Julie Paquette

The applicant, a minority shareholder in a family-owned lumber company, brought an application for an oppression remedy under s. 248 of the Business Corporations Act, seeking an order to force the respondents to buy out her shares or liquidate the company.

She alleged that the company's refusal to pay dividends despite being profitable, and its refusal to buy her shares, constituted oppressive conduct.

The respondents argued the claim was statute-barred and that the retention of capital was necessary due to the cyclical nature of the softwood lumber industry and the expiration of the Canada-US softwood lumber agreement.

The court found that while the claim regarding recent non-payment of dividends was not statute-barred, the applicant did not have a reasonable expectation of receiving dividends given the industry's challenges.

The court concluded that the company's conservative management style and decision to retain a high working capital were valid business decisions and did not constitute oppression.

The application was dismissed.

The defendants brought motions for leave to appeal an interlocutory decision that dismissed their Rule 21 motions to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim.

The plaintiffs, including a former RCMP member, claimed damages for harassment, assault, and sexual assault.

The defendants argued the claims were barred by section 9 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act because the plaintiff received a pension for PTSD.

The court refused leave to appeal, finding no conflicting case law on the principles for striking pleadings and no good reason to doubt the motion judge's conclusion that it was not plain and obvious the entire claim was barred.

The defendant's motion for leave to appeal an order granting the plaintiffs leave to amend their statement of claim and requiring the defendant to answer discovery refusals was dismissed.

The plaintiffs sought costs of $7,672.26 on a partial indemnity basis for the written motion.

The court found the plaintiffs' docketed hours excessive and noted the reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party.

Costs were fixed at $3,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The defendant, W.O. Stinson & Son Limited, sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that granted the plaintiffs leave to amend their Statement of Claim and required the defendant to answer questions refused at discovery.

The underlying action involved an oil leak from a tank installed by the defendant.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision regarding the amendment of pleadings or the discovery refusals.

Furthermore, the court held that the proposed appeal did not raise matters of general importance, as the issues were specific to the facts and pleadings of the case.

The plaintiff, having been wholly successful at trial and awarded damages including punitive damages, sought costs.

The plaintiff had served two Rule 49 offers to settle, both of which were beaten at trial.

The court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs up to the date of the first offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter, noting that the 2005 Costs Subcommittee guidelines for counsel fees are outdated.

Total costs of $140,360.11 were awarded.

The defendant sought costs after successfully setting aside an ex parte interim interlocutory Mareva injunction obtained by the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs argued that costs should be determined after trial or awarded in the cause.

Applying the factors under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court considered success, the complexity of Mareva injunction proceedings, and the plaintiffs’ decision to proceed without notice despite the absence of urgency.

While the defendant sought substantial indemnity costs, the court held that the plaintiffs’ motion was not entirely groundless and awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis.

Costs of $17,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST were ordered payable in any event of the cause to preserve the plaintiffs’ access to justice.

The plaintiffs sought to continue an interim ex parte Mareva injunction freezing the defendant father’s assets in a civil action alleging long‑term physical and emotional abuse and seeking $7.65 million in damages.

The defendant moved to set aside the injunction, denying the allegations and disputing claims that he intended to dissipate assets.

The court applied the test for Mareva injunctions requiring a strong prima facie case, assets within the jurisdiction, and a real risk of asset dissipation.

The evidence supporting the abuse allegations consisted largely of contradictory affidavits and lacked independent corroboration, raising credibility issues that could only be resolved at trial.

The court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish a strong prima facie case and therefore set aside the interim Mareva injunction.

The defendant brought a motion seeking security for costs under Rule 56.01(1)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure in an action arising from a construction subcontract dispute.

The plaintiff corporation claimed damages for breach of contract after allegedly being terminated and not paid for work performed, while the defendant alleged defective work and asserted significant back-charges and set-off.

The court held that although the plaintiff asserted impecuniosity, the evidentiary record did not establish true impecuniosity because it failed to address potential financial resources of its principal and other potential beneficiaries of the litigation.

The court also found that the merits of the claim appeared difficult and that the interests of justice favoured protecting the defendant from unrecoverable costs.

Security for costs was therefore ordered in staged payments totaling $33,000.

Following earlier interlocutory proceedings involving an injunction and Anton Piller order in a dispute concerning confidential engineering information and alleged misuse of intellectual property, the court determined the appropriate costs awards.

The responding party sought costs for obtaining the ex parte injunction and Anton Piller order and for successfully resisting a motion to set them aside.

Applying the factors in Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including success, complexity, proportionality, and reasonable expectations of the losing party, the court found the hourly rates and claimed time generally reasonable.

Although the moving parties achieved limited success in varying certain terms of the Anton Piller order, the injunction and order were maintained.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the responding party for the initial ex parte motion and the motion to set aside, with costs of a later motion left in the cause.

Former employees and a competing corporation moved to set aside or vary an interim injunction and Anton Piller order obtained ex parte by their former employer.

The employer alleged the employees copied large volumes of confidential engineering files relating to proprietary sonar technology before leaving to establish a competing business.

The court found strong prima facie evidence of copying confidential files in breach of confidentiality agreements, a risk of serious commercial harm, and a real possibility that electronic evidence could be destroyed.

The balance of convenience favoured maintaining the injunction and preservation measures.

The injunction remained in effect and the Anton Piller order was varied largely on consent while preserving seized materials under the supervision of an independent supervising solicitor.

Following a property dispute involving Hydro lines located on neighbouring land, the parties resolved the substantive issue by consent requiring removal of the lines.

The remaining issue concerned the quantum and scale of costs payable to the successful applicants.

The court considered the factors in Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including success, proportionality, settlement offers, hourly rates, and the reasonable expectations of the losing party.

Although the applicants were successful, the court held that substantial indemnity costs were not justified because the conduct was not reprehensible and no Rule 49 offer applied.

Costs were fixed at a reduced amount reflecting partial indemnity principles and proportionality.