Paul William Muirhead

Following a trial where the plaintiff was awarded over $1.8 million in damages for environmental contamination against one defendant but was unsuccessful against another, the court determined the costs payable by the unsuccessful defendant.

The court rejected the plaintiff's request for substantial indemnity costs, finding the defendant's conduct was not egregious.

The court applied a partial indemnity scale, reducing the fees by 10% to account for the successful co-defendant's involvement, and by a further 15% to reflect divided success on the issues and limited financial success compared to the amount claimed.

Total costs of $214,890.44 were awarded to the plaintiff.

This addendum to reasons for decision addresses a request by the defendant, Fraser Hillary’s Limited, to present supplementary submissions concerning compensation under s. 99 of the Environmental Protection Act, citing the Court of Appeal decision in McCann v. Environmental Compensation Corp. The court declined the request, affirming the principle of finality and finding that the issue did not warrant reconsideration.

The court also clarified its prior finding that applying s. 99(2) was not retroactive and questioned the applicability of McCann to the present case.

The plaintiff property owner sued the adjacent dry cleaning business and its principal for environmental contamination caused by the migration of dry cleaning solvents (PCE/TCE) onto his lands.

The court dismissed claims in trespass, strict liability, and negligence, but found the corporate defendant liable in private nuisance and under section 99 of the Environmental Protection Act.

The individual defendant was not found liable as he did not own or control the pollutant at the time of the spills and his subsequent inaction did not cause the plaintiff's damages.

The court awarded the plaintiff $1,632,500 for remediation costs and $201,726.71 for engineering expenses.

Following a trial on liability for a motor vehicle accident where the deceased driver was found 80% responsible and the City of Ottawa and its bus driver 20% responsible, the court determined the costs payable to the successful plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs sought over $811,000 in costs and disbursements.

The court reviewed the factors under Rule 57.01, including proportionality, the complexity of the case, and the results achieved.

The court reduced the plaintiffs' claimed costs due to excessive hourly rates for students/paralegals, duplication of effort, and excessive time spent on certain stages.

The court awarded the plaintiffs $527,065.25 in fees and $143,531.25 in disbursements.

Additionally, the court granted a Sanderson Order requiring the unsuccessful defendants to pay the costs of the successful defendant insurer directly.

The plaintiffs were injured when the SUV they were passengers in ran a red light and was struck by an OC Transpo bus.

The driver of the SUV was killed and admitted to be primarily at fault.

The plaintiffs sued the bus driver and the City of Ottawa, alleging the bus driver was also negligent.

The court found that the bus driver, despite having the right of way, owed a duty of care to avoid the collision.

The court held that the bus driver breached the standard of care of a professional driver by speeding, failing to adjust his driving for the snowy and slushy road conditions, and momentary inattention.

Relying on expert accident reconstruction evidence, the court concluded that but for the bus driver's negligence, the accident could have been avoided.

Liability was apportioned 80% to the SUV driver and 20% to the bus driver.

The plaintiff sued the defendants for environmental contamination of his properties caused by dry cleaning chemicals originating from the adjacent property owned by the corporate defendant.

The individual defendant, who owned another adjacent residential property, moved for summary judgment dismissing the claims against him in negligence, nuisance, trespass, and statutory liability.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that genuine issues for trial existed because determining the individual defendant's liability required a comprehensive understanding of complex and evolving expert opinions regarding the source and migration of the contaminants, which necessitated oral testimony and cross-examination at trial.

The respondent farmer was injured when his uninsured all-terrain vehicle (ATV) was struck from behind by a truck on a public road.

He sued the truck driver, the truck owner, and his own insurer for damages and statutory accident benefits.

The motion judge found the ATV was a 'self-propelled implement of husbandry' exempt from compulsory insurance.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the ATV was an off-road vehicle that required insurance when operated on a public road.

Consequently, the respondent's action was statute-barred and his claim for statutory accident benefits was foreclosed.

The defendants brought a motion under rule 21.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking determination of questions of law before trial.

They argued that the plaintiff farmer’s action for damages arising from a motor vehicle collision was barred under s. 267.6(1) of the Insurance Act because he operated an uninsured all‑terrain vehicle (ATV) on a public road, and that his claim for statutory accident benefits was barred by s. 30(1)(a) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The court held that the ATV, used exclusively in farming operations, qualified as a “self‑propelled implement of husbandry” under the Highway Traffic Act.

As such, it was excluded from the definition of motor vehicle and from Ontario’s compulsory automobile insurance regime.

The plaintiff was therefore not barred from suing the negligent driver and his claim for statutory accident benefits was not foreclosed.

The defendants appealed a decision dismissing their motion to strike the plaintiff's action.

The plaintiff sued the Children's Aid Society alleging 'grooming', 'identity theft', and 'brainwashing' related to earlier child protection proceedings.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the action, finding it was an abuse of process and a collateral attack on previous judicial findings that had repeatedly rejected these allegations.

The court also found the motion judge erred in failing to apply the Anns/Cooper test for a novel tort.

The appellant appealed from orders of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the merits of the claims asserted had been finally adjudicated in previous proceedings.

Costs were awarded to the respondents in the amount of $5,000.

The appellant appealed an order denying him costs and expenses incurred in realizing on a mortgage security.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's finding that there had been no default by the mortgagors and no waste committed, meaning the costs were not recoverable.

The court also dismissed the appellant's claims of procedural errors and bias, and upheld the denial of a certificate of pending litigation.

The respondents' cross-appeal was allowed, deleting a $5,000 payment previously awarded to the appellant for expenses, as there was no default to justify it.

Following a decision on the merits where the applicant was partially successful in claiming weight training and psychological assessment expenses, the parties could not agree on the costs of the arbitration.

The arbitrator applied the criteria in section 12(2) of the Expense Regulation and found that because success was divided and no party engaged in conduct that prolonged the proceeding, each party should bear its own expenses.

The insurer's request to recover its $3,000 assessment cost was also denied as it is not a recoverable expense under the regulation.

The applicant, who was injured as a pedestrian in a motor vehicle accident, sought statutory accident benefits for continued chiropractic, massage, and weight training, as well as the cost of a psychological assessment.

The insurer had terminated benefits based on a DAC assessment.

The arbitrator found that continued chiropractic and massage therapy were no longer reasonable and necessary, as they were not good long-term solutions and the applicant needed to focus on physical conditioning.

However, supervised weight training was deemed reasonable and necessary.

The arbitrator also ordered the insurer to pay $857 for a psychological assessment, finding it necessary given the applicant's cognitive and behavioural issues.

Claims for interest were granted, but the claim for a special award was dismissed.

The moving parties brought a motion to review and vary an order dismissing their appeal for delay.

The underlying actions had been dismissed as an abuse of process and the moving parties were declared vexatious litigants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the moving parties failed to provide a persuasive explanation for their delay in perfecting the appeal and failed to demonstrate any merit to the appeal.

The appellant appealed from a trial decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for the reasons of the trial judge.

The respondent was awarded its costs of the appeal.

The endorsement contains no further substantive analysis.

Following a decision on statutory accident benefits, the parties disputed the applicant's entitlement to arbitration expenses and the calculation of interest on a special award.

The arbitrator awarded the applicant her expenses of $19,048.46, finding that she achieved partial success and raised significant issues.

The arbitrator also clarified that the $5,000 special award previously ordered was inclusive of interest under subsection 282(10) of the Insurance Act.

The issue of ongoing loss of earning capacity benefits was deferred to a further pre-hearing.