Peter James Elkins Cronyn

Following a partially successful appeal, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The appellant was awarded $25,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes for the costs of the appeal.

The costs of the trial were reserved to the trial judge hearing the new trial.

The appellant was injured when the respondent lost control of his vehicle on an icy road, crossed the centre line, and struck the appellant's stopped vehicle.

At trial, the respondent did not testify, and the jury found no negligence on his part, dismissing the action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on liability, holding that crossing the centre line in breach of the Highway Traffic Act establishes a prima facie case of negligence.

Absent any explanation from the respondent to negate this evidence, the jury's verdict was unreasonable.

The defendants brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to attend a further independent psychiatric examination.

The plaintiff had previously attended an examination, but due to an administrative error, was examined by the wrong doctor (the intended doctor's brother).

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that a further examination was unnecessary and would cause him prejudice due to a real risk of harm, as he had a history of suicidal ideation and hospitalizations following previous assessments.

The court found that the further examination was necessary and fair, as the defendants had a right to an expert opinion from a specialist of their choice.

The court ordered the examination to proceed in Ottawa, with the condition that the plaintiff's treating psychiatrist be available immediately afterward to mitigate any risk of harm.

The defendant municipality brought a motion to bifurcate the trial into separate hearings for liability and damages in a catastrophic personal injury motor vehicle accident case.

The plaintiffs opposed the motion.

The court granted the motion, finding that the liability issues were distinct from the complex damages issues, and that a separate liability trial would likely save significant time and costs, especially since a damages trial would be unnecessary if the municipality was found not liable.

The court also granted the municipality leave to bring the motion after the action had been set down for trial.

The plaintiff was rendered an incomplete quadriplegic following a third motor vehicle accident.

Her insurer, ING, terminated her statutory accident benefits, arguing her condition was caused by prior accidents and a pre-existing spinal disease.

The trial judge found the third accident materially contributed to her impairment, granted declarations for ongoing benefits, and awarded aggravated damages and a risk premium.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the declarations, the application of the material contribution test to accident benefits, and the aggravated damages award.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part to set aside the risk premium, as it is not permitted under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs claimed damages for historical sexual assaults against multiple defendants.

The plaintiffs entered into Pierringer settlement agreements with all defendants except three, and the action against the settling defendants was dismissed.

The remaining active defendant, Dr. Kerr, moved to set aside the dismissal order, arguing the trial judge might lack jurisdiction to apportion fault to the settling defendants under s. 1 of the Negligence Act.

The motions judge held the court lacked jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Superior Court has jurisdiction to determine the degree of fault of the settling defendants, even though they will not be parties at trial, as this avoids prejudice to the non-settling defendants and promotes the public interest in settlement.