impecuniosity, and challenged the quantum.

The court found the litigation was a private dispute, not public interest, and rejected the impecuniosity argument due to lack of evidence.

However, the court reduced the defendant's claimed costs, noting the defendant's conduct contributed to the litigation's length through "uneven enforcement measures" and finding several claimed amounts excessive or improper.

The court fixed costs at $30,000, inclusive of HST and disbursements, payable by the plaintiffs to the defendant.

The plaintiffs sought damages for proprietary estoppel and/or negligent misrepresentation against the Town of LaSalle after the Town prohibited vehicular access to unopened road allowances, thereby restricting access to the plaintiffs' detached garage.

The plaintiffs alleged that the Town induced them to build the garage with implied permission for access via an unopened road allowance.

The court found that the Town was not aware of the plaintiffs' intention to use the unopened road allowance for vehicular access and that the plaintiffs' reliance was not reasonable.

The Town's actions were deemed a legitimate exercise of its powers to address legal, financial, and liability concerns.

The claims for proprietary estoppel, negligent misrepresentation, and punitive damages were dismissed.

The court also addressed the limitation period, finding the action was commenced within time.

The appellants, the City of Ottawa and a city bus driver, appealed a trial judgment finding them 20% liable for a fatal intersection collision.

The bus driver, travelling on a green light, collided with a vehicle that entered the intersection on a red light.

The trial judge found the bus driver negligent for speeding and momentary inattention, concluding the accident could have been avoided had he driven at the speed limit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's articulation of the standard of care or her causation analysis.

The appeal regarding the trial judge's costs award was also dismissed.

The defendant sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that bifurcated the trial into liability and damages phases.

The moving party argued that the bifurcation order conflicted with appellate jurisprudence, specifically the rule that a trial cannot be bifurcated without consent when a valid jury notice is in place.

The court found that there was a conflicting decision and good reason to doubt the correctness of the bifurcation order, satisfying the test for leave to appeal.

The motion for leave to appeal was granted.