Joseph Youssef Obagi

The plaintiff, an insured person, brought an action against a medical assessment firm and its assessors, alleging they fraudulently or negligently altered medical reports to minimize her statutory accident benefits.

The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim, arguing the Licence Appeal Tribunal had exclusive jurisdiction, the pleadings disclosed no reasonable cause of action, and the action was an abuse of process.

The court held it had jurisdiction over tort claims against non-insurer third parties.

The court struck the direct claims for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation due to lack of proximity, but allowed the claims for the tort of unlawful means, inducing breach of contract, and negligence to proceed, finding that the application of expert witness immunity should be determined at trial.

Following a partial judgment enforcing a settlement agreement, the court determined the outstanding issues of interest and costs.

The court awarded interest on the settlement funds from the date of acceptance to the date of payment, applying a 19.9% rate (reflecting the plaintiffs' litigation loan) on $200,000 and the Courts of Justice Act rate of 3% on the balance.

The court also fixed the plaintiffs' substantial indemnity costs for the period between the offer and acceptance, reducing the claimed fees slightly, and awarded partial indemnity costs of $11,000 for the hearing.

A personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident in which the defendant crossed the centre line and collided with the plaintiff's dump truck, causing life-altering injuries.

The tort claim against the estate was settled on December 22, 2025 when the defendant accepted the plaintiffs' offer dated June 21, 2021 (with certain paragraphs waived).

The settlement required payment of $1 million plus itemized costs of $195,100, with additional substantial indemnity costs from June 21, 2020 to the date of acceptance to be quantified by agreement or fixed by a judge.

The court confirmed the terms of the accepted offer and found no justification for continued withholding of the settlement funds.

The court reserved on the quantum of post-offer substantial indemnity costs, the availability and rate of interest from the date of settlement until payment, and costs of the hearing.

The appellant was injured in a workplace accident and received WSIB benefits while retraining at an architectural firm.

He was subsequently injured in a motor vehicle accident, rendering him a paraplegic and unable to continue his retraining, which reduced his WSIB benefits.

He applied for income replacement benefits under the SABS, but his insurer denied the claim on the basis that he was not 'employed' at the time of the accident.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Licence Appeal Tribunal erred in its interpretation of 'employed' by requiring an exchange of wages for services, and held that the appellant's employment relationship and receipt of employment-related income satisfied the statutory requirement.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict dismissing her negligence action against the respondent homeowners after she slipped and fell on their staircase.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in excluding the first set of expert slip resistance testing, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's gatekeeping decision under the White Burgess framework, as the excluded testing differed materially from the actual conditions.

Even if the exclusion were erroneous, no miscarriage of justice resulted because the tampering theory was still advanced at trial through other evidence and the jury's verdict turned on the credibility of the parties.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident, claiming catastrophic impairment under Criterion 7.

The respondent denied the benefits.

The Tribunal found the applicant was not catastrophically impaired, as her Whole Person Impairment rating was 48%, falling short of the 55% threshold.

The Tribunal rejected the WPI ratings for incontinence and headaches provided by the respondent's own expert, finding the incontinence was pre-existing and did not worsen post-accident.

Claims for psychological services, case management, interest, and a section 10 award were also dismissed.

The appellant, a housing corporation, appealed a motion judge's decision striking its claims against a manufacturer and seller of a defective toilet flushing system.

The appellant sought damages for excess water costs resulting from system failure.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, holding that: (1) the manufacturer could not be sued under the Sale of Goods Act as it was not a seller in privity with the purchaser; and (2) the claim in negligence was for pure economic loss, which is not recoverable in tort absent exceptional circumstances not present here.

The court confirmed that such disputes are customarily dealt with by contract, not tort.

The decision addresses three mid-trial motions in a solicitor’s negligence action.

The plaintiffs sought leave to admit late-served expert reports and to call Ms. Tara Sweeney as a participant expert.

The defendant sought to limit the plaintiffs’ claim to damages arising from an alleged improvident settlement and objected to the plaintiffs calling multiple experts on the same issue.

The court held that the plaintiffs are precluded from advancing any theory of liability beyond the improvident settlement claim, denied leave to rely on the late-served expert reports, found Ms. Sweeney is not a participant or non-party expert, and permitted the plaintiffs to call both Mr. Will and Ms. Maitland-Carter as experts on Mr. Cardill’s standard of care, but not both Mr. Will and Ms. Sweeney on Mr. Good’s standard of care.

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a decision finding he was not 'employed' prior to the accident and therefore not entitled to income replacement benefits.

The applicant argued the adjudicator erred by considering the quantum of WSIB payments, his decision to extend a work placement, and the interpretation of a WSIB letter.

The Tribunal found no error of law or fact in the original decision, noting that the evidence was relevant to determining whether the applicant received remuneration in exchange for services provided to an employer.

The request for reconsideration was dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought a mid-trial motion seeking to prevent the defendant, John Cardill, from relitigating whether their former solicitor, Donald Good, breached the standard of care in settling their personal injury actions.

The plaintiffs argued that this issue had already been determined in a prior costs assessment by Justice Hackland.

The court reviewed the doctrine of abuse of process and concluded that it did not apply in this case, as Mr. Cardill was not a party to the prior proceeding and it would be unfair to bar him from making a full defence.

The motion was dismissed.

This decision addresses whether Anne Meehan, a plaintiff in the action, is competent to testify at trial.

The court held a voir dire to determine her testimonial competence, considering her ability to understand the nature of an oath or solemn affirmation and her capacity to communicate evidence.

Despite inconsistencies and some cognitive limitations, the court found that Ms. Meehan demonstrated the necessary capacities to perceive, recollect, and communicate, and ruled that she may testify on a promise to tell the truth.

This ruling addresses whether Anne Meehan, a plaintiff, is competent to testify at trial.

The court reviews medical assessments of Ms. Meehan’s capacity, the statutory requirements under the Ontario Evidence Act, and the parties’ arguments regarding the necessity and form of a competency examination.

The court concludes that a voir dire is required to determine Ms. Meehan’s competency, as mandated by section 18(2) of the Evidence Act, and clarifies that such an examination need not occur in a formal courtroom setting.

The applicant sought a determination of catastrophic impairment following a motor vehicle accident.

After the applicant relocated to British Columbia, the respondent insurer scheduled insurer's examinations in Toronto and offered to pay for flights and accommodations, but refused to inquire with other vendors about conducting the assessments in British Columbia.

The respondent subsequently denied the claim due to the applicant's non-attendance.

The Tribunal held that the respondent failed to make reasonable efforts to schedule the examinations at a convenient location as required by section 44(9)(2)(i) of the Schedule, because it only asked one vendor.

Consequently, the applicant was not barred from proceeding with his application.

The applicant requested reconsideration of a preliminary issue decision that barred him from proceeding with his claim for failing to attend insurer's examinations.

The Tribunal found that the preliminary decision finally disposed of the appeal, making it eligible for reconsideration.

The Tribunal granted the reconsideration, finding it had erred in law by reversing the statutory onus under s. 44(9)2(i) of the Schedule, incorrectly requiring the applicant to prove the examination location was inconvenient rather than requiring the insurer to prove it made reasonable efforts to schedule a convenient location.

The preliminary issue was ordered to be reheard by a different adjudicator.

The plaintiff, Shawn Balla, brought a motion to lift the stay of his action imposed by section 17 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act.

The motion was heard on January 7, 2025.

The court found that Balla met the test for leave under subsection 17(7) of the Act, establishing both good faith and a reasonable possibility of success in his claim of bad faith against certain defendants.

The court granted leave against those defendants who wrote "responsive" on the Health Care Observation Forms, allowing the action to proceed against them, and provided directions for further disclosure and amendment of the statement of claim.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) decision denying certain statutory accident benefits.

The Divisional Court found that the LAT adjudicator denied the appellant procedural fairness by unilaterally separating her hearing from her mother's, drastically reducing the scheduled hearing time without adequate notice, and refusing to allow cross-examination of the respondent's occupational therapist whose report had been materially altered by an assessment company.

The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted for a new hearing before a different adjudicator.

The applicant sought income replacement benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

At the time of the accident, the applicant was participating in a Work Transition Plan through the WSIB and working at an architecture firm, but his WSIB payments were not contingent on providing services to the firm.

The Tribunal found that the applicant was not 'employed' under section 5(1)(1) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule because he did not receive remuneration in exchange for the services he provided.

Consequently, the applicant was not entitled to income replacement benefits.

The defendants, two insurance companies, brought a motion under Rule 6.01 to have two bad faith actions heard together or one immediately after the other without a jury.

The plaintiffs opposed the motion, citing significant delay and distinct legal issues.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the defendants' delay in bringing the motion was unacceptable and prejudicial to the plaintiffs, particularly given that one action was already scheduled for trial.

The court also noted that the issues, while related, were sufficiently discrete to proceed separately, and a decision in the more advanced action might resolve or narrow the other.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal a decision of MacLeod RSJ dated May 17, 2024.

The Divisional Court denied the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following its August 15, 2024 decision.

The parties resolved the costs of the appeal and underlying prejudgment interest motions by consent.

The respondent agreed to pay the appellants an all-inclusive amount of $60,000 for appeal and motion costs.