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The court dismissed a mortgagor's motion to stay a power of sale, finding a CRA lien does not take priority or constitute a court order for contempt purposes.
The plaintiff, Drew Reid, brought a motion seeking to quash the enforcement of Ganaraska Credit Union Ltd.'s mortgage, an accounting and return of personal possessions, and a finding of contempt against the defendants for allegedly defying a Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) lien.
The court dismissed the motion, finding that the mortgage sale was not a "fire sale" and was for fair value, the CRA lien did not claim priority over the mortgages, and the plaintiff's attempts to stay enforcement lacked merit, especially as the property had already been sold.
The court also clarified that a CRA lien is not a court order for the purposes of a contempt finding.
Parties ordered to bear their own costs following divided success on summary judgment motions.
Following summary judgment motions where success was divided, the court determined the issue of costs.
The plaintiff recovered $6,132.96 in the main action, while the defendant recovered $51,801.05 in the counterclaim, with the amounts set off against each other.
Both parties sought partial indemnity costs, with the plaintiff claiming $106,063.41 and the defendant claiming $76,730.39.
Given the divided success and the amounts recovered falling within the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court and Simplified Procedure, the court ordered that both parties bear their own costs.
The court established a timetable for written costs submissions after the parties failed to agree.
This endorsement sets out a timetable for the delivery of costs submissions and bills of costs for both the main action and counterclaim.
Following a previous decision dated May 2, 2017, the parties were unable to agree on costs, prompting the court to establish a schedule for their submissions.
Landlord fundamentally breached a reinstated commercial lease, entitling the tenant to damages for wrongful eviction.
The plaintiff landlord and defendant tenant both brought summary judgment motions concerning a commercial lease dispute.
The landlord re-entered the premises for non-payment of rent and non-performance of covenants.
The court found the re-entry for non-payment of rent valid, but the re-entry for non-performance of covenants invalid due to non-compliance with the Commercial Tenancies Act.
The court further found that the parties subsequently entered into an agreement to reinstate the lease, which the landlord then fundamentally breached by refusing access and imposing new conditions.
Damages were awarded to both parties, with the tenant receiving a significantly larger award for wrongful termination of the reinstated lease and rushed moving costs, while the landlord received re-entry costs incurred prior to its fundamental breach.
Costs awarded following mixed success on family law delay and disclosure motions.
Following several family law motions addressing delay, disclosure, and spousal support, the court determined costs between the parties.
One respondent’s motion to dismiss for delay and reduce spousal support was dismissed, while added respondents successfully obtained dismissal of the applicant’s claims against them for delay.
Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court held that costs generally follow the event and awarded partial indemnity costs accordingly.
The applicant was awarded partial indemnity costs against one respondent for his unsuccessful motion, while the added respondents were awarded their costs for both the dismissal motion and a prior 14B motion.
The court reduced the amount sought for the 14B motion for proportionality.
Trust claims against extended family dismissed for inordinate delay.
Multiple respondents brought motions to dismiss a family law application for delay.
The applicant had commenced claims including trust claims against extended family members and a family business but failed to advance the matter for nearly five years following procedural directions requiring particulars and disclosure.
The court held that the delay was inordinate and unexplained and that prejudice to the added respondents was presumed and not rebutted, particularly where particulars had never been provided and documentary evidence had been lost.
The claims against the added respondents were therefore dismissed for delay.
However, the court declined to dismiss the claims against the spouse because family law proceedings between spouses involve ongoing issues such as support and property equalization and both parties contributed to the delay.
Summary judgment granted where loan claim barred by Limitations Act.
The plaintiffs sought a certificate of pending litigation and an interlocutory injunction concerning property purchased by their daughter after funds had earlier been loaned to assist in purchasing a different property.
The defendant brought a cross‑motion for summary judgment, arguing the claim for repayment of the loan was barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.
The court held the alleged acknowledgment of debt contained in family litigation financial disclosure did not revive the limitation period because it was made after expiry and was not directed to the creditors.
Claims framed in unjust enrichment and constructive trust could not circumvent the limitation period, and the plaintiffs had no equitable mortgage or proprietary interest in the property.
Summary judgment was granted dismissing the action and the plaintiffs’ motions for a certificate of pending litigation and injunctive relief were dismissed.
Dealership's registration of vehicle in buyer's name precluded it from denying seller's authority to sell.
The appellant appealed the dismissal of its application for a declaration that it owned a Porsche purchased from a third party who fraudulently claimed to have bought it from the respondent dealership.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the dealership's act of registering the vehicle in the appellant's name provided prima facie evidence of the third party's authority to sell.
The appellant was declared the true owner, and a cross-appeal was allowed on consent, ordering the dealership to pay a specified sum to a credit company.