Jeffrey R. Robles

The Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) appealed an Associate Justice's decision regarding refusals motions during discovery in two related actions.

The TTC alleged conspiracy, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment against Ronald Howard Spaeth, Specbilt Enterprises Inc., and Michael Hickey, claiming they manipulated procurement processes and overcharged for parts.

Mr. Hickey also sued TTC for wrongful dismissal.

The appeal concerned the production of financial records, bank records, and documents related to the relationship between Mr. Spaeth and Prostuff Group.

The court allowed the appeal in part, finding the Associate Justice erred in principle by overly limiting the scope of relevant documents for production, particularly regarding financial records and supplier transactions, and the relationship between Mr. Spaeth and Prostuff Group, but upheld the refusal for general payroll records.

The plaintiff, having been wholly successful at trial and awarded damages including punitive damages, sought costs.

The plaintiff had served two Rule 49 offers to settle, both of which were beaten at trial.

The court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs up to the date of the first offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter, noting that the 2005 Costs Subcommittee guidelines for counsel fees are outdated.

Total costs of $140,360.11 were awarded.

The Applicant appealed a decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles suspending her driver's licence for medical reasons following an episode of loss of consciousness and a possible seizure.

The Applicant had a history of brain surgery for an arteriovenous malformation in 1984 but had been seizure-free for over 20 years.

The episode occurred after severe sleep deprivation and exposure to poor air quality.

Medical experts concluded that the risk of recurrence was very low and that anticonvulsant medication was unnecessary.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found that the Applicant did not suffer from a condition likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive safely and set aside the Registrar's decision.

The applicant requested reconsideration of a Tribunal decision that dismissed her human rights application as an abuse of process because she had signed a full and final release.

The applicant argued she was denied the opportunity to present oral evidence regarding the circumstances of the release at the preliminary hearing.

The Tribunal dismissed the reconsideration request, finding that the applicant had the opportunity to present evidence but failed to do so, and that this failure did not constitute new facts or a denial of procedural fairness.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and reprisal in her employment.

The respondents requested early dismissal on the basis that the applicant had previously signed Minutes of Settlement containing a full and final release.

The applicant argued the release was void because she lacked the mental capacity to understand it.

The Tribunal found the medical evidence did not establish a lack of capacity and held that allowing the application to proceed in light of the clear release language would be an abuse of process.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant father appealed an order requiring him to pay child support arrears, retroactive child support, ongoing child support based on imputed income, and costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's refusal to rescind arrears, the retroactive support award, and the imputation of income, noting the father's failure to provide adequate income information and his disreputable conduct.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to reduce the post-judgment interest rate on the arrears from 10% to the average rate since 1995, given the dramatic decline in interest rates and the passage of time.

A motion to adduce fresh evidence was dismissed.

The plaintiffs sought a certificate of pending litigation and an interlocutory injunction concerning property purchased by their daughter after funds had earlier been loaned to assist in purchasing a different property.

The defendant brought a cross‑motion for summary judgment, arguing the claim for repayment of the loan was barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held the alleged acknowledgment of debt contained in family litigation financial disclosure did not revive the limitation period because it was made after expiry and was not directed to the creditors.

Claims framed in unjust enrichment and constructive trust could not circumvent the limitation period, and the plaintiffs had no equitable mortgage or proprietary interest in the property.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the action and the plaintiffs’ motions for a certificate of pending litigation and injunctive relief were dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that found them liable for trespass, issued a mandatory order, awarded damages including punitive damages, refused to order partition, and awarded substantial indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's strong findings of fact or assessment of damages.

The court upheld the punitive damages due to the egregious nature of the trespass and affirmed the costs award.