Peter James Elkins Cronyn

The plaintiffs in three related lawsuits arising from a fatal head-on automobile accident brought summary judgment motions to determine liability.

All parties agreed that liability could be determined by summary judgment but held diametrically opposed positions on who was liable.

The court found that the existence of competing expert accident reconstruction reports, particularly those based on computer simulations with unknown reliability, created genuine issues of material fact regarding causation.

The court also noted an "air of reality" to the contention that the deceased plaintiff's distracted driving might have contributed to the collision, despite a prior Highway Traffic Act conviction against one of the defendants.

Consequently, the motions for summary judgment were dismissed, as a full trial with oral testimony and cross-examination was deemed necessary to resolve the complex factual disputes and competing expert opinions.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their limitations defence in an action brought by the respondent for improper use of confidential and proprietary information disclosed in 2002.

The respondent filed its action on September 9, 2011.

The motion judge found that the respondent's obligation to exercise due diligence was not triggered prior to April 2009, and that exposure to the appellants' affairs through a consultant's work was insufficient to constitute actual notice or trigger a duty to investigate.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding errors of fact or law, and affirmed that the respondent could not have discovered its claim until September 11, 2009, when exercising reasonable diligence.

The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' statement of claim, or in the alternative, for leave to file a statement of defence, arguing that the action was barred by section 9 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act (CLPA) and section 111(2) of the Pension Act.

The plaintiffs, including a former RCMP Staff Sergeant, sought damages for intentional torts, breach of contract, and Charter violations arising from alleged harassment and assault during her service, for which she had already received a disability pension for PTSD.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding that it was not plain and obvious that the claims were entirely barred, particularly for damages not covered by the pension, claims for events after the initial injury, and Charter claims.

The court also found that section 111(2) of the Pension Act did not require a further stay as the plaintiff was not seeking to review or re-assess her pension.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim based on the expiration of the limitation period.

The plaintiff alleged misappropriation of software and breach of non-disclosure agreements and fiduciary duties.

The court applied the discoverability principle under the Limitations Act, 2002, finding that the plaintiff did not discover its claim until September 11, 2009, when it confirmed the defendants authored the disputed software.

Consequently, the action, commenced on September 9, 2011, was within the two-year limitation period.

The court dismissed the limitation defense, granting partial summary judgment to the plaintiff.

Secondary issues regarding discovery were adjourned or left to the trial judge.

The defendants moved to stay a civil action brought by an RCMP member alleging assault, sexual assault, harassment, and related torts arising during her service on the RCMP Musical Ride.

The moving party argued that under s. 111 of the Pension Act and s. 9 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, the action must be stayed until the plaintiff applied for and exhausted the statutory pension process for disability benefits arising from the same injuries.

The plaintiff argued the statutory scheme should not apply to intentional misconduct such as assaults and sexual assaults.

The court held that the statutory language broadly captures injuries or diseases arising out of service and reflects Parliament’s intent to prevent double recovery.

Accordingly, the action was stayed pending a final determination of the plaintiff’s entitlement to a pension by the Veterans Review and Appeal Board.