Bruce A. Glass

The defendants sought leave to appeal a costs order made by Corkery J. following a settlement.

The underlying issue concerned whether costs and disbursements ran to the date of service of the settlement offer or the date of acceptance, impacting costs accumulated over a two-month period.

The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the defendants did not meet the grounds under Rule 62.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as there were no conflicting decisions on principles of costs interpretation and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the original order.

The applicant, Brynn Alexandra Campbell, brought a Garofoli application to exclude her statements and blood/alcohol concentration analysis from trial, alleging Charter infringements under sections 7, 8, 10(a), 10(b), and seeking remedy under section 24(2).

The court found that Campbell's statements were compelled under the Highway Traffic Act and thus excluded under section 7 of the Charter.

The blood evidence was deemed illegally obtained by nurses acting as state agents, violating sections 7 and 8 of the Charter, particularly given Campbell's phobia of needles and refusal of consent.

Applying the R. v. Grant analysis, the court concluded that the Charter infringements were serious, and the evidence should be excluded under section 24(2), as its admission would undermine public confidence in the justice system.

The search warrant, based on this excised information, lacked reasonable and probable grounds.

The defendant, G.S., was charged with sexual assault, sexual interference (touching for a sexual purpose a person under 16), and exposing genital organs to a person under 16.

The complainant, JH, a 7-year-old, provided conflicting accounts of the alleged events to her mother, police, and in court.

The court found that the mother's emotional reaction and police questioning techniques likely intimidated the child, making her testimony unreliable.

The defendant and his wife denied all allegations, and their testimony was believed.

Applying principles from R. v. W.(D.), the court found that the Crown had not proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and all counts were dismissed.

The applicant sought an order to cross-examine the affiant and sub-affiants for search warrants, alleging improper police procedures in obtaining private health information without consent or a court order.

The applicant argued that the affiant failed to disclose crucial information to the issuing Justice of the Peace, which, if known, would have prevented the issuance of the warrants.

The Crown contended that the information was lawfully obtained and fully disclosed.

The court found a sufficient foundation to permit cross-examination of the affiant and sub-affiants to determine if there was a shortfall of disclosure to the Justice of the Peace, which could lead to the exclusion of evidence.

The defendants Mosstek Landscaping Inc. and Casey John Moss brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's personal injury claim, arguing that the limitation period had expired before they were added to the action.

The plaintiff contended that the discoverability rule applied, as she was unaware of their involvement in snow and ice removal until after the initial limitation period.

The court found that there was a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding whether the plaintiff exercised due diligence in discovering the landscaping defendants' identity.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The Crown applied for a bail review of a Justice of the Peace's decision to release the defendant, Christopher John Clymer.

The defendant faced serious charges including two counts of aggravated assault and had a criminal record with violent offences.

The Superior Court found that the Justice of the Peace erred by failing to adequately analyze the secondary grounds and by not considering the tertiary grounds for detention, as required by R. v. St. Cloud.

The court vacated the original bail order and ordered the defendant's detention, finding that both secondary and tertiary grounds for detention were met, particularly given the serious nature of the alleged offences, the defendant's violent criminal history, and the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The defendant sought a stay of prosecution for charges of possession of child pornography, accessing child pornography, and possession of a firearm, alleging a failure by the Crown and police to disclose relevant evidence.

During pre-trial motions, it was revealed that significant information had not been disclosed to the defence, constituting a breach of the defendant's section 7 Charter rights.

The court found no bad faith but acknowledged negligent oversights.

While the Crown conceded a Charter infringement, it argued against a stay of proceedings.

The court dismissed the application for a stay, opting instead to exclude the non-disclosed evidence, allowing the trial to proceed with the remaining evidence.

In a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to admit autopsy, hospital, and clothing photographs of the deceased.

The defence objected, arguing the photographs were excessive, unnecessary, and unduly prejudicial.

The court applied the test of relevance and probative value versus prejudicial effect, finding the photographs highly probative for the jury to understand the nature of the injuries and the defendant's statements, and not unduly prejudicial.

The court ruled to admit all vetted photographs, emphasizing their necessity to assist the pathologist's testimony and provide context beyond diagrams.

The defendant, Salvatore Joseph Badali, was sentenced for living on the avails of prostitution from a person under 18, obtaining sexual services from a female under 18, and procuring a female under 18 into prostitution.

The court had previously found mandatory minimum sentences under sections 212(2) and 212(4) of the Criminal Code unconstitutional.

Considering the victim's impact statement, the defendant's extensive criminal record, and the principles of denunciation and deterrence, the court imposed a global sentence of 3 years in custody, less 60 days for pre-trial custody and restrictive bail conditions, resulting in a net sentence of 34 months.

Specific sentences were 22 months for living on avails (concurrent for procuring) and 12 months consecutive for obtaining sexual services.

A DNA order and a 20-year Sex Offender Information Registration Act order were also issued.

Sharon Baksh pleaded guilty to manslaughter during her second-degree murder trial.

The sentencing hearing considered aggravating factors, including a home invasion, the victim's age (89), and 149 stab wounds, alongside mitigating factors such as her drug/alcohol dependency and troubled childhood.

The court accepted a joint submission for a 12-year custodial sentence, which, after 1.5x credit for pre-sentence custody, resulted in a net sentence of 7 years, 8 months, and 13 days.

Non-communication, DNA, and lifetime weapons prohibition orders were also issued.

The plaintiff brought an action for wrongful dismissal after being terminated without notice from a fixed-term employment contract that provided nine months’ pay if ended early.

The employer alleged cause and counterclaimed for conversion and misuse of confidential information, asserting the employee sold a company health and safety manual to another business.

The court found the manual template had been created by the employee prior to employment and remained his property, and that the employer failed to prove misuse of confidential information or breach of directives regarding outside consulting work.

The dismissal for cause was unsupported.

The employee was entitled to contractual damages equal to nine months’ salary.

The accused was sentenced after being convicted of conveying a terrorist hoax, fabricating evidence, public mischief, and obstructing a peace officer.

The offences arose from a fabricated online discovery purporting to reveal jihadist plans targeting the Pickering Nuclear Generating Station, which triggered an extensive multi‑agency national security investigation.

Forensic computer evidence established that the accused had created and embedded nuclear plant plans within an image of the Quran and falsely reported the discovery.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence due to the seriousness of terrorist hoaxes and the significant investigative resources expended.

A global custodial sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment was imposed for the principal counts, with a concurrent 4‑month sentence for obstruction, followed by two years’ probation and a five‑year weapons prohibition.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of physical evidence and statements obtained following a vehicle stop.

Police stopped the accused based on an alleged smell of marihuana and subsequently searched the vehicle, discovering a loaded handgun.

The court found the officer’s evidence regarding the odour of marihuana not credible and concluded that the detention, arrest, and search lacked lawful foundation.

Multiple breaches of sections 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms were established, including failure to provide timely access to counsel and continued questioning after the accused requested a lawyer.

Applying the framework from Grant and related jurisprudence, the court held the breaches were serious and admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The evidence and statements were excluded under s. 24(2).

The accused was charged with fabricating a terrorist hoax involving the Pickering Nuclear Generating Station, fabricating evidence, public mischief, and obstructing a peace officer.

The Crown alleged that the accused created a false computer file embedding nuclear plant emergency plans within an image of the Quran and falsely claimed it was discovered on a jihadist website.

Forensic computer evidence demonstrated that the materials had been fabricated and placed on the accused’s computer rather than downloaded from the internet.

The court rejected the accused’s explanation, finding the evidence proved the hoax was intentionally created to mislead authorities and trigger a terrorism investigation.

The accused was found guilty on all four counts.

Following a trial concerning allegations of negligence by municipal officials relating to the requirement of a building permit for a deck constructed at a multi-unit residential property, the plaintiffs were unsuccessful.

The plaintiffs had originally advanced a claim for malicious prosecution but abandoned it shortly before trial, while continuing to seek aggravated and punitive damages based on allegations of improper and dishonest conduct by municipal officials.

The defendant municipality sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing that the plaintiffs pursued speculative and serious allegations without evidentiary foundation and forced extensive preparation, including for claims later withdrawn.

The court found the plaintiffs advanced excessive and unfounded allegations and had rejected several settlement offers from the defendant.

Substantial indemnity costs were therefore justified, though the court reduced the quantum sought and fixed costs at $70,000 inclusive of HST.

The plaintiffs brought a negligence action against a municipality alleging that building officials negligently provided incorrect advice about whether a building permit was required for construction of a residential deck.

After acting on the advice, the plaintiffs were later ordered to obtain a permit and faced enforcement proceedings under the Ontario Building Code Act.

Although a later Divisional Court decision determined that a permit was ultimately unnecessary, the trial court held that the municipal officials had acted reasonably in responding to a brief verbal inquiry and in subsequently enforcing the Building Code after receiving a complaint.

Applying the Anns/Kamloops framework and authorities including Ingles v. Tukaluk Construction Ltd., the court found the officials met the applicable standard of care in administering the Building Code and municipal policy.

The court also held that the claimed damages, including legal costs from prior proceedings and alleged lost income, were not recoverable in this negligence action.

The claim was dismissed.

The applicant sought a declaration that his insurer had a duty to defend him in a civil action arising from an altercation that resulted in an assault conviction and alleged personal injuries to the plaintiff.

The insurer denied coverage relying on policy exclusions for intentional or criminal acts.

The court applied duty‑to‑defend principles and held that where pleadings include a potentially independent negligence claim, an insurer must defend if there is a possibility that the claim could fall within coverage.

Because the underlying statement of claim pleaded both assault and negligence and it remained possible that liability could be established on a non‑intentional basis, the exclusion provisions could not yet be conclusively applied.

The insurer was therefore required to defend the action, except with respect to punitive or exemplary damages which were expressly excluded.

The defendants applied for leave to cross-examine the affiant and sub-affiant on an application for authorization to intercept private communications, in the context of a Garofoli challenge.

They argued that investigative necessity had not been established and that police prematurely resorted to wiretap authorizations instead of pursuing conventional investigative techniques such as surveillance, informant development, and tracking orders.

The Crown opposed the request, submitting that the authorization materials fully described the investigative steps taken and that cross-examination was unnecessary.

The court held that there was no basis to permit cross-examination, noting there was no suggestion the affiant misled the authorizing judge and that the Garofoli review would proceed based on the existing materials.

The application for cross-examination was dismissed.

Following a jury trial dismissing claims for assault, false arrest, false imprisonment, and negligent police investigation arising from an altercation at a shopping centre, the successful defendants sought costs.

The action had involved a 14‑day trial and earlier motions with costs reserved to the trial judge.

The court considered the seriousness of the allegations, the significant damages claimed, and the time required to defend the action.

Although the police defendants argued for a higher scale of costs due to allegations of bad faith and fraud, the court treated all claims as falling within the partial indemnity scale.

Costs were awarded to both groups of defendants in the amounts requested.

The accused brought an application seeking a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter after approximately 34.5 months in custody awaiting trial on multiple drug and firearm trafficking charges arising from a large multi‑accused investigation.

Applying the framework from R. v. Morin and R. v. Askov, the court examined the allocation of delay between inherent time, defence actions, Crown conduct, and institutional delay.

The court found the prosecution involved complex multi‑accused proceedings, extensive disclosure, a preliminary inquiry including a Dawson application challenging wiretap authorizations, and multiple defence‑initiated adjournments and counsel changes.

Institutional delay was determined to be within acceptable limits and much of the elapsed time was attributable to inherent or defence‑related factors.

The applicant failed to establish significant prejudice beyond the normal hardships of pre‑trial custody.

The application for a stay of proceedings was therefore dismissed.